Monday, November 29, 2021
The Roman parable of John Courtney Murray looms large in the modern American Catholic imagination. The Jesuit theologian argued that the First Amendment was in keeping with Catholic orthodoxy at a time when the Holy See still insisted that the American model of religious freedom was a suboptimal church-state arrangement—tolerable only when the optimal arrangement, a Catholic confessional state, was out of reach. Officially censored by the Holy Office in 1954, Murray’s ideas would be vindicated a few years later by the Second Vatican Council, and specifically by the Declaration on Religious Freedom (1965), which Murray himself helped draft. As former Commonweal editor Margaret O’Brien Steinfels once said, it is “the Catholic rule of thumb, that anyone with a good idea for changing Church teaching or practice, I think here of John Courtney Murray, ought to be made to suffer for it.” Yet, so far, we have known only the contours of Murray’s pre-conciliar ordeal. Despite the meticulous historical work of Joseph A. Komonchak, who has been painstakingly piecing together evidence from a wide array of personal, ecclesiastical, and governmental archives, a crucial perspective was still missing: that of the Holy See itself.
Full article at Commonweal: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/not-quite-silenced
November 29, 2021 | Permalink
Saturday, November 27, 2021
The Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy has published, online, an article-ized version of the amicus brief that Chuck Cooper and his colleagues submitted -- and that I was pleased to join -- in the Dobbs case. It's called "Roe and Casey Were Grievously Wrong and Should Be Overruled." As it happens, the title captures pretty well the argument!
Friday, November 26, 2021
In 2020, the Journal of Catholic Legal Studies and the Center for Law and Religion at St. John's co-hosted a symposium on a draft book by Professors John Breen and Lee Strang: "A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal Education." Deans of several Catholic law schools (including Rob Vischer), as well as other learned academics (including Rick Garnett), offered comments on the manuscript. Those comments were published by JCLS last year.
Professors Breen and Strang have now offered this thorough and very interesting reply, in the new issue of JCLS. Their remarks are well worth your time.
Sunday, November 21, 2021
In my experience, preachers in Catholic parishes don't know quite what to do with the Feast of Christ the King, which is today. Usually, the day's "message" or "theme" has been (again, in my experience) something to the effect that we should ask if we are "putting Jesus first in our lives/hearts" (and, certainly, we should).
And yet . . . especially in light of the emerging (and much needed) focus in the Church on religious liberty and the realities of both aggressive secularism and persecution, it's worth (re-)reading Quas Primas, the encyclical of Pope Pius XI that instituted the feast day in 1925, and remembering that this institution's purpose sounded more in political theology than in personal piety and devotion. This feast is a reminder that government is not all, that there are things which are not Caesar's, and that everything, in the end, is "under God." A bit:
"[T]he Church, founded by Christ as a perfect society, has a natural and inalienable right to perfect freedom and immunity from the power of the state; and that in fulfilling the task committed to her by God of teaching, ruling, and guiding to eternal bliss those who belong to the kingdom of Christ, she cannot be subject to any external power."
This is, to put it mildly, a striking proposal.
Friday, November 19, 2021
The Notre Dame Law School was honored to welcome Prof. Mary Ann Glendon, who delivered on Wednesday the inaugural Rice-Hasson Distinguished Lecture. Her topic was "Human Ecology and the Lawyer's Vocation." You can watch a recording of the lecture, here.
Prof. Glendon drew on writings of Pope Francis and his two predecessors, to develop the intriguing proposal that our cultural, institutional, and human "ecology" requires care, attention, and stewardship, no less than our natural/environmental one.
I've seen people wondering out loud on social media the past few days about what might be going on with the Texas Heartbeat Act at the Supreme Court. I have not quite caught up with all the briefing, but I did get a chance to listen to the arguments recently. With apologies to anyone else who has advanced the line of analysis below, it's not one that I've seen out there but that seems plausible to me.
First, let's put aside the question of whether there is anything unconstitutional about the Texas Heartbeat Act. Just assume that at least five Justices think that there is.
