Mirror of Justice

Proselytization Clarification

I agree with Rick's clarification, assuming that Pope John Paul II, in Dignitatis Humanae, was not asking for the government to play a role in restraining religious communities from engaging in practices that could be construed as "dishonorable or unworthy." After all, modern liberalism's notions of honor and worthiness might not leave much room at all for evangelization efforts. If we're going to unleash state power to restrain proselytization, I still think it should be limited to clear cases of tangible harm like financial fraud or physical coercion. To the extent that the Pope was simply asking for religious communities to comport themselves in a worthy manner -- and was not licensing the state to regulate proselytization based on its own self-serving interpretation of infinitely malleable terms -- the Pope's statement embodies the "marketplace of ideas" approach to proselytizing. We certainly can and should employ tools of moral suasion and condemnation when religious communities cross the line of decency in their recruitment efforts, but we should be extremely hesitant in asking the government to give our moral judgment the force of law.

Rob

Proselytization Clarification

Rob (below) worries about my statement (below Rob's) that:

Many reasonable people, in many religious traditions, have expressed concerns about aggressive and otherwise unworthy "proselytization" efforts. And, many of us might concede that a government could have a common-good interest in taking steps to expose such efforts, in order to protect the freedom-of-conscience of its citizens.

I could not agree more with Rob that (almost) any efforts by government to restrict the efforts of believers to call others to "conversion" should be condemned and resisted. By "exposing" "unworthy" efforts, I meant only to say that I have no problem using anti-fraud laws, etc., to expose charlatans who prey on the vulnerable ("Join my Church of the Unbreakable Ankle and send me all your money!"). As for "unworthy" proselytization efforts, Rob is quite right to remind us that bells should be ringing, and red flags waving like crazy, when anyone suggests that full-throated and committed evangelization is unworthy or inappropriate in a democracy. I meant only to echo John Paul II (no slouch when it comes to defending religious freedom and evangelization) and the Council Fathers. While I agree with Rob that the class of speech government ought to stay most removed from is witnessing, evangelization, etc., I am also willing to sign on to the following, from Dignitatis humanae:

Religious communities also have the right not to be hindered in their public teaching and witness to their faith, whether by the spoken or by the written word. However, in spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices everyone ought at all times to refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy, especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people. Such a manner of action would have to be considered an abuse of one's right and a violation of the right of others.

This understanding of "unworthy efforts" might cover a *bit* more than "outright fraud" or "physical coercion," but not much. I appreciate Rob's "calling" me on this.

Rick

UPDATE: See above. Rob's right.

Conversion's marginalization in America

Rick's post ("Conversion bans in India") is directly relevant to our own legal and intellectual landscape, not just India's. Even in our society, to accuse someone of proselytism packs a powerful pejorative punch. I believe that this stems from our modern tendency to view religious belief as either a facet of one's cultural identity (e.g., "he's Irish-Catholic" or "he was raised as a Southern Baptist") or as a simple lifestyle preference (e.g., see most analyses of the "megachurch" movement). It is the undeniable mark of a fundamentalist to be caught speaking of religious belief in terms of claims as to ultimate truth. If religion is not to be understood as the quest for truth, then what could possibly be the justification for seeking to invade another individual's most private sphere of autonomy in hopes of prompting a switch in culture or lifestyle, especially when the switch concerns a matter that is so potentially divisive and inflammatory?

I devoted one of my law & religion classes to proselytism, and the direction of the discussion was eye-opening. I offered the hypothetical of a classmate approaching them in the cafeteria to invite them to church and talk about Jesus; the class was split between viewing the classmate as a relationally stunted cultural imperalist and as a deluded zealot. When I asked what might motivate such person to "witness" about his faith, it was not until the fifth or sixth possibility that someone suggested, "He might believe his faith is actually true." If we view religious belief as potentially true or false, proselytism takes on a entirely new gloss, but we rarely view religious belief in those terms.

Indeed, even Rick's post included some eyebrow-raising sentiment, as he concedes that:

Many reasonable people, in many religious traditions, have expressed concerns about aggressive and otherwise unworthy "proselytization" efforts. And, many of us might concede that a government could have a common-good interest in taking steps to expose such efforts, in order to protect the freedom-of-conscience of its citizens.

My question is, what exactly is an "aggressive" or "otherwise unworthy" proselytization effort? And who do we trust to identify such efforts? And what should we want the government to do about them? In many countries, I know that materially assisting non-Christians at the same time you tell them the story of Christianity is viewed as an unfair advantage in the contest of religious ideas. But for the witnessing Christian, such a link is non-negotiable. This may be my upbringing as an evangelical coming to the fore, but barring outright fraud or physical coercion, I'm concerned that, if we concede that some proselytizing is legitimate and some is not, we've given up way too much ground.

Admittedly, the American legal system is not on the verge of following India's path on this subject, as our robust tradition of religious liberty will most likely maintain space for the "Jesus freaks" and "moonies" among us. But without a doubt, it is a culturally marginalized -- in many sectors, despised -- space that they occupy.

