Mirror of Justice

Margaret Farley at Notre Dame, No Less!

Sister Margaret is giving a lecture at Notre Dame tomorrow (Wednesday).  Click here for details.

Then, on Thursday, she will discuss her new book--the one Rob referenced in his post--with an interdisciplinary group of Notre Dame faculty.  If you would like informatioon about the Thursday gathering, please e-mail Cathy Kaveny (who studied under Margaret at Yale):

m.cathleen.kaveny.1@nd.edu

Michael P.

Margaret Farley

In his post below, Rob refers to Margaret Farley's new book.  MOJ-readers may be interested to know that Margaret Farley , who holds an endowed position at Yale Divinity School, is Sister Margaret Farley:  She is a member of the Sisters of Mercy--and a past president of the Society of Christian Ethics.

Reply to Richard Myers

Dear Richard,

Your invocation of Dr. Kevorkian suggests to me that you may not grasp Rob Vischer's point.

Assume (1) that objective O is a morally worthy objective (e.g., saving the life of a pregnant woman with an ectopic pregnancy).

Assume (2) that under the doctrine of double effect it is it is morally permissible for me to take action A (e.g., surgically remove the fallopian tube) in order to achieve O even though A will result in the death of Z (e.g., the fetus).

Assume (3) that I can achieve O by killing Z intentionally--and that the advantage of this latter course of action over action A is that I can achieve something else that is morally worthy (e.g., preserving the woman's capacity to bear children).

Given that no matter which of the two paths I take Z is going to die, and given that it is morally permissible for me to take action A, why should we accept that it is morally impermissible for me to kill Z intentionally, thereby achieving something that is morally worthy at no cost to Z, who is going to die no matter which choice I make?

Michael

Drinan Chairs

MOJ friend, John Breen, points us to an article by James Hitchcock entitled "The Strange Political Career of Fr. Drinan."  The article suggests that in addition to being a darling of the pro-abortion lobby, Drinan (and his immediate provincial superiors) put a political agenda ahead of obedience to the Father General of the Society, Pedro Arrupe, leading them to employ various tactics, including delay, casuistry, obfuscation, and calculated deception, to achieve their objectives.

ectopic pregnancy: two references

Here are two good sources on the issue of management of ectopic pregnancies: first, Bill May discusses this issue at some length in his book "Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life" beginning at page 182; second, Kelly Bowring published an article on this in the annual volume of University Faculty for Life. Both conclude, quoting May, that "the use of the drug methotrexate and the surgical procedure of salpingostomy [are immoral because they are judged] to be acts of abortion understood as the intentional killing of the innocent unborn." The reasoning supporting this conclusion, as Rob noted earlier, is that the principle of double effect doesn't apply because the act involved is viewed as a direct abortion that cannot be defended by resort to a good motive (protecting the mothers' future fertility). Rob views this as hair-splitting but I think it is quite reasonable to rely on the view that one shouldn't do evil to achieve some good end. We see this in the assisted suicide debate all the time. We don't allow Jack Kevorkian to intentionally kill just because he claims to have a good motive (relieving pain).

Richard M. 

Taboo v. "Justice"

William Placher has written an interesting review of Margaret Farley's Just Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics:

According to Farley, the basic question of sexual ethics is, "With what kinds of motives, under what kinds of circumstances, in what forms of relationships, do we render our sexual selves to one another in ways that are good, true, right and just?" Just turns out to be the key word. Being just to others means giving them their due—respecting individual differences but treating each individual as of unconditional value.

In just relationships we do no unjust harm (a difficult challenge given how vulnerable people make themselves in sexual relations); we do nothing without the consent of our partner; and we establish relationships based on mutuality and equality. We love in ways that take into consideration the commitments we are making for the future. While not all sexual activity involves producing children, it should take place in a context of responsibility for future generations and a commitment not to harm third parties or forget our wider responsibilities to social justice. These principles provide a middle ground between the traditional rules and "anything goes."

. . . . The lasting effects of "sexual taboo morality," Farley writes, "might have to do with developing shame and guilt more than wisdom and prudence about human sexuality."

