How would Bottum explain the Justice Kennedy of Casey, Lawrence, and Windsor?

Thanks to Rick for the link to David Goldman's book review of Joseph Bottum's An Anxious Age: The Post-Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of America. A question prompted by the review: How would Bottum explain Justice Kennedy? More precisely, how would Bottum explain Kennedy's opinions in cases like Casey, Lawrence, and Windsor? I ask because these opinions appear to exhibit the features of the post-Protestant secular religion that Bottum discusses, but Kennedy seems more post-Catholic than post-Protestant. 

In their rhetoric at least, Kennedy's opinions in Casey, Lawrence, and Windsor exhibit "a sense of the sacred, but one that seeks the security of personal salvation through assuming the right stance on social and political issues." They exude "a self-perpetuating spiritual aura," and they reflect "social and political ideas elevated to the status of strange divinities . . . born of the ancient religious hunger to perceive more in the world than just the give and take of ordinary human beings, but adapted to an age that piously congratulates itself on its escape from many of the strictures of ancient religion." These opinions of Justice Kennedy's are recognizable for "the glory and the annoyingness of their moral confidence and spiritual certainty." 

These are all features of the secular religion that Bottum attributes to the "perpetuation of Protestant attitudes in secular form." But there is something genealogically Catholic in at least some of the rhetoric of these Kennedy opinions. (For a pre-Windsor discussion of rhetorical similarities among Casey, Lawrence, Dignitatis Humanae, and various other documents of Catholic social teaching, see Frank Colucci, Justice Kennedy's Jurisprudence: The Full and Necessary Meaning of Liberty.) How might Bottum explain these aspects of Justice Kennedy's judicial output? How should we? Might there be consonance between Bottum's understanding and Christopher Ferrara's?