Rob

Conversion bans in India

In today's New York Times, and also in the current issue of the New Republic, we learn about the efforts of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) -- the Hindu nationalist party that heads India's ruling coalition -- to employ laws that penalize religious conversions.

Apparently, many lower-caste Hindus ("dalits") have converted to Buddhism and Christianity. This is from the New Republic:

"Traditionally a tool of Christian missionaries, conversion became a political strategy in 1956, when, during a mass ceremony, B.R. Ambedkar, a dalit leader, convinced half a million untouchables to convert to Buddhism to protest exploitation. Since then, another three million dalits have become Buddhists. And, according to John C.B. Webster, a leading authority on conversions in India, hundreds of thousands of dalits have quietly turned to Christianity. In the southern states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, isolated villages have recently switched to Islam, whose influence is growing as young Indians return to the region after working in the Persian Gulf.

To be sure, conversion is no panacea. Its benefits can be largely symbolic, since upper-caste Hindus still view converted dalits as second-class citizens. Still, says Webster, conversion allows untouchables to redefine themselves primarily in terms of religion rather than caste, removing some indignities. And joining India's well-funded and well-organized Christian community, which runs some of India's best schools, can also bring significant social and economic benefits."

TNR also reports:

"The Freedom of Religion Bill . . . punishes anyone who converts another person through force, fraud, or 'allurement' with up to three years in prison and a fine of about $2,200. Taken literally, it doesn't seem to violate the constitution's ban on caste discrimination or its promise to protect freedom of religion. But its fine print targets dalits who want to convert to Christianity and Islam. Aravinda Pajanor, a constitutional law expert based in Chennai, says the law singles out untouchables by imposing stiffer penalties for converting them than for converting other groups."

Many reasonable people, in many religious traditions, have expressed concerns about aggressive and otherwise unworthy "proselytization" efforts. And, many of us might concede that a government could have a common-good interest in taking steps to expose such efforts, in order to protect the freedom-of-conscience of its citizens. Today's articles suggest, though, that the motive underlying India's anti-conversion efforts is little more than raw politics: Hindu nationalists worry that conversions to Islam, Buddhist, and Christianity threaten their demographic power base. Is there anything to be said in defense of the developments described in these articles? Or -- as it seems to me -- are we seeing un-freedom in its most raw form?

Rick

UPDATE: See my response to Rob's post, above.

Is Kerry simply "rendering unto Caesar?"

In an editorial today, the Denver Post weighs in on Kerry's "Catholic problem," lamenting the fact that certain elements of the Church's hierarchy seem to be upsetting the nice public/private distinction laid out by John Kennedy in regards to his faith and public office. In the Post's view, these elements "risk reawakening the fear among non-Catholics about whether the official acts of Catholics in office might be dictated by the Vatican." So if a priest or bishop calls on a Catholic public official to take seriously Church teachings on matters of public import, they have no one to blame but themselves when the inevitable (and presumably justified, in the Post's view) anti-Catholic backlash comes.

And as if religious stereotyping was not enough, the Post decides to engage in a bit of confused scriptural interpretation, suggesting that the whole problem can be solved by remembering "a much earlier statement on the separate roles of church and state: 'Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's.'"

It's all perfectly clear now: render unto God whatever you do in your private time; everything else is Caesar's.

Rob

Kerry, Kissling, and Fraud on the Church

The recent opinion piece by columnist Ellen Goodman (link here) well illustrates my fears about the potential for scandal to the faithful posed by the nomination by a major political party of a candidate for president who claims membership in the Catholic Church and yet strongly disavows central Catholic teachings on the sanctity of human life and the vitality of the family to civil society. The central and predictable theme of the Goodman column is that religious faith is but a private matter of isolated conscience, little more than a hobby, that should have no implications for public life. In other words, an individual citizen, or at least a politician, should lead a splintered life, carefully segregating matters of faith from everything that is public-regarding. That of course is bad enough.

Perhaps even more troubling is the resurrection of anti-Catholic attitudes and figures masquerading as reasonable and authentic alternative Catholic voices. While the Catholic Church is large and diverse, it is not open to everything such that it stands for nothing. Goodman’s column devotes entire paragraphs to lengthy quotations from Frances Kissling of the deceptively named Catholics for a Free Choice (CFC). Kissling is a former abortion clinic operator and head of the abortion industry trade group, and, moreover, acknowledges that she does not pray nor take Communion (so much for being Catholic). The CFC is not a membership organization and instead funded by wealthy foundations aligned with the abortion industry. Even beyond its pro-abortion line, CFC is a virulently anti-Catholic organization, with sweeping rejections of everything that is distinctly Catholic, from Church leadership to sexual teaching to any religious witness to the culture, often expressed in the most stereotypical of anti-Catholic language.

John Kerry’s nomination thus may provide respectable cover and even moral support to anti-Catholic entities like Catholics for a Free Choice, further damaging the integrity of Catholic Social Teaching as a meaningful and coherent set of teachings and subverting the witness of the Church to the world. In my view, on certain fundamental matters like human life, no public figure can call him or herself Catholic with integrity unless he acts to protect the defenseless unborn. But, at the very least, surely we can agree that Kerry is obliged to clearly and loudly acknowledge that he believes in the sanctity of unborn life as a matter of personal faith and moral teaching and that he emphatically distances himself from fraudulent and notorious anti-Catholic figures like Frances Kissling.

