Mirror of Justice

another response on authority/conscience

I had a couple of quick reactions to the useful discussion of authority/conscience.

First, the view that Steve mentions (as set forth by Father James Bretzke SJ) is precisely the view of conscience critiqued by Pope John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor (and critiqued by Pope Benedict in his numerous writings on conscience). In paragraph 32 of VS, JP II mentions that "certain currents of modern thought have gone so far as to exalt freedom to such an extent that it becomes an absolute, which would then be the source of values....The individual conscience is accorded the status of a supreme tribunal of moral judgment which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about good and evil. To the affirmation that one has a duty to follow one's conscience is unduly added the affirmation that one's moral judgment is true merely by the fact that it has its origins in the conscience. But in this way the inescapable claims of truth disappear, yielding their place to a criterion of sincerity, authenticity and 'being at peace with oneself,' so much so that some have come to adopt a radically subjectivistic conception of moral judgment."

This last point is quite important. Under the subjective understanding of conscience, the concepts of good and evil lose meaning. Under the subjective view, we are "infallible," and I realize that there is a attractiveness to that position. (I think that was the only time the idea of infallibility was used in the encyclical.) Our choices are beyond criticism (except in the rare cases when the choice is insincere).

Second, Pope John Paul tried in VS and other writings to counter the idea that adherence to a view of moral truth means that one is subject to the heteronomous commands of an arbitrary sovereign. In the Pope's view, the moral law is something that is built into our human nature. Living in the truth is the key to our genuine fulfillment and authentic freedom. Our adherence to the truth is our participation in the wisdom and providence of God.

Richard M.   

Cathy Kaveny and JP II and the New Feminism

Rob's post and Cathy Kaveny's article raise some good questions. I read through the Catholic Encyclopedia article very quickly and it sounds as if it was written in .... 1912. I surely wouldn't defend every statement in that entry. It should be noted that along with the questionable, sweeping statements in the 1912 Encyclopedia are also statements containing the (prophetic) comment that the negative impact of liberalized divorce laws would principally harm women. There are also other sound features to the 1912 entry, which Cathy notes.

I should say that it is difficult to write Encyclopedia entries. I have some experience with this, having co-edited the Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought (here). I wrote the entry on "feminism" for that Encyclopedia and I'd be happy to send a copy of that entry to anyone who asks.

There are some good questions raised though about the new feminism, and the conference Rob nicely mentioned (which is being organized by my colleague Jane Adolphe and Helen Alvare from CUA) will I'm sure explore these questions in depth.

I do think though that it makes more sense to explore the writings of recent Church documents such as Pope John Paul II's writings on the new feminism or the CDF's 2004 statement "On the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World" (here) then to focus on the questionable comments in the 1912 Encyclopedia entry. Those recent documents strongly defend the importance of the participation of women in public life.

Cathy's more important point though is about the anthropology the Pope uses. That view emphasizes the complementarity of men and women. I'd like to ask Cathy a question or two. Does she disagree with the view that "the genius of women" is needed in all areas of social life or is that phrase of Pope John Paul part of the paternalism to which she objects? Does she disagree with the CDF's view of human nature that celebrates "the importance and the meaning of sexual difference, as a reality deeply inscribed in man and woman"? If Cathy doesn't disagree with JP II or the CDF in these areas, then what is her concern?

Richard M.

   

ministerial exception

I have not yet had a chance to read Greg Kalscheur's article, but I'll just offer a quick comment. I know that is hazardous, but why should that stop me. (On March 21, 2008, the Second Circuit decided a case on this issue that appears to take the subject matter jurisdiction (smj) approach advanced in the article. Here is a link to the Second Circuit case.) I want to think this through again after reading the article, but the smj approach seems wrong. In the Second Circuit case, the plainitiff brought a Title VII claim and surely the federal courts have smj over those claims. It may be that the claim fails (e.g., because the employer doesn't have enough employees to be covered by Title VII) but that doesn't mean that the federal court didn't have smj over the Title VII claim. The claim would fail on the merits.

I am sure that Greg is making a broader point about whether the courts ought to intrude on the matters raised by the ministerial exception, but I think it confuses things (here I am speaking as a Civil Procedure teacher) to think of this as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. The distinction between the merits and subject matter jurisdiction is common, but we shouldn't extend the confusion into an issue (ministerial exception) that is complex enough. The constitutional basis for the ministerial exception, if there is such a basis, should be front and center and we shouldn't be distracted by calling the matter one of "subject matter jurisdiction."

Richard M.

honoring political figures: another controversy at BC

I understand that there has been a lot of controversy at Boston College law school about honoring Attorney General Mukasey. As I understand things, Mukasey will be the commencement speaker at the law school's graduation ceremony but he won't receive the Founder's Medal, which has typically been awarded to commencement speakers.

I don't have a problem with the decision not to give Mukasey the award. I think it is a good thing that (Catholic) schools pay close attention to the people they honor. I don't think that Catholic schools should honor people who have views that are in conflict with authoritative Church teaching on important moral issues. I understand, though, that recent recipients of the Founder's Medal have included pro-choice politicians. Why should BC honor politicians with those records (e.g., a 100% NARAL rating) and not honor Mukasey?

Maybe someone who knows the facts here could provide some additional information.

