More on Ectopic Pregnancy

Regarding our conversation on ectopic pregnancy, Boston College law prof Greg Kalscheur, S.J. recommends a 1993 article from Theological Studies by James Keenan, "The Function of the Principle of Double Effect."  (I don't have the link.)  Here's the abstract:

The casuistric principle of double effect should be applied taxonomically rather than geometrically as is currently being done. The geometric application assumes that the principle can be used as moral justification for any action which fits the four conditions of the principle. Instead, the principle should be recognized as an abstraction representing common aspects of paradigm cases which contain their own internal certitude. The taxonomic analysis shows that the principle does not apply to the case of ectopic pregnancy, although it fits the principle geometrically.

In the article, Keenan quotes John Noonan's conclusion that "whenever the embryo is a danger to the life of the mother, an abortion is permissible. At the level of reason nothing more can be asked of the mother."

And John McGuinness writes because he is:

becoming uncomfortable with the prominent role the "burining building" hypothetical is playing in the moral analysis on MOJ, as it has several probalem that make it ill-suited as a moral guide.  First, as Prof. Penalver noted when he introduced the hypothetical, there is a significant moral difference between choosing to save one person over another, and deliberately killing one person for the benefit of another.  Second,  there's often a gap between what we "would" do and what we "should" do.  If I came home today and found a man with a knife standing over the bloody corpses of my wife and children, it's likely I would do some things that are not morally correct.  Third, this type of analysis would work to justify all sorts of discrimination.  A white racist would probably save a white baby over a black baby -- does this make segregation OK?  The ingrained discrimination is precisely what we are trying to confront.  The "burning building" is almost a tautology -- I would discriminate against embryos; therefore discimination is OK.  Fourth, your particular use of it is flawed -- you say that the choice between an embryo or your wife would not be difficult becuase several chidren depend on her for love and care.  But I suspect the choice between your wife and your newborn child would at least be difficult (although perhaps the same), even though nobody is dependent on the newborn child. The hypothetical may be a useful tool for uncovering what our initial moral intuition is, but it should not be one of the first tools we reach for in evaluaing the morality of policies.

Just to be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the fact of my favoring my wife's life over our early-stage embryo's life establishes its moral correctness.  But it raises some questions for me, especially because I am confident that if I was presented with the dilemma 100 times, I'd make the same decision 100 times, and if I reflected deeply on my decision for many months, I'd remain resolute in its correctness.  It's not just a function of my personal bias because if a stranger in the same situation asked for my advice, I'd tell him the same thing.  And it's not the same as reacting in passion to the sight of the person who has just murdered my family.  It is a decision that seems grounded, in a meaningful way, in the core convictions of my conscience. (Hence the relevance of the burning building hypo: in that case, I would not only find it morally acceptable to rescue the infant instead of the blastocyst, I would find it morally unacceptable to rescue the blastocyst instead of the infant.) 

So again, if I choose to save my wife by ending the life of our embryo -- and if I choose what may be the safest route by removing the embryo itself, rather than the tube -- is my conscience improperly formed?  And if so, what moral insight am I lacking? 

To take the inquiry to another level, if the natural law is written on our consciences, whose conscience would tell them to let the mother risk death instead of removing the embryo?  And if the vast majority of persons of faith who do value life, including pre-born life, would choose my course of action on this issue, then where else is the natural law written?

Rob