Greg Sisk

Randy Barnett on Liberty at Notre Dame

We were fortunate today at Notre Dame Law School to host constitutional-law scholar (and blogger) Professor Randy Barnett. Professor Barnett's talk, sponsored by Notre Dame's very active Federalist Society, consisted of an outline and defense of his new book, "Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty." My colleague, Tricia Bellia, provided an insightful response.

Barnett's argument includes the claims that (a) the Supreme Court has interpreted incorrectly the Constitution's enumerated-powers provisions, thereby dramatically expanding the powers of the federal government, at the expense of individual "liberty," and (b) the Court has failed to appreciate and enforce the liberty-protecting limits that properly constrain the exercise of the "police power" by the States. In a nutshell, Barnett says that, at present, our constitutional landscape is "islands of individual liberty in a sea of government power" when it should consist of "islands of government power in a sea of individual liberty."

Barnett's arguments, and his new book, are important and provocative. Many of them, in my view, are convincing. Also, it has been interesting for me to reflect on how different understandings of what "freedom" really is, and what it is for (see generally, John Garvey, What Are Freedoms For) lead to different conclusions about the propriety of certain state actions, even among those who are sympathic -- as I am -- to many of Barnett's libertarian positions and premises. Professor Barnett's liberty-protecting theory proceeds, it appears, from claims about natural rights, the public-private distinction, and the "harm principle." Another freedom-protecting theory -- one that is no less committed than is Barnett to the moral priority of individual rights and private associations over the state -- might proceed instead from (Catholic?) claims about truth, virtue, and the common good. See, for example, Avery Cardinal Dulles's essay, "John Paul II and the Truth About Freedom," and George Weigel's paper, "A Better Concept of Freedom."

In any event, Professor Barnett's talk, like his work generally, was engaging, open-minded, and challenging. I would recommend that any "Mirror of Justice"-reading law students (and I hope there are a few!) take Barnett's claims very seriously. If you think he is wrong, be sure you can explain why.

Rick

Call for Papers

Click here to view a PDF version of the following information.

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THE SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE LAW
October 8, 2004
CALL FOR PAPERS

Sponsored by
Journal of Catholic Social Thought
Villanova University School of Law
Villanova Office of Mission Effectiveness
As part of its commitment to exploring the continuing relevance of Catholic Social Thought to the law, the Journal of Catholic Social Thought, a peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary journal jointly published by the School of Law and the Office of Mission Effectiveness, invites those interested to submit proposals for papers to be presented on the following theme:

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF SUBSIDIARITY:
What Does Law Have to Learn From the Catholic Concept of Subsidiarity?
Contributors are encouraged to explore

• The nature of the Catholic concept of subsidiarity in relation to non-Catholic versions


• Contrasting ideological interpretations of subsidiarity 


• The relevance of the Catholic concept to both public law (i.e., federalism, international law) and private law (i.e., corporate law) 


• The broader jurisprudential implications of subsidiarity 


• Any other topics relevant to the theme

Paper proposals must be submitted no later than June 1, 2004.
Papers presented at the conference will be considered for publication in volume 2 of the Journal of Catholic Social Thought.

The conference will be held at Villanova University, in Villanova, Pennsylvania, outside of Philadelphia, on October 8, 2004.

For more information, contact Mark Sargent at the School of Law at [email protected].

Bishop O'Malley on American Culture

Here's a story, in which Boston's bishop, Sean O'Malley, is reported to have said recently that "American culture is inhospitable to Roman Catholic teaching, and likened preaching to Americans to a form of martyrdom." According to the article, Bishop O'Malley "compared the Catholic Church in the United States to 'exiles in the midst of Babylon.' He said Catholics 'find themselves in a hostile, alien environment where the overriding temptation is to assimilate, the cultural pull is to conform to a dominant cultural influence that is incongruous with our faith and our destiny.'"

Is he right? If so, what does this "exile" status mean for Catholic lawyers and law teachers?

Rick

Population and Regulation

Here's an interesting-looking paper, by Casey Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer, entitled "Population and Regulation." The paper "present[s] a model of efficient regulation" in which "setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have them." "In both the efficiency and redistribution versions of our model," the authors conclude, "having a larger [i.e., more populous] jurisdiction is better." "In the efficiency model, regulation reduces the marginal cost of addressing social problems[.] In the redistributive model of regulation, more interests are articulated when the jurisdiction is larger." The authors note, though, that "competition among jurisdictions as in Tiebout (1956) or diversity of preferences among people (Alesina and Spolaore 2003) are arguments favoring smaller jurisdictions."

There is, to be sure, much more to this paper, and I am sure that much of it goes well beyond my own understanding and training. Still, it strikes me that the paper's project, and its conclusions, are quite interesting from a CST / subsidiarity point of view.

Rob? Steve? Others? What do you think?

Thanks, as always, to Larry Solum for the tip.

Rick