Richard M.

the scope of substantive due process

Last month, the Fifth Circuit decide a potentially important case, Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle. The opinion is here. The case involves "the constitutionality of a Texas statute making it a crime to promote  or sell sexual devices." The Fifth Circuit, by a 2-1 vote, found the statute unconstitutional. The decision creates a conflict with at least the 11th Circuit, which rejected constitutional challenges to similar Alabama law.

The basic issue in these cases is how to read Lawrence v. Texas. Since 2003, most courts have read Lawrence narrowly. Most courts have been unwilling to extend the Court's ruling to other contexts. Put another way, the dire predictions in Justice Scalia's dissent (that Lawrence puts an end to all morals legislation) have not yet come to pass.

The 5th Circuit's recent ruling takes up Lawrence's invitation. The court extends substantive due process to conduct that doesn't even involve a relationship, a fact mentioned repeatedly in Lawrence. The 5th Circuit also rejects public morality as a sufficient basis for the Texas law.

These cases raise profound issues about the nature of freedom, the state's interest in public morality, and the role of the judiciary, among others.

Richard M.

   

new parental rights decision

On January 31, 2008, the First Circuit decided Parker v. Hurley. Here is a link to the opinion. The court rejected a variety of constitutional claims by parents who complained that their very young children (kindergarten-2d grade) were exposed to books that portrayed same-sex marriage in a favorable light. The parents asked for notice and an opportunity to opt-out. The opinion (which is lengthy) viewed this as basically a re-run of the Mozert case. The court's main reason for rejecting the claims was that the  plaintiffs hadn't pleaded a "constitutionally significant burden." Mere exposure to offensive ideas does not state a claim.

This ruling is nothing new but it still seems to me quite wrong. The idea that there is no burden seems hard to believe. The court seems to admit that the school's choice of books has deeply offended the plaintiffs' sincerely held religious beliefs. The court means that this isn't a cognizable "burden." But the court can only reach this conclusion by understating the impact that the plaintiffs assert (the case was decided on the pleadings and so the court had to accept the plaintiffs' allegations). That deficiency also seemed true in the Mozert case where the court had to redescribe the plainitffs' claim. The courts just don't seem to believe it when parents say that their religion prohibits exposing their children to certain books.

The problem here is that parents do not have sufficient control over the education of their children. It doesn't seem adequate to say that "exposure to the materials in dispute here will not automatically and irreversibly prevent the parents from raising" their children.

This ruling is another instance where the constitutional doctrine departs from Catholic social teaching. That teaching emphasizes parental control over education and also the need for parents to have sufficient resources (vouchers?) to choose the type of education they desire.

Richard M.

comment on Hardt's article

Here are a couple of quick comments on John Hardt's fine article in America (Church Teaching and My Father's Choice). I thought the article was well done. I have some reservations though. I don't think Hardt's approach is at all consistent with the CDF's statement on this issue. I think Hardt's view is similar to the view expressed in the Commonweal editorial we discussed back in December. Here is a link to my brief post on that editorial. In my view, there are a couple of points where Hardt's position diverges from the CDF statement. First, Hardt takes the view that the pvs condition itself is "a fatal pathology." The real "problem" is that these patients won't die soon enough. Second, he seems to subscribe to a dualistic understanding of the person. I think this is reflected in his (dismissive?) reference to "baseline biological existence." Third, I think Hardt makes the common mistake of regarding the life of the patient as "excessively burdensome" rather than focusing on whether the treatment is excessively burdensome. Fourth, despite Hardt's focus on pvs and his statement that the pvs diagnosis "affects only a miniscule number of patients," I think it is quite clear that his discussion (which turns on the subjective evaluation of the patients's condition) is not limited to pvs patients.  His analysis is not incorrect because of that but we ought to acknowledge that his principle is not confined to a narrow situation.

I'll refer again to Mark Latkovic's clear analysis of the moral issues, and to my (less clear) treatment of these issues in connection with the Terri Schiavo case.

Richard M.

 

Scalia and the death penalty

I agree completely with Eduardo's recent post. I may not have made that clear when I briefly described Bob Fastiggi's article on this issue. Fastiggi's article is a critique of Justice Scalia's approach to this issue. Fastiggi takes the view (and I agree with this) that the teachings on the death penalty in EV and the revised Catechism are (although not definitively proclaimed) deserving the treatment set forth in Lumen Gentium 25--the religious submission of intellect and will. This requires more than respectful consideration. Charlie Rice, who wrote the entry on the death penalty for the Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought I recently co-edited, is here a better model than Justice Scalia. After EV and the revised Catechism were issued, Charlie changed his view on this topic.

Richard M.

levels of teaching authority

I am by no means an expert on this issue. There is a very good article on this question by my friend Bob Fastiggi entitled "Capital Punishment, the Magisterium, and Religious Assent." The article was published at 12 Josephinum Journal of Theology 192-213 (Summer/Fall 2005). In this article, he explains the three levels of Church teaching (as set forth in the Profession of Faith). First, are solemn, infallible teachings (e.g., divinity of Christ). Second, are issues definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals (e.g., illicitness of euthanasia, the reservation of priestly ordination to men). Issues in these first two categories are binding on Catholics. Third, are teachings of the Magisterium that have not been definitively proclaimed. Fastiggi places the teachings of JP II and the Catechism on the death penalty in this third category. These teachings are owed the religious submission of intellect and will (as set forth in Lumen Gentium 25).    