Second, assume that the unconstitutionality comes not from any textually discrete portion or temporally discrete set of possible applications but from the combination of all the features of the statutory scheme.
Third, identify what aspect of the scheme can be disregarded in order for the currently apprehended/assumed unconstitutionality to go away.
It is this third step that is most analytically liberating. For there need not be one-to-one correspondence between what makes a statutory scheme unconstitutional and what follows as a matter of being declared unconstitutional. Suppose a statute ABCDE, in which A, B, C, D, and E are distinct textual provisions of an act that each contribute something different to its operation. Now suppose that ABCDE as a combination is unconstitutional. It can but need not follow that A, B, C, D, and E are all to be judicially disregarded as unconstitutional. But it might also be enough that A or B or C or D or E be treated as not-law.
Something of this sort happened in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants (2020). That was the robocalls-to-cellphones case in which the Court held (1) the robocalls-to-cellphones ban was unconstitutionally content-based because of its exception for government-backed debt collection robocalls, and (2) the ban was still enforceable going forward, because (3) the offending exception could be severed.
Note the imprecise wording of (3). It's not so much the exception itself that offended. An exception does not abridge speech. The abridgement comes from the ban. The offending thing was the ban-with-exception as a package. But even though the ban-with-exception was unconstitutional, the ban remained enforceable after AAPC was decided. (Put aside for now whether severance is a thing that Courts do, or just a metaphor that has spun out of control. It's the latter, but that need not detain us here.)
There are any number of ways in which AAPC-style damage control could operate on the assumed-to-be-unconstitutional combination known as the Texas Heartbeat Act. For example, I haven't studied Texas law enough to know whether something like this would work, but presumably there is some pre-existing enforcement authority in some of the named defendants that would enable their enforcement of the Texas Heartbeat Act's criminal-law-like prohibition against performing certain abortions but for the provision that specifically singles out certain officials and says that they cannot enforce the THA. If that's right, then judicially disregarding that provision alone would be enough for the private suit to go forward, which is the only issue before the Court in the current posture.
I haven't done the work to know if something like this might be a path the Court could take. But once one recognizes the possibility of AAPC-style damage control in situations of unconstitutional combinations, then one can appreciate one reason why a quicker answer may not have been forthcoming from the Court. It could also be, of course, that the opening assumption of this post is wrong; maybe there are not at least five firm votes for unconstitutionality. For now, we'll have to wait, see, and occasionally speculate.
November 19, 2021 | Permalink
Monday, November 15, 2021
I was privileged over the last few days to participate in the 21st annual Fall Conference of the deNicola Center for Ethics and Culture at Notre Dame. What a gift to the Church and the Academy this Center and its activities are. I hope many people can watch the talks and discussions as they appear on the deNicola Center's YouTube channel. (If you watch just one panel, it should be "The Dignity of the Sexed Body: Asymmetry, Equality, and Real Reproductive Justice," featuring Erika Bachiochi, Abigail Favale, and Leah Libresco Sargeant. If a whole panel is too much and you want to see just one (non-plenary) talk, then ub this Year of St. Joseph, you have to go with Elizabeth Lev's visually and spiritually inspiring talk on depictions of St. Joseph in art as part of "The Dignity of Saints" presentation.)
The original title of my presentation was "Unwinding the Anti-Magisterium in the Supreme Court's Abortion Opinions." This promised too much for a talk that was to be between 18 and 20 minutes long, so I changed it to "Unwinding the Anti-Magisterium in Dobbs v. Jackson's Women's Health." (I was also pleased that this narrowed version clocked in at 18:59.)
Because this presentation was on the undercard, no video recording of it will appear on YouTube. An audio recording (of my talk only, not of others on my panel or of the Q&A) is available here . A .pdf version of my slides is available here.
The talk is pitched to the audience of people attending a conference entitled "I Have Called You by Name: Human Dignity in a Secular World." Although discussing the law (accurately, I hope), it is not directed toward an audience of legal specialists.
The bottom line of my reasonable hope for Dobbs is on slide 30/32: "Even if the Court does not affirm
prenatal personhood, it should negate Roe’s negation of prenatal personhood."
