Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, March 19, 2015

Baude's "flouting the rule of law" critics should explain precisely which rule of law his proposal flouts

In the dust-up over Will Baude's op-ed proposal for plaintiff-specific compliance in King v. Burwell, one peculiar feature stands out. Some of Baude's legal critics contend that the Obama Administration's adoption of his proposal would flout the rule of law even while they do not identify any particular rule of law that the Administration would be violating. As far as I have been able to discern to this point, there is none.     

The opening paragraph of Noah Feldman's Bloomberg View commentary contends that "[o]beying the court only with respect to the plaintiffs in this case would be a flagrant violation of the rule of law." But one reads that essay in vain for an identification of which specific rule of law would be violated, flagrantly or not. Feldman's opening sentence asks: "Could the Barack Obama administration really ignore an adverse Supreme Court judgment in the King v. Burwell health-care litigation, as a University of Chicago law professor has proposed?" The problem with this sentence--as we know Feldman knows from elsewhere in his commentary--is that Baude makes no such proposal. Baude's proposal is not to ignore the Supreme Court's judgment, but to obey the Court only with respect to the plaintiffs in the case. 

Relatedly, Josh Blackman's commentary at National Review Online describes Baude's proposal as a "procedural putsch" (though it is probably more precisely pegged only as "precedential parsimony").  Blackman accuses the Obama Administration of making "unprecedented assertions of power" that "have flouted the rule of law," but he ultimately differentiates the question of legal correctness from the rule of law. "Even if legally correct," he writes of plaintiff-specific compliance,"this practice should be emphatically rejected." 

I understand the political and practical difficulties posed by plaintiff-specific compliance in King v. Burwell. And I understand why some others of Baude's critics disagree with his proposal even while acknowledging that he is right about its legal permissibility. But the "rule of law" criticisms are of a different sort, and they remain puzzling insofar as they are untethered from what one might call "the law of law." 

In the United States, there are three ways that a court's judgment can have binding legal effect: the law of preclusion, the law of precedent, and the law of remedies.

Of these three types of "law of law," both the law of preclusion and the law of precedent operate primarily in other, later cases. If the government were to lose in King v. Burwell, a non-party to that case could almost certainly use non-mutual offensive issue preclusion to win another challenge to the subsidies in a later case. [UPDATE: D'oh! Shouldn't have needed to be reminded, as I was shortly after posting, about United States v. Mendoza. Non-mutual offensive issue preclusion is unavailable against the federal government.] But it would not even be necessary to rely on preclusion, for every court would be bound as a matter of precedent to hold the subsidies illegal. To the extent that the doctrines of preclusion and precedent operate only in other, later cases, however, their reach extends only to whichever other, later cases there happen to be. Given the nature of the relief sought in King v. Burwell, there may not be very many such cases.

By contrast with the law of preclusion and the law of precedent, the law of remedies at least has the potential to provide for broader binding effect in King v. Burwell itself. If legally authorized, a nationwide injunction against the responsible government officials would authoritatively forbid any further implementation of the challenged subsidies. But the legal propriety of a nationwide injunction is far from clear.

Josh Blackman addressed some of the issues relevant to nationwide injunctive relief in two earlier posts criticizing Baude's proposal, ultimately suggesting that "unusual factors" in this case would allow for a nationwide injunction. But the reason that he had to rely on "unusual factors" is that the usual approach toward injunctive relief would require that the injunction should only be as broad as necessary to give the plaintiffs relief from their injury, and the King plaintiffs do not advance nationwide injury requiring nationwide relief. (It might also be worth noting that Blackman discusses D.C. Circuit precedent about nationwide injunctions, but not the seemingly more confining Fourth Circuit precedent that would govern in King if the Supreme Court itself does not specify the scope of injunctive relief. See, e.g., Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 434-36 (4th Cir. 2003) (reversing nationwide injunction that was "broader in scope than that necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff" and that "did not carefully address only the circumstances of the case").)

Another way of coming at the scope-of-injunctive-relief issue is to imagine that the King plaintiffs had sought to represent a class of all subsidy-eligible plaintiffs and asked a court to certify that class under Rule 23(b)(2). Would it have been proper to certify the King plaintiffs as representatives of such a class? Not a chance. Why, then, should they be able to secure an injunction that would accomplish the same result?

The reason this all seems confounding is that it would usually be foolish to engage only in plaintiff-specific compliance with a Supreme Court ruling. But that is largely because of all the court losses that would follow in later cases. Those losses would be attributable, however, to the law of precedent and the law of preclusion, not to a nationwide remedy. And it would be a mistake to treat the potential absence of enough later cases in which precedent or preclusion would compel practical nationwide compliance as an argument for authorizing nationwide injunctive relief.

Perhaps I am missing something. But until Baude's "flouting the rule of law" critics explain which particular rule of law would be violated by adoption of his proposal, I don't know how to find my way to agree with them on this point. 

To say that plaintiff-specific compliance is legally permissible is far from suggesting it would be advisable for the Obama Administration to follow that course. There is much that is legally permissible that is inadvisable for any number of reasons. And I would not advise being so grudging in King v. Burwell.

It is nonetheless important to acknowledge the legal permissibility of plaintiff-specific compliance. Not only is casual acceptance of judicial supremacy undesirable but clear appreciation for the legal limits of judicial authority can also usefully inform the Supreme Court's crafting of interim relief such as a temporary stay like the one issued after Northern Pipeline. If the Court declines to grant such relief to ease the transition, but the Obama Administration deems some transitional relief necessary, the Administration can lawfully rely on the legal limits on judicial relief when deciding how to proceed.

https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/03/baudes-flouting-the-rule-of-law-critics-should-explain-precisely-which-rule-of-law-his-proposal-flou.html

Walsh, Kevin | Permalink