Richard M.

Pope Benedict's planned speech at La Sapienza University

Pope Benedict was scheduled to deliver a speech at La Sapienza University in Rome at the beginning of the academic year. In the face of a planned protest, the Vatican cancelled the speech because of a lack of the "prerequisites for a dignified and tranquil welcome." The speech the Pope had planned to deliver has been released. Here is a link. The speech, a follow-up to the Pope's Regensburg address, is quite interesting. In the course of the speech, Benedict discusses Rawls and Habermas.

The speech is marked by Benedict's characteristic humility. His main emphasis is on the importance of the university in the pursuit of truth. He mentions the danger that reason --"if it wants only to construct itself on the basis of the circle of its own arguments and that which convinces it at the moment--worried about its secularity--...will cut itself off from the roots by which it lives; then it will not become more reasonable and more pure, but it will break apart and disintegrate."

He closes with a mention of how he sees his role as Pope--"to continaully invite reason to seek out the true, the good, God, and on this path, to urge it to glimpse the helpful lights that shine forth in the history of the Christian faith, and in this way to perceive Jesus Christ as the Light that illuminates history and helps us to find the way to the future." It's a pity that Benedict was not welcomed to deliver this message in person.

Richard M.

"right to do wrong"--comments

I think I am agreement with Robert Miller in the discussion Rick mentioned yesterday. This whole question--is there a right to do wrong--is tricky because as Miller mentions "there are many senses of the word right."

Miller mentions Dignitatis Humanae and he seems to say that that document endorses the idea that a person can have a right to do wrong. Here is my understanding. The Catechism (2108-2109), principally citing Dignitatis Humanae, states: "The right to religious liberty is neither a moral license to adhere to error, nor a supposed right to error, but rather a natural right of the human person to civil liberty, i.e., immunity, within just limits, from external constraint in religious matters by political authorities." The limits just referenced "must be determined for each social situation by political prudence, according to the requirements of the common good, and ratified by the civil authority in accordance with 'legal principles which are in conformity with the objective moral order.'"

So, there might be a civil immunity to do wrong in certain circumstances. But even this is limited, as the Catechism and Dignitatis Humanae make clear. All "wrongs"--immoral acts--need not be proscribed by the State, but it wouldn't be helpful to say that someone had a moral "right" to do something that the State had decided not to proscribe for prudential reasons. A state might decide not to criminalize suicide (because the state might think that an attempt to commit such an act was more often the product of depression than a "rational" choice). But that doesn't mean that it would be helpful to say that someone had a "right" to suicide.

With regard to abortion, it seems clear that there can be no "right" to such conduct. Even though one may have a civil immunity to do wrong in certain instances this wouldn't extend to abortion because this is the sort of thing that Aquinas mentions when he treats the issue of whether the law ought to prohibit all vices. The law ought to prohibit those vices when the prohibition is necessary to the maintenance of human society (Aquinas mentions murder and theft as examples, and surely this would also extend to abortion.)         

I think it still fair to say that there is no right to do wrong, beyond the limited civil immunity noted above with the limits set forth by the objective moral order.

Richard M. 

Statement about Ave Maria developments

Below is a statement about the latest developments at Ave Maria School of Law.

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On behalf of a majority of the faculty of Ave Maria School of law, we write to express our profound sorrow regarding the deplorable treatment of tenured Professor Stephen J. Safranek at the hands of the administration of Ave Maria School of Law. Dean Bernard Dobranski has initiated the process to terminate Professor Safranek's tenure and the School has now suspended him without pay (as of September 15, 2007) during the termination process. We believe that it is critical to publicly disassociate ourselves from and condemn the administration's conduct.

The professed Mission of Ave Maria School of Law includes full adherence to Ex Corde Ecclesiae, which emphasizes respect for the dignity of every member of the academic community. In our view, the suspension and proposed termination of Professor Safranek does not adhere to this standard. Although we will not discuss the charges against Professor Safranek at this time, we will say that they are painfully thin.

Aside from the weakness of the charges against Professor Safranek, we are troubled by the disciplinary process that has led to the recent actions against him. The stated bases for these actions are a record of "findings" compiled by Dean Dobranski in connection with a series of alleged incidents for which Professor Safranek was ultimately "censured" or "reprimanded." In each instance, the Dean served as the sole arbiter regarding what acts constituted misconduct or "firing offenses" while repeatedly refusing to answer questions seeking clarification of his pronouncements. In nearly every instance, he or his at-will employees were the complainants or "victims" of Professor Safranek's alleged wrongdoing. The Dean served as the sole prosecutor, judge, and jury regarding whether vaguely defined offenses had occurred, usually refusing to even grant the "accused" any detailed information regarding the "charges" before conducting the "inquiry."

This flawed process has now culminated in the extraordinary action of suspending Professor Safranek without pay (as of September 15, 2007) through a vote of the "Executive Committee" of the School's Board. Although the suspension appears unjust in itself, the Dean's chosen procedures are absolutely lacking in even the veneer of fundamental fairness or due process norms. Indeed, the suspension occurred without deliberation by the full Board of Governors, without faculty consultation, without due process, and without any meaningful explanation as to why the circumstances satisfy the relevant standard of an "extraordinary" case. This abuse of this procedure has effectively stripped Professor Safranek, a husband and father of seven children, of the very security that tenure is supposed to afford faculty members at law schools approved by the American Bar Association.