The only thing I'd add at this point is that second point on slide 31/32 about nonjusticiability as an antidote to the abortion (anti-)magisterium is misleading. It says "Take the stance that the Court lacks judicially manageable standards to replace its perception of personhood with Congress’s or state governments’ perceptions." What I meant to say, instead, is that the Court should recognize that it lacks judicially manageable standards to put in place its perception of personhood in preference to Congress's or state governments' perceptions (with the implicit qualifier that these perceptions need to be reasonable in order to be acceptable).
Friday, November 12, 2021
Students for Religious Liberty, St. Thomas More Society, Christian Legal Society, Jewish Law Students Association present:
LAST RIGHTS, Religious Liberty, the Death Penalty, and Ramirez v. Collier
Feat. Professor Rick Garnett
Nov. 16, 2021
November 12, 2021 | Permalink
Wednesday, November 3, 2021
The Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School is pleased to announce a writing competition on topics and questions within the Program’s focus. This writing competition requests student-authored scholarly papers and will honor winners with cash awards. The purpose of this writing competition is to encourage scholarship related to the intersection of church, state & society, and in particular how the law structures and governs that intersection.
Topic and Form: Papers should be focused, broadly, on topics related to church, state & society. For guidance on selecting a topic, students may wish to view our Program website and mission statement: https://churchstate.nd.edu/
Papers must be between 9,000-13,000 words, including footnotes and/or endnotes. Papers should be double spaced and use Bluebook citation rules.
Eligibility: The competition is open to law students in good standing, enrolled in a traditional law degree (J.D. or LL.B.), a Master’s degree (LL.M.), or a doctoral degree (S.J.D./J.S.D. or Ph.D.) program at an ABA-accredited law school within the United States. The competition is also open to recent graduates not yet practicing law (those completing clerkships or engaged in similar pursuits are eligible). Co-authored papers will not be accepted. Papers already published, or in the process of being published, are not eligible.
Submissions: Papers must be submitted by March 1st, 2022. Winners will be announced on or before May 6th, 2022. Papers must be e-mailed in .pdf form. Each submission must include a cover letter (that summarizes the paper and states the paper word count) and resume in a separate .pdf document. Papers should not include author names in order to ensure that submissions to judges can be scored with anonymity. Emailed submissions should be sent with “2022 Writing Competition” in the subject line, and addressed to: [email protected]
Judges: Papers will be judged by Church, State & Society Director, Richard W. Garnett, other faculty members at Notre Dame Law School, and possibly law & religion scholars from other U.S. law schools.
Prizes: First Place, $3,000 cash award; Second Place, $2,000 cash award; Third Place, $1,000 cash award; Honorable Mention awards of $500.
November 3, 2021 | Permalink
Monday, November 1, 2021
Growing up, I thought my career choice – a singular choice, made only once – was a direct and public reflection of my relationship with God. If my faith in God was strong enough, it meant I should probably be a missionary or a pastor. One problem: I knew enough missionaries and pastors to know that I didn’t want to be either one. I contemplated attending graduate school for theology rather than going to law school, as if that might be closer to a true “Christian” vocation. When I moved from legal practice into the academy, I started writing about the intersection of law and religion. Not quite ministry, but close enough to count in God’s eyes?
Obviously, it’s taken a while for me to understand that vocation is more about becoming the person God has called me to be, less about my career choice. Or as Thomas Merton put it, “discovering vocation does not mean scrambling toward some prize just beyond my reach but accepting the treasure of true self I already possess.”
Which brings me to David Link, who died on Thursday. He was a tax attorney who left private practice to teach, eventually serving as Notre Dame Law School’s dean for nearly 25 years. He left Notre Dame to become the founding dean of St. Thomas Law, helping launch the school. Soon after Dave left St. Thomas, his wife Barbara passed away, and he went to seminary, becoming a Catholic priest at age 71. Fr. Link devoted the rest of his days to prison ministry, working primarily at a maximum-security prison in which most of the inmates were convicted of murder.
