Kmiec on Catholics, judges, and precedent

A long and very interesting interview with Pepperdine's Professor Doug Kmiec, "Catholic Judges, the U.S. Constitution, and Natural Law," is available at ZENIT (you might have to scroll down).  Note that Professor Kmiec kindly concludes his interview with a plug for Mirror of Justice!

Here is one exchange:

Q: Right now there are three, and there could be four, Catholics sitting on the Supreme Court. However, they often have diverging views on some important issues. Is there a Catholic way of interpreting the U.S. Constitution, or can there be legitimate disagreement about the meaning of the text?

Kmiec: The tools of constitutional interpretation are the text, history and structure of the American Constitution. Part of that history includes the Declaration of Independence and its reference to self-evident truths of creation, created equality and unalienable rights.

As Lincoln reflected, the Constitution was framed for the philosophy of the Declaration, not the other way around. It is to secure our unalienable rights that "governments are instituted." All those who would seek judicial office should sincerely appreciate the intrinsic value of the human person reflected in the Declaration.

Moreover, one would expect, and I do, that those who are truly sustained by the Catholic faith and a Catholic family, and perhaps educated in Catholic schools, would have a special appreciation by study of the natural law tradition and its direct contribution to the American order of these first principles.

As to divergence among believers, in law or anything else, that is part of the human condition. In truth, Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Anthony Kennedy ­- the three Catholics presently on the Supreme Court -- have a statistically high level of agreement in matters of legal interpretation, though each has had different legal training and experience, and that, rather than their common faith, likely explains the variations among them.

Professor Kmiec very nicely identifies what was good, and what might have been off-base, in Bishop Skylstad's call not long ago for a Court that would rule in accord with certain USCCB-preferred policies:

Q: Recently, Bishop William Skylstad, president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, sent a letter to President Bush calling for a Supreme Court justice that would rule in a number of ways consistent with the bishops' public policy agenda. What would be the jurisprudential consequences for a Catholic justice who heeded Bishop Skylstad's call?

Kmiec: Bishop Skylstad's letter was a direct and entirely appropriate expression of Catholic faith. The letter might be perceived as somewhat misunderstanding the intended role of the Supreme Court, but one can hardly fault the bishop for this since some members of Congress, themselves, wrongly think of judges as policy-makers.

As a matter of original understanding, nothing in the Constitution is at odds with any of the policies the bishop urges. For example, while the Constitution provides for capital punishment, there is nothing precluding the American people in their respective states to end or limit its application if the people come to be persuaded by the witness and prayer and instruction of Catholics -- and others -- in the public square that, as John Paul II taught in "The Gospel of Life," its application should be rare.

And, of particular relevance to our discussion about Roberts, precedent, and Roe, there's this:

Q: Can a Catholic judge in good conscience strike down laws restricting abortion that he or she believes are unconstitutional? What about applying unjust laws? What should a judge do in the case of a moral conflict?

Kmiec: As a matter of formal logic, it must be readily admitted that no person in or out of office can set himself or herself above the divine law. Yet, repeatedly and circumspectly, the Church's teaching is directed at "elected officials" or those casting "a legislative vote."

. . . Nowhere, however, does the Church formally instruct judges to act outside the bounds of their judicial office to legislate from the bench. The Church exhibits great respect for the separation of powers, even as the justices themselves have been less than faithfully observant of this constitutional building-block.

Here, the Church is following in the instruction of St. Thomas Aquinas, who argued "that all should have some part in the government; for in this way peace is preserved among the people, and all are pleased with such a disposition of things and maintain it."

. . . So, while Church leaders are well within their rights as citizens to point out in public statement or amicus brief how they believe that a proper understanding of law does not support abortion on demand, a Catholic judge may be part of a judicial system that includes Roe.

In ruling on such matters, a judge does not become morally complicit in the underlying act or share in its intent. If the question is: Does John Roberts have a specific Catholic duty on the bench to restrain abortion? -- Justice Scalia has given the apt answer: "A judge ... bears no moral guilt for the laws society has failed to enact."

Rick