In our view, these actions (and many others) reveal the extent to which this administration has betrayed the Law School's Mission. They further reveal how faculty members can expect to be treated at any law school created in Southwest Florida under the current administration and governing Board. Such a school is unlikely to respect the most basic elements of academic freedom and tenure,let alone dedicate itself to providing an integration of faith and reason designed to serve the Church and the broader community.

Notwithstanding this tragic turn of events, we remain committed to the service of our students and alumni, who provide the primary reason for the Law School's existence. For their sake, we intend to do everything that we can to renew the Law School's commitment to ABA Standards and, more importantly, to the teachings of the Catholic Church as envisioned in Ex Corde Ecclesiae.

We continue to ask for your prayers, your support, and your full participation in our efforts to heal our community and to return the Law School to the pursuit of its Mission.

Yours in Christ,

Richard S. Myers, Mollie A. Murphy, and Joseph L. Falvey, Jr.

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Richard M.

    

Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought is available

I wanted to let people know that the Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought, Social Science, and Social Policy was just released by Scarecrow Press (a divsion of Rowman & Littlefield). I had the great privilege of editing this project with Michael L. Coulter (Grove City), Stephen M. Krason (Franciscan University), and Joe Varacalli (Nassau Community College-SUNY). This project was sponsored by the Society of Catholic Social Scientists. The Encyclopedia is nearly 1200 pages and is published in 2 volumes. There are about 850 entries from nearly 300 contributors.

Some of the prominent contributors include Cardinal George Pell (Sydney), Bishop Giampaolo Crepaldi (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace), Bishop Nicholas DiMarzio (Brooklyn, New York), Bishop J. Michael Miller (Congregation for Catholic Education and just named to Vancouver BC), Father C. John McCloskey (Faith and Reason Institute), Mary Ann Glendon (Harvard), James Hitchcock (St. Louis U), Mark Latkovic (Sacred Heart Major Seminary), William E. May (JP II Institute), Father Francis Canavan SJ (Fordham), Father Joseph Koterski SJ (Fordham), Charles Rice (Notre Dame), Ronald Rychlak (Ole Miss), Russell Shaw (Pontifical University of the Holy Cross), and Paul Vitz (Institute for Psychological Sciences).

Ave Maria School of Law had a critical role in the project. Dean Bernard Dobranski generously supported the project since its inception. My assistants Sheri (Ashley) Fornell and Sharon Sansoterra were instrumental to our efforts. Sue Berendt and Dia Moulton also contributed greatly. A number of Ave Maria students (Albert A. Starkus III, Trent Pepper, Daniel G. Byrne, and Heather Brenneman Miles) provided important research assistance. The following Ave Maria professors also contributed entries--Jane Adolphe, Howard Bromberg, Joseph Falvey Jr., Bruce Frohnen, Patrick Quirk, Stephen Safranek, and James Sonne.   

We think that this is a unique resource. It is a bit expensive for individual purchase (the list pric eis $150) although it would certainly be appropriate for libraries. We tried to make an effort to include a range of perspectives within the Catholic tradition. So, for example, on economic issues we have contributions that range from those that are more free-market oriented to those from a more distributist perspective.

We are hoping to have a website resource available within a couple of weeks. This website will have the full list of entries and contributors and also include sample entries so that people can get an idea of the quality of the Encyclopedia. I will post something when the website is on-line.

Richard M.      

Benedict XVI on the Postconciliar Period

Sandro Magister has a fascinating transcript of Pope Benedict XVI reflecting on the postconciliar period. Here. Although we all have our own thoughts about this period, I don't think many have the wisdom and historical perspective of Benedict (I have to say my knowledge of the aftermath of the Council of Nicaea is a bit thin). The transcript closes with a beautiful passage that reflects Benedict's humility and his deep love of "the Crucified One" and his optimism. I will only quote the last line of the transcript--"In this combination of the humility of the Cross and the joy of the risen Lord, who in the Council has given us a great road marker, we can go forward joyously and full of hope."

Richard M.

a few more thoughts on speakers

I very much appreciate the further comments from Karen Stohr, Tom Berg, and Father Araujo. I am not sure I have a lot to add. I do think that Karen makes a good point about drawing a distinction between Catholic and non-Catholic speakers. While I think it would be inappropriate for a Catholic university to give an honorary degree to the Governor of Michigan (Jennifer Granholm), who stated that she was 100% pro-choice the last time she ran for office, it would make it make it worse in my mind if a Catholic university did so because she is prominently identified as a Catholic.