I wonder, if we could ask David Link to describe his vocation while he was sitting in his office at Winston & Strawn parsing new tax regulations, then pose the same question to Dean Link as he welcomed the inaugural JD class to St. Thomas, and to Fr. Link as he counseled an inmate serving a life sentence, would his answers have changed? Did his vocation shift at each new step of his career, or did his vocation actually remain constant? His perception of the ways his gifts could best help meet the world’s needs evolved over fifty years, no doubt. But his defining vocation was not tax attorney, law school dean, or even Catholic priest. His defining vocation, I suspect, was his heeding of the prophet Micah’s call “to act justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with your God.”
As we observe All Saints' Day, I encourage us to reflect on vocation, both in our own lives and in the lives of our students. What difference might it make if we view vocation less as a one-time career choice and more as a commitment to being the person God has created us to be?
Rest in peace, David Link – may your memory be a blessing.
Friday, October 29, 2021
Interesting chapter by Rafael Domingo.
In this chapter, I argue for religious freedom as a first-class right, and I criticize the views of some distinguished scholars who react against traditional conceptions of religious freedom and deny the right to any special protection of religion by legal systems. I focus primarily on Ronald Dworkin and Brian Leiter’s views and arguments. I conclude that Dworkin’s approach to religion belittles the idea of God. Yet conviction about the existence of God and the holding of profound ethical and moral convictions are not so independent as Dworkin argues. Leiter’s approach belittles the idea of religion, which cannot be reduced to a matter of commands, a lack of evidence, and consolation. I argue why religion is more than a matter of conscience and a personal decision about ultimate concerns and questions. Religion cannot be reduced to moral conscience, let alone ethical independence in foundational matters. An increasingly globalized and pluralistic society demands a more comprehensive approach that fully protects all religions and creeds.
October 29, 2021 | Permalink
Friday, October 22, 2021
Cardinal Gerhard Müller will speak at Notre Dame on Wednesday, October 27th.
Carey Auditorium, Hesburgh Library
4-5:30 p.m. | Wednesday, October 27
Cardinal Gerhard Müller is the former Prefect of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith. He has written more than 600 works on topics of theology and the Catholic Church and is the editor of the 16-volume The Complete Works of Joseph Ratzinger: Pope Benedict XVI.
He will speak on the Pope’s role in protecting human dignity as part of his tour promoting his new book, The Pope: His Mission and His Task, and copies of his book will be available for purchase at the event.
October 22, 2021 | Permalink
Tuesday, October 12, 2021
The Supreme Court heard oral argument yesterday in Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center. The case involves the constitutionality of a Kentucky law regulating abortion. But abortion barely came up at all. That's because the question presented has nothing to do with the constitutionality of the Kentucky law at issue. The question, instead, is about the ability of Kentucky's Attorney General to intervene and defend the law further after a different state official declined to press the defense any further.
One way to think about yesterday's argument is as providing a glimpse of what the Supreme Court's post-Roe abortion-law docket might look like.
If the Supreme Court reverses the Roe/Casey regime, the Court will still hear cases that involve abortion laws. But those cases will not be about first-order questions of personal autonomy. They will instead be about the scope of Congress's power to regulate commerce, choice of law questions, and so on. They will implicate trans-substantive bodies of doctrine rather than adding to the accumulation of abortion-specific caselaw.
October 12, 2021 | Permalink
Sunday, October 10, 2021
We are stewards of the rule of law, and that means we also have to be honest and unflinching students of our history. Under the gaze of previous generations, what does it mean – what should it mean – to be called to help form the next generation of lawyers and leaders? Are we being faithful to the witness of those who came before us?
Saturday, October 9, 2021
Mark Movsesian and I discuss a set of challenges on the basis of religious scruple to the recently imposed New York COVID vaccine mandate in this new podcast.
Along the way, we chat about some of New York Governor Kathleen Hochul's recent remarks that "[t]here are not legitimate religious exemptions because the leaders of all the organized religions have said there's no legitimate reason." Also: "I'm not aware of a sanctioned religious exemption from any organized religion"; and, "In fact, they are encouraging the opposite. Everybody from the pope on down is encouraging people to get vaccinated." As it happens, Mark and I have expressed some sympathy, in different fora and for somewhat different reasons, for this general position as respects religion's legal definition. But on the existing doctrine, it may run into some problems.
