Conscience and Voting: The Big Question

   My recent essay “It’s Hard Work: Reflections on Conscience and Citizenship in the Catholic Tradition,” is in part a strong critique of the Voter’s Guide for Serious Catholics and similar lines of analyses, which outline voting as a two step process: 1) identify “intrinsically evil” (or "non-negotiable") principles, and 2) vote for a candidate who best matches opposition to these evils.  I argue that this methodology is in sharp contrast with the 2007 analysis approved by 98% of the bishops, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship.   

   Like the analysis in Serious Catholics, the bishops do not hedge on the position that Catholics must hold toward intrinsic evils: “They must always be rejected and opposed and must never be supported or condoned.”  And the bishops also point out that some issues are much more important than others: a well-formed conscience “recognizes that all issues do not carry the same moral weight and that the moral obligation to oppose intrinsically evil acts has a special claim on our consciences and our actions.”

   But Forming Consciences does not stop there.  It also includes a mid-layer analysis. The task is not simply a matter of identifying principles, because a larger role is given to prudence, the virtue which “shapes and informs our ability to deliberate over available alternatives, to determine what is most fitting to a specific context, and to act decisively.”  For the bishops, decisions about voting entail a complex reflection, using “the framework of Catholic teaching to examine candidates’ positions on issues affecting human life and dignity as well as issues of justice and peace.  It also examines the candidates; “integrity, philosophy and performance”; as well as their capacity to influence a given issue.

   A second way in which the bishops’ position differs from Serious Catholics is in its discussion of the moral principle of “cooperation with evil.”  Serious Catholics lifted out of context a 2002 Vatican statement that one is not permitted “to vote for a political program or an individual law that contradicts the fundamental contents of faith and morals.”  The Vatican statement was discussing the duties of elected officials, but Serious Catholics applied the analysis directly to citizen voters, reasoning:  “Some things are always wrong, and no one may deliberately vote in favor of them.  Legislators, who have a direct vote, may not support these evils in legislation or programs.  Citizens support these evils indirectly if they vote in favor of candidates who propose to advance them.”

   The bishops, on the other hand, clearly rejected this leap.  They clarified that the question of the voter’s moral responsibility hinges on the voter’s intent:  “A Catholic cannot vote for a candidate who takes a position in favor of an intrinsic evil, such as abortion or racism, if the voter’s intent is to support that position.  In such cases a Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in grave evil.”

   Because intent is the hinge, the bishops warned that the intrinsic evil analysis should not become an excuse for a “single-issue” approach to voting:  “[a] voter should not use a candidate’s opposition to an intrinsic evil to justify indifference or inattentiveness to other important moral issues involving human life and dignity.”  Further emphasizing the role of intent, they stated:  “There may be times when a Catholic who rejects a candidate’s unacceptable position may decide to vote for that candidate for other morally grave reasons.  Voting in this way would be permissible only for truly grave moral reasons, not to advance narrow interests or partisan preferences or to ignore a fundamental moral evil.”

   This brings me to what I consider to be the big remaining question: What counts as a “morally grave reason?”  Some of the analyses currently circulating suggest that a particular candidate’s failure to oppose an intrinsic evil (such as abortion), could only be overridden by the other candidate’s failure to oppose an equally serious intrinsic evil (such as genocide or preemptive nuclear strike)—in other words, it requires a head to head on principles. 

   But I can’t find support in Forming Consciences for the argument that a “morally grave reason” requires a head to head on principles, or in some way excludes a range of mid-level prudential questions. I believe the bishops’ analyses leaves ample space for consideration of questions such as:

• What institutional role does the position at stake play in shaping the policy against this particular evil—as the bishops put it, what will be the candidate’s “capacity to influence” the issue? 
• Regardless of the candidates’ statement of principles, how will their specific mesh of social, economic, and legislative policies play out on the ground to remedy the particular evil both nationally and globally?

   I’d like to express sincere “docility” on this point—I’m happy to be educated about perspectives on whether the process for determining what is a “grave moral reason” should focus only principles, or should also account of the mesh of principles and practical judgment.  Thoughts?