I think there are a range of cases here. We mentioned this a bit last Spring with regard to Condoleezza Rice. The opposition to her focused on her position on the war. I mentioned that critics might also have cited her mildly pro-choice views. I think one could argue that since her views on abortion had not been a part of her public responsibilities that it would be appropriate not to disqualify her on these grounds alone. I guess one could think about other cases when the speaker's identification with (and role in implementing) a position that is in conflict with Church teaching might be more or less clear. People seem to agree that it would not be appropriate to honor someone such as Kate Michelman even if she were being honored for her work on a worthy cause (e.g., breast cancer awareness). Other cases might be tougher. What about honoring (by inviting the person to give a conference keynote speech) the head of the ACLU who would speak on free speech. The connection of the ACLU with the abortion rights perspective would in my mind make this choice inadvisable. I suppose it's better to look at concrete examples because I am not sure that I've thought about this enough to know whether it is possible to come up with a set of principles in advance.

With regard to candidates, I don't have a problem with debates or with something close to a debate (a series of talks by candidates). There may be some risks with this though because I think candidates sometimes use their Catholic identity when it is clear they don't share the Church's moral beliefs. So, a Catholic candidate for Governor might emphasize her role as a Eucharistic minister at her parish or feature in her campaign literature a talk she gave to a local Catholic high school. I don't think a Catholic institution ought to be wary about being used by the politician.

Maybe, as Father Araujo suggests, Catholic schools shouldn't be so eager to have the "benefits" of having speakers in lofty positions (presidents, governors, etc.).

Richard M. 

       

honoring Bush

Eduardo has some good questions about the propriety of honoring President Bush. Here is a very quick response. I'd say that Bush's support for the death penalty is not inconsistent with the Church's teaching. I'd agree with Avery Dulles (here) that the Church has not (yet) taken the view that the death penalty is always immoral, and that the decision about whether it is permissible in certain conditions is a prudential judgment on which people can reasonably disagree. On the war in Iraq, we discussed this a bit last year when the issue of honorary degrees came up in the context of Boston College and Condoleezza Rice. Here was my view at that time. I took the view that the administration had not taken a position that was inconsistent with Church teaching and that the area of disagreement about the war (I suspect that my views on this are probably close to Eduardo's) related to prudential judgments. On torture, if the Bush Administration has defended a position contrary to that expressed in the Catechism (2297-2298) than I'd say that would be grounds for opposing an honorary degree.

Richard M.

    

commencement speeches

I have to disagree with Karen Stohr about her take on commencement speeches. She contends that rescinding an invitation means that the school is saying that the speaker can't make a contribution to the communal project of pursuing the truth. I don't think that is what is going on here at all. I think honorary degrees and commencement speeches (usually the speaker is also receiving an honorary degree, at least where we are talking about higher education) send a message about the school's identity. The honor is being bestowed on someone the school thinks it ought to honor. While the honor doesn't necessarily mean that the school endorses everything the person has ever said or done, the choice to honor someone who disagrees with Church teaching on very important issues has the potential to interfere with the clarity of the message that the school ought to be trying to communicate.

The school might think the person had something to contribute to a a discussion of an issue and it might be appropriate to have a debate between Mario Cuomo and Henry Hyde or Judge James Buckley about the role of a public servant. It would be perfectly appropriate for the school to have a debate on infanticide featuring Peter Singer and Robby George or a discussion on liberation theology involving Father Sobrino and Pope Benedict.

But a commencement speech is not a debate. The school is defining itself through these selections and the selection (the honoring) of someone who is in favor of abortion rights communicates either that the school doesn't think there is anything wrong with the person's views or that the error in the person's views isn't terribly important. With regard to the issue of abortion, I think those are the wrong messages to be sending.

Richard M.    

    

liberation theology

Thanks to Eduardo for the post on the Ny Times article on liberation theology. I thought it was interesting that the article doesn't say much about the theological aspects of the movement. The theology of the movement was the Vatican's concern in the recent document relating to the works of Father Jon Sobrino SJ. That document, contrary to what the Times suggested, was a doctrinal and not a disciplinary document. The Vatican made it clear that the preoccupation with the poor and the oppressed is shared by the whole Church. The theological elements that the Vatican has criticized go to the core of the Christian message. The Explanatory Note accompanying the Notification states that Father Sobrino's "methodolgical errors give rise to conclusions which do not conform to the doctrine of the Church in certain key areas: the divinity of Jesus Christ, the Incarnation of the Son of God, the relationship of Jesus with the Kingdomof God, Jesus' self-consciousness, and the salvific value of Jesus' death."

The concern for the poor expressed is admirable. The practical strategies of the liberation theologians, though, should be judged by practical concerns (Will it Liberate? was the title of a book by Michael Novak on liberation theology that suggests the proper focus). The concerns that many have about liberation theology are its heterodox understanding of theology and its tendency to equate arguable political programs with the Gospel.

Maybe Eduardo could explain a bit more about why he thinks the theological aspects of the movement are so creative.

Richard M.

 

University Faculty for Life conference at Villanova

The annual meeting/conference of University Faculty for Life (UFL) will be held at Villanova on June 1-3, 2007. This year's conference, which is being supported by Our Sunday Visitor Institute and Ave Maria School of Law, is being organized by Jeanne (Heffernan) Schindler from Villanova. This year's conference should be excellent. The speakers will include Helen Alvare, David L. Schindler, and John Keown. The call for papers (and other conference information) is available on the UFL website. I hope to see many of you there.

Richard M.

 

forthcoming encyclopedia of Catholic social thought

I mentioned this project before, but I wanted to alert people to a forthcoming Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought. Here. I am one of 4 co-editors of this volume. My co-editors are Michael Coulter, Steve Krason, and Joe Varacalli. We have been working on this for over 5 years and we just received the page-proofs; publication is due this summer.