Friday, October 8, 2021
Religious freedom does not matter because the Constitution protects it; instead, the Constitution (like modern human-rights law) protects it because religious freedom matters. It is not a gift from the government; it is a limit on the government. Every person, because he or she is a person, has the right to religious liberty—to embrace, or to reject, religious faith, traditions, practices, and communities. This freedom is enjoyed by, and is important to, religious believers and nonbelievers alike. Religious freedom, protected through law, helps both individuals and communities to flourish. It protects the “private” conscience and also promotes the “public,” common good. Religious or not, devout or not, we all have a stake in the religious-liberty project, and in the success of what Thomas Jefferson called our First Amendment’s “fair” and “novel” experiment.
This article is based on Constitution Day remarks Garnett delivered on September 23, 2021, at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina.
October 8, 2021 | Permalink
Tuesday, October 5, 2021
A new issue of the Journal of Law & Religion has been published, and it's available for free (here) until November 15. The issue features an article from Nate Oman and book review contributions from Frank Ravitch, Cathy Kaveny, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Perry Dane, and many others. Definitely worth checking out.
In recent months, in various forums, there have been interesting and important conversations and debates -- involving many Catholic legal scholars, including Gerard Bradley, Robert George, Sherif Girgis, John Finnis, Adrian Vermeule, and several other MOJ contributors -- about constitutional interpretation, "originalism" in its various stripes and also its rivals, the role of the common good and of natural law in judicial decisionmaking, the (in)adequacy of liberal proceduralism, and so on. The upcoming Dobbs case, in particular, has been central to these conversations and debates. Recently, Hadley Arkes (in the Wall Street Journal) and Ed Whelan (at the Bench Memos blog) had some back-and-forths on these topics. (Go here for some links.)
My friend and former student, Eric Hageman, wrote up a short response to Arkes's WSJ piece, and -- with his permission -- I'm posting it below:
My friend and mentor Hadley Arkes writes again to advance his vision for “a better originalism,” decrying the “truncated originalism” of yesteryear and arguing it is insufficient for conservative judges to reject Roe merely because the Constitution contains no right to abort one’s child. Instead, we are told, judges must reach past written law and decide abortion cases based on the immorality of abortion.
Professor Arkes’s proposal ignores the importance of judicial fidelity to written law, and his attacks are effective only against a third-rate version of originalism.
Though Professor Arkes does not tell us how, precisely, the “better originalist” judge would behave, I assume he would decide cases by referring directly to moral reasoning, as a supplement to (if not outright replacement for) the written law. Applied to, say, Dobbs, the opinion of Arkes, J., would uphold Mississippi’s abortion restriction on the ground that one has no moral right to take a life, setting aside the Constitution’s silence on abortion, the possibility that the due process clauses protect unborn people, and the historical and moral contexts of both.
I doubt I’d have any qualms with Justice Arkes’s moral reasoning, but it would have no business in the U.S. Reports. We are a constitutional republic, which means we’ve delegated certain duties to certain offices and their holders. We have given Congress power to make law. (More accurately, we’ve transmitted some legislative power to Congress from the states.) We’ve given federal judges power to resolve cases or controversies. Sometimes, a case requires a judge to decide whether a statute violates the Constitution, which is the superior law. Judges act within their authority by applying the Constitution over the inferior law (or by leaving the inferior law alone if it does not violate the Constitution). When a judge decides this conflict by relying on anything but the Constitution and statutes (whose meanings are, of course, informed by moral and historical context), she places that consideration above one or the other, contrary to her constitutional power.
