Tuesday, August 25, 2015
It is not news, even if it is unfortunate and damaging to the common good, that the New York Times takes a consistently extremist position on the issue of abortion. Although it purports regularly to pronounce on the location and content of the "mainstream," the Times is reliably on the fringe both of public opinion and morality when it comes to questions regarding the extent to which unborn children may and should be protected in law.
In this editorial, "Abortion and Down Syndrome," the Times take a position that, notwithstanding the support it might (sadly) enjoy in public opinion, should be deeply chilling and troubling. In criticizing an Ohio proposal that would restrict abortions based on a diagnosis that the unborn child has Down Syndrome, the Times takes the view that the fact "a majority" (actually, much more than that) of such diagnoses result in abortion, the proposal is for that reason objectionable. Actually, it is because such diagnoses (and other diagnoses or predictions of disabilities) so often result in the decision that the disabled unborn child should not be permitted to live that the expressive and pedagogical function of the law is so needed on this matter. The Times piece gives no indication that there is even something to be worried about here; it is completely silent regarding the connection between the attitude that results in extremely high abortion rates for disabled children and the treatment and welfare of those persons with disabilities who were not aborted.