The encyclopedia is large (it should be about 1200 pages) and includes approximately 850 entries from over 300 contributors. Most of the contributors are members of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists and/or the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Father Araujo SJ is one of the contributors along with my Ave Maria colleagues Jane Adolphe, Howard Bromberg, Joe Falvey, Bruce Frohnen, Patrick Quirk, Steve Safranek, and Jim Sonne. Other contributors include Cardinal Pell, Archbishop Michael Miller, Mary Ann Glendon, Father Canavan SJ, Bill May, Mark Latkovic, David Gregory, Father Joe Koterski SJ, and many, many others. I hope that people will take a close look at the volume.

Richard M. 

religious liberty and truth

Rob asked about the relationship between religious liberty and truth and wondered why truth doesn't limit the operation of religious liberty. I think Dignitatis Humanae does make it clear that religious liberty must be understood in light of and is limited by the objective moral law. According to Father Brian Harrison, Dignitatis Humanae's reference to the objective moral law was inserted after an intervention by then-Archbishop Karol Wojtyla. This linkage between freedom and truth was a key theme for Pope John Paul II throughout his pontificate, in particular in Vertitatis Splendor.

The Catechism (at 2108-2109) makes this point in this way: "The right to religious liberty is neither a moral license to adhere to error, nor a supposed right to error, but rather a natural right of the human person to civil liberty, i.e., immunity, within just limits, from external constraint in religious matters by political authorities. This natural right ought to be acknowledged in the juridical order of society in such a way that it constitutes a civil right. The right to religious liberty can of itself be neither unlimited nor limited only by a 'public order' conceived in a positivist or naturalist manner. The 'due limits' which are inherent in it must be determined for each social situation by political prudence, according to the requirements of the common good, and ratified by the civil authority in accordance with 'legal principles which are in conformity with the objective moral order.'"

Dignitatis Humanae did not endorse Casey-style reasoning about individual moral autonomy.

Richard M.      

Solemnity of St. Joseph

On this Solemnity, I thought I'd encourage people to read Pope John Paul II's Apostolic Exhortation on St. Joseph. Here. I think it is unfortunate that this document is so little known. The short section on "work as an expression of love" is valuable for those of us who toil in "secular" occupations.

Richard M. 

comment on Welby case

In large part because I don't think I have a clear idea of the underlying facts, I am not entirely sure how to evaluate the Welby case. I have been concerned by some of the arguments made in defending Welby's actions. For example, the article by John Paris from the Tablet had the subtitle--"A life too burdensome." That seems to me the wrong approach to take. Catholic teaching on this issue has drawn a distinction between burdensome treatments and burdensome lives. To regard some lives, in impaired conditions, as too burdensome gets close to denying the good of human life. In the Terri Schiavo case, for instance, that seems to be precisely the dynamic. To the people who were so eager to have her food and water withdrawn, her life was not worth living and some, her husband, regarded her as already dead. But for Terri, the treatment wasn't burdensome. Her life had a value that ought to have been respected throught he continued administration of ordinary care. That was the point of John Paul II's message on the treatment of PVS patients. But for Terri's husband, her continued existence was obviously too burdensome. 

Human life, however valuable, need not be preserved at all costs and there are situations where the treatment may be too burdensome (or extraordinary or disproportionate). Maybe that was the case in the Welby situation. Most commentators think that it was permissible to have removed the respirator in the Karen Ann Quinlan case, although her food and water were not withdrawn and she lived for a number of years. Maybe the Welby case was different, though, because he seemed intent on securing his death (not just avoiding atreatment that had proved too burdensome). The whole use of his case to promote the "right to die" movement in Italy seems to suggest that something more significant was going on then just replaying the Quinlan case. The ideological use of his situation and death certainly weighed into Cardinal Ruini's decision to deny a Church funeral.

Richard M.   

"The Family and Human Procreation"

On June 6, 2006, the Pontifical Council for the Family announced the publication of "The Family and Human Procreation." (The document is dated May 13, 2006.) I have had a lot of trouble locating the document and recently ran across an English translation here, on the Women for Faith & Family website. The document reflects on the current threats to the family and attempts to "shed light on the anthropological foundations of family life as a place or environment for procreation and will thereby help the many people today who desire to lead a rich and fruitful family life and contribute to the social regeneration of the family in contexts where such regeneration is necessary."

The document is quite wide-ranging. I was particularly struck by its efforts to explore how the family helps to promote solidarity and to avoid the excessive individualism of much of Western culture.

Richard M.

chris kaczor on ectopic pregnancy

Chris Kaczor (Loyola Marymount) has written a paper entitled "Ectopic Pregnancy and the Catholic Hospital" that he will present at a meeting of the US Bishops in February. I am sure that he'd send a copy to anyone who is interested. He can be reached at crkazor@aol.com or ckaczor@lmu.edu.

In this paper, Chris considers the various treatment options and concludes that salpingostomy and methotrexate may both be used by Catholic hospitals since the underlying moral issues have not yet been definitively resolved.