These principles are simple and easy to understand, only a step removed from Schoolhouse Rock’s three-ring circus. But, as I’ve written elsewhere, it’s hard to overstate the scandal that takes place when a judge violates these principles, relying on extralegal considerations to “interpret” law. It disserves litigants, actual and potential, who rely on written law to situate their affairs. It tells other judges—including those whose relationship with moral principles and the natural law is more tenuous than Professor Arkes’s—that they, too, may supplement imperfect statutes with their own moral reasoning, which they will not recognize as inferior to Professor Arkes’s. Most importantly, it strips us, the American people, of our right to constitutional republicanism. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell is right: This isn’t merely about results. It’s not even about the words on the page. It’s about sovereignty, about who governs you.
That’s why originalism and textualism are so important: they preserve our constitutional order and our right to govern ourselves. And really, they are no more complicated than the order they protect. Textualism is the simple proposition that statutes mean what their words were understood to mean at the time they were enacted. Originalism is what we call the same proposition applied to the Constitution. Both principles reflect the facts that (1) our laws are written words and (2) words have objective, ascertainable meaning. Viewed like this, theories of textualism are so obvious they hardly deserve a name.
As far as I know, Professor Arkes has yet to cope with this humble account of originalism and textualism. As Ed Whelan argues in his own response, the version of originalism Professor Arkes attacks instead is unrecognizable to most conservative judges. He aims his fire first at Bostock, claiming that Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court would be corrected “most decisively” by the moral truth that sex is unchangeable. But in the same breath, Professor Arkes seems to acknowledge that no single educated reader in 1964 would’ve thought “discrimination on the basis of sex” meant “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation” or “discrimination on the basis of sex identity.” Textualism asks precisely that question, and, applied properly, would solve Bostock to Professor Arkes’s satisfaction. Later, Professor Arkes claims that Loving v. Virginia, which struck down interracial-marriage bans, has no textual basis in the Constitution, which says nothing of marriage. This simply ignores the Equal Protection Clause, which no textualist would do.
I’m deeply disturbed by this theory of “better originalism,” in part because it echoes some of the ugliest features of other recent postliberal arguments. For one, it tends to judge originalism (and itself) only for the results it achieves, ignoring the way it achieves them. But then, despite this consequentialism, the theory cannot account for the results it will yield in the hands of its enemies. Moreover, its proponents hardly ever tell us what affirmative behavior they’d like to see; they simply reject the status quo, optimizing rhetorical leeway. Most concerning, it reflects and appeals to a disturbing cynicism (which I am sincerely, absolutely certain Professor Arkes does not himself share): that neutral principles are fairytales, that we should emulate progressives’ success in setting fire to antiquated notions of pluralism and liberalism. Applied here, that “their” judges have had their fun, and now it’s time for “our” judges to have theirs.
The bitter irony is that the neutral principles Professor Arkes decries would have saved us from the cases he decried. Those principles, intelligently and faithfully applied, would have yielded the results Professor Arkes wants, perhaps indicating that our written law is enough to protect us from progressivism. Herein lies yet another feature of contemporary postliberalism (again, one I’m certain Professor Arkes does not himself suffer): extraordinary ingratitude, a desire to kill the goose that laid the golden egg. Much like centuries of liberal democracy and American capitalism have produced extraordinary prosperity and personal liberty, forty years of textualism and originalism have produced a federal judiciary that reliably rejects progressive excesses and focuses instead on fidelity to the law and the rights of those it exists to serve. Where our liberal democratic principles have failed, it has been because those in power reject, undervalue, and undermine these principles, ignorant of the miraculous conditions in which we find ourselves. But the answer to those failures is more capitalism, more republicanism, more pluralism, and more liberalism.
So too here.
* * *
Eric Hageman is an attorney in Washington, D.C.
Sunday, October 3, 2021
- 41% of Biden voters and 52% of Trump voters at least somewhat agree that red states / blue states should secede from the union to form their own separate country.
- 46% of Biden voters and 44% of Trump voters at least somewhat agree that it would be better for America if whoever is President could take needed actions without being constrained by Congress or the courts.
- 62% of Biden voters and 82% of Trump voters at least somewhat agree that “our country needs a powerful leader in order to destroy the radical and immoral currents prevailing in society today.”