Richard M.

new book on double effect

I wanted to mention a new book on double effect. The book is Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil by Thomas A. Cavanaugh. It is available in the UK and is scheduled to be published in the US very soon by Oxford University Press. Tom Cavanaugh is the chair of the philosophy department at the University of San Francisco and has written several noteworthy articles on this issue. I haven't yet read the book but I expect that it will make an important contribution to the discussion of double effect.

Richard M.

another comment on ectopic pregnancy

I very much appreciate the further comments of Karen Stohr and Rob and Julian Velasco. The problem I have with Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle's argument is that it seems too abstract. It seems a much too facile way of just "redescribing" the actions of the doctor. It doesn't focus adequately on the physical act that is being undertaken. So, they justify craniotomy as not involving intentional killing because the surgeon "intends" to save the mother's life and is just rearranging the skull of the fetus. That seems euphemistic. Under this approach to thinking about intention, in the ectopic pregnancy example (and maybe this would apply to justify an abortion too) the doctor doesn't intend to "kill" the embryo he is just "removing" the embryo. I think that is some cases (as Chris Kaczor has pointed out), this "removal" can result in the successful implantation of the embryo and if that is true then the death of the embryo is not essential to accomplish the doctor's goals. Bill May cites a doctor who says that this removal-with-possibility-of-implantation is not the way this procedure is usually employed. I'd agree that the physical description isn't alone decisive, and that it is not decisive that the doctor acts on the embryo. May does distinguish salpingectomy by stating that it is a procedure performed on the body of the mother and not the child and that a salpingostomy is performed on the child's body, securing its death in the very act of removing it. May seems to have in mind something that Kevin Flannery has discussed in trying to distinguish intention/foresight--that we ought to look at the norms of medical practice. As Flannery states in discussing the hysterectomy example, it is to benefit the mother's health that the gravid cancerous uterus is removed. The craniotomy does no good to the patient upon whom the doctor acts although the purpose is good (to save the mother's life).

I am not sure this adequately responds to Karen's arguments, and my colleague Ed Lyons tells me that my account presented here doesn't do the job. I thought I'd post these reflections in order to stimulate some further discussion. I think this excahnge has helped me to clarify my thinking, even if that might not be apparent to anyone else.

Thanks again.

Richard M.

Society of Catholic Social Scientists annual meeting

Before too much time goes by, I wanted to mention the most recent annual meeting of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists. The meeting/conference was at the University of Dallas. The plenary talks were by Ron Rychlak (Mississippi Law) and by J. Budziszewski (Texas Philosophy). The latter talk featured insightful comments by my colleague Kevin Lee and by Frank Beckwith. The banquet address was by Gerry Wegemer (Dallas, English) who spoke with great eloquence about the witness of St. Thomas More.

The SCSS is a good group, and I encourage people to take a look at its activities. Most of the members are not law professors, and so the conferences are usually quite diverse (some law, but more history, political theory, sociology, etc.). I don't mean to slight the law professors--there was a very good session featuring 3 professors from Mississippi Law--Ron Rychlak, John Czarnetzky, and Kyle Duncan. 

One important SCSS project is a forthcoming encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought. See this link for information.

Richard M.

ectopic pregnancy and moral reasoning

I think the basic disagreement here is over a broader question of moral reasoning. The basic point I was trying (albeit not too clearly) was that there are moral absolutes. There are exceptionless moral norms that must be honored even if the actor has a good motive or has some further intention (sometimes described as remote or ulterior) that is good. So, persons have a right not to be killed, even if they are going to die soon and even if their killing would result in some good effects (relieve their suffering and the suffering of their family, save money, etc.). So, in the questions put by Michael Perry, I'd say that the fetus has a right not to be killed (this violates the exceptionless moral norm described by May, and by JP II in Veritatis Spelndor and Evangelium Vitae, that there should be no intentional killing of an innocent human person), even if everything else he says is true. That act is a violation of human dignity, even if the fetus would soon die or might die from other methods (removal of the fallopian tube).

The stakes here are quite high (this broader issue of moral reasoning) even though the ectopic pregnancy instance is a hard case. Kelly Bowring describes this well in his article, where he mentions that his wife was faced with an ectopic pregnancy that was treated by salpingectomy. I think his wife has gone on to have 5-6 children since that time.

Richard M. 

ectopic pregnancy: two references

Here are two good sources on the issue of management of ectopic pregnancies: first, Bill May discusses this issue at some length in his book "Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life" beginning at page 182; second, Kelly Bowring published an article on this in the annual volume of University Faculty for Life. Both conclude, quoting May, that "the use of the drug methotrexate and the surgical procedure of salpingostomy [are immoral because they are judged] to be acts of abortion understood as the intentional killing of the innocent unborn." The reasoning supporting this conclusion, as Rob noted earlier, is that the principle of double effect doesn't apply because the act involved is viewed as a direct abortion that cannot be defended by resort to a good motive (protecting the mothers' future fertility). Rob views this as hair-splitting but I think it is quite reasonable to rely on the view that one shouldn't do evil to achieve some good end. We see this in the assisted suicide debate all the time. We don't allow Jack Kevorkian to intentionally kill just because he claims to have a good motive (relieving pain).

Richard M. 

drinan chairs: a comment

I guess I'll offer a comment about the Georgetown and BC chairs honoring Father Drinan. My first reaction is that these decsions are not a huge surprise but that the decisions are open to serious question. I am sure that Father Drinan has done a lot of good things in his long career. (One of my younger sisters was his research assistant a couple of decades ago and she had good things to say about his personal qualities.) But his public profile involves a long record of support for abortion rights. That record includes his scandalous New York Times op-ed in support of President Clinton's veto of a ban on partial-birth abortions. I understand that he recanted that op-ed but I don't think that recantation received much attention. Father Drinan also serves on the Boards of the ACLU and PFAW, groups that are not known for their strong support of Catholic social teaching. Given this record (and perhaps he has reformed on the issue of abortion), I don't think that a Catholic law school ought to have a chair in his honor. Maybe the theory is that his other work cancels out these lapses, but the message that is being sent is that the areas where he departs from the teachings of the Church must not be terribly important.

When we discussed the Rice honorary degree, I noted that a school defines itself in part by the people the school chooses to honor and to hold up as role models. These actions do not signal a whole-hearted embrace of Ex Corde.   

Richard M.   

Drinan Chair?

Because the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling is 90 pages long, I thought I'd ask about a less controversial issue. What do folks think about Georgetown Law School's recent announcement of a Drinan Chair in Human Rights? Do you think that we will witness a protest like the one we saw at Boston College this spring over the controversial award of an honorary degree?

Richard M.

      

conscience and democracy, again

Thanks to Steve for his recent post on conscience and democracy. I think a useful way to think about this is to ask whether one's conscience is infallible. In some versions of conscience, it seems that one's conscience can never be mistaken--that it is a capacity to decide about the content of good and evil. (As Pope Benedict has recently stated, this view destroys the categories of good and evil.) The understanding of conscience set forth in the Catechism (sections 1776-1802) and Veritatis Splendor (which, I take it, Steve rejects) is different. In that view, conscience (freedom) is linked to truth. Under this view, one has a duty to follow one's conscience, but that determination can be wrong. The Catechism discusses this at some length under the heading "erroneous judgment." Under Steve's view, is this category an empty set?

I admit to being perplexed by Steve's view that the Catechism's view of conscience is inconsistent with American democracy. Does he mean to say that one could not follow the Magisterium on a disputed moral question without somehow breaking faith with American democracy? Or just that one could not support a law that was consistent with a moral view held by the Magisterium because that would violate the Establishment Clause? There are, of course, many who might react negatively to someone who held the view expressed by the Catechism but I understood Steve to be suggesting something far more sweeping.

Richard M.

   

Pope Benedict on faith, reason, and the university

Courtesy of Sandro Magister (and my colleague Ed Lyons who directed my attention to this), here is Pope Benedict's address on faith and reason and the university. I haven't had a chance for a careful read yet, but a quick glance suggests that it is well worth a careful read.

Richard M.

Reminder about Ave Maria conference on John Paul the Great

After reading Patrick Brennan's recent post about the upcoming Scarpa conference at Villanova, I started thinking--what a great conference, but why do these conferences fall when the baseball pennant races are swinging into high gear, when important college football games (ND-Michigan) are being played, and when many of us are trying to figure out the offsides rule while watching youth soccer games. I then realized that I won't be attending to any of these important matters this weekend either because there is another important conference that will be occupying the time of contributors and friends to MOJ.

On Septemeber 15-16, 2006, Ave Maria School of Law will be hosting a conference on "Pope John Paul II and the Law." This conference is being supported by a generous grant from Our Sunday Visitor Institute. Information about the conference is available here.

Here is the list of speakers, in order of appearance--Kevin Lee, Gerry Bradley, Howard Bromberg, Father Kevin Flannery S. J., Ed Peters, Jane Adolphe, Father Robert Araujo S. J., Jason Eyster, and Richard Myers. I hate to single out any particular speaker but I think the highlights will be Ed Peters's talk on canon law (a much-neglected topic) and the different perspectives on capital punishment that will be offered by Father Flannery (from the Gregorian who this year is the Remick Fellow at Notre Dame's Center for Ethics and Culture) and my colleague Howard Bromberg.

The papers from the conference will be published by the Ave Maria Law Review in the spring of 2007

Richard M.         

another conference on Pope John Paul II and the Law

On September 15-16, 2006, Ave Maria School of Law will be hosting a conference on Pope John Paul II and the Law. The conference is supported by a generous grant from Our Sunday Visitor Institute.  Jane Adolphe, Father Robert Araujo S. J., Gerry Bradley, Howard Bromberg, Jason Eyster, Father Kevin Flannery S. J., Kevin Lee, Richard Myers, and Ed Peters will be speaking at the conference. The papers from the conference will be published in the Ave Maria Law Review. Conference information (schedule, registration form) is available here. 

Richard M.

St. Antoninus and abortion

The book to consult on this issue is John Connery S. J.'s book "Abortion: The Development of the Roman Catholic Perspective" (Loyola University Press 1977). Father Connery explains that Antoninus relied on the distinction between the animated and unanimated fetus that was prevalent before the process of fetal development was understood. Antoninus condemned abortion of the animated fetus in all cases. For the unanimated fetus, Antoninus allowed abortion to save the life of the mother. According to Father Connery, this was completely dependent on the distinction between the animated and unanimated fetus