- 56% of Biden voters at least somewhat agree that there’s no real difference between Republicans and Fascists, and 76% of Trump voters at least somewhat agree that there’s no real difference between Democrats and Socialists.
- 75% of Biden voters and 78% of Trump voters at least somewhat agree that Americans who strongly support the opposing party have become “a clear and present danger to the American way of life.”
- 80% of Biden voters and 84% of Trump voters at least somewhat agree that elected officials from the opposing party are a “clear and present danger to American democracy.”
Thursday, September 30, 2021
Tandon v. Newsome, South Bay Pentecostal, & Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn on Religious Liberty and the Pandemic
Tandon v. Newsome, South Bay Pentecostal, & Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn on Religious Liberty and the Pandemic
Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Law
Concurrent Professor of Political Science
Director, Program on Church, State & Society
Notre Dame Law School
Notre Dame Law School
This chapter examines a series of opinions and orders, issued by the Court during its 2020-21 Term, in connection with religious-freedom challenges to various regulations and restrictions issued by governments in response to the Coronavirus pandemic.
Read at SSRN here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3933052
September 30, 2021 | Permalink
A public address by US Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr. on "The Emergency Docket." Presented by the Constitutionalism and Rule of Law Lab at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, with co-sponsorship by the Notre Dame Law School.
September 30, 2021 | Permalink
Monday, September 20, 2021
The McCullen Center at Villanova will host a webinar on Tuesday, September 21 at 4:30pm EDT featuring Stuart Banner of UCLA Law speaking about his book The Decline of Natural Law: How American Lawyers Once Used Natural Law and Why They Stopped (Oxford University Press, 2021) with commentary from Michelle Madden Dempsey (Villanova) and Jeffrey Pojanowski (Notre Dame). Registration and details available here.
Three Notre Dame Law students gained valuable exposure this summer in the area of religious-institutions practice. Sponsored by the Law School’s Program on Church, State & Society, each summer fellow assisted a religiously affiliated organization.
Read about their fellowship experiences here: https://churchstate.nd.edu/news-events/news/program-on-church-state-society-2021-fellows-share-summer-experiences/
September 20, 2021 | Permalink
Wednesday, September 15, 2021
St. Thomas Law opened its doors twenty years ago last month, and one way we are celebrating is by redoubling our commitment to live out our distinctive Catholic mission in ways that meet the needs of our society. Last week, we launched the Initiative on Restorative Justice & Healing, a coordinated effort to leverage our expertise and resources to help restore relationships fractured by injustice, with a particular focus on racial injustice, sexual abuse by clergy and institutional failures within the Catholic church, and societal polarization. Directed by my faculty colleague Fr. Dan Griffith, this project is a great example of our mission in action, demonstrating the importance of integrating legal acumen with empathy, concern for the whole person, and the transformative power of human connection. Fr. Griffith and Professor Hank Shea, a former federal prosecutor, have been co-teaching a course on restorative justice for several years, and we will look to expand those efforts to include a hands-on restorative justice practicum course, community partnerships, externships, lectures, conferences, training sessions, and broader visibility into ways that restorative justice practices can help bring healing to our communities.
With an understanding of justice as right relationships, we believe that this work can be a core component of Catholic legal education.
This video (created by Hunter Johnson) is a helpful introduction to the role that restorative justice has played in the resolution of clergy sexual abuse cases in our Archdiocese, and this video of last week's launch event provides a preview of the Initiative's potential impact. Restorative justice pioneer and former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Janine Geske will chair the Initiative's advisory board.
Monday, September 13, 2021
Case Prompt for Notre Dame Law School’s Sixth Annual National Appellate Advocacy Tournament for Religious Freedom
Just released - the case prompt for this year's National Appellate Advocacy Tournament for Religious Freedom.
The tournament takes place (virtually) Friday, October 8, 2021 through Sunday, October 10, 2021.
There is still room for a few more teams. To register, see this link:https://shop.nd.edu/C21688_ustores/web/product_detail.jsp?PRODUCTID=8367&SINGLESTORE=true
Questions regarding the tournament should be directed to Zahraa Nasser at [email protected]
September 13, 2021 | Permalink