The key question, of course, is whether we lose more than "shame and guilt" when we lose the taboo.  Placher takes note:

Sexual passion is powerful stuff. At least on some occasions an old-fashioned taboo may be a stronger controlling force than a principle of justice. In a society where sex is used to sell nearly everything, young people (and not-so-young people) find living a sexually responsible life really hard. Margaret Farley has the guts and the clarity of mind to give us a third alternative to "narrowly constituted moral systems and rules" on the one hand and sexual chaos on the other. Whether enough people in our society have the good sense and self-discipline to put such a proposal into practice is a harder question.

Rob

First Things web site

The First Things web site for today (October 30, 2006) contains a somewhat more developed version of my blog a few weeks back on "construction vs. development". See http://www.firstthings.com/

Richard S.

Scholarship Is Stranger Than Fiction . . .

Aldous Huxley Veronique Munoz-Darde has posted her novel, Brave New World article, Rawls, Justice in the Family and Justice of the Family.  Here is the abstract:

I contend that a form of contractualism more individualistic than Rawls' would do better at addressing concerns about justice and the family raised by feminist theorists, and that it would also compel us to be more egalitarian. Dissatisfactions expressed with Rawls's neglect of issues related to gender and the family can only be addressed if 'parties in the original position' are strictly defined as individuals. Thus defined, they are not only able to address questions of justice within families, but can also explore the less familiar question of justice of the family, namely whether the family should exist, from the point of view of justice. I conclude by exploring the question of whether the family should be abolished, in view of its leading to life chances unequal between individuals, and compare the family with a generalized, well resourced and well run orphanage.

In the paper itself, she concludes that "I am not sure on further scrutiny that the family scores better than the orphanage."  I don't think she's kidding.

Rob

Cheap Grace & Ectopic Pregnancy

Notre Dame law prof Julian Velasco responds to my question about where to find the natural law if the dictates of our consciences tell us that it's morally permissible to remove an embryo when the mother's life is at stake:

It may well be true that "the vast majority of persons of faith who do value life, including pre-born life, would choose my course of action on this issue."  But I suppose that it would also be true that the vast majority of person of faith who do value marriage, including chastity, would choose to engage in premarital sex.  It is probably also true that, in many times and places, the vast majority of people of faith who did value life, including the lives of slaves, would also choose to have slaves.  Consciences can be corrupted by culture.  The "everybody would do it" defense, assuming its accuracy, may be a mitigating circumstance reducing the degree of an actor's culpability, but it has no bearing on the objective morality of the issue.

I think the problem is one of presumption.  It's not so much that people believe that what they are doing is perfectly good in God's eyes, but rather that they feel comfortable that a loving and understanding God will forgive the offense.  ("After all, I would forgive this, and God is much more forgiving than I am, so surely He will forgive it.")  And well He might; but the issue is whether there is an offense, not whether there will be forgiveness.

Presumption becomes especially problematic when one moves from the truly difficult circumstance, e.g., an ectopic pregnancy, to the more general one, e.g., an unwanted pregnancy.  If it is wrong to move from "abortion is wrong" to "no abortions, even in ectopic pregnancies," it is far more wrong to move from "abortion may be permissible in extreme circumstances" to "abortion may be permissible more generally."

I agree with Julian that Americans are easy prey for the "cheap grace" mindset.  But at least on the question of the permissible means of ending an ectopic pregnancy, I think the issue is not whether I will be forgiven, but how I've given offense in the first place.  Given the difficulty of articulating the moral claim at issue (you must remove the tube, not just the embryo) in a way that resonates with our core convictions, to what else do we appeal?  This gets back to Steve's earlier observation that "If natural law is written on our hearts, the Catholic position should be capable of defense without resort to authority."

Rob

Wills on Bush and religion

In the New York Review of Book, Garry Wills has a long essay criticizing the Bush Administration for what Wills regards as its excessive injection of religion into policymaking.  It's overheated and unfair, in my view (e.g., "[t]he labyrinthine infiltration of the agencies was invisible to Americans outside the culture of the religious right").  In the end, I do not think it is a stretch to say that, in Wills's view, any argument or position that is (a) held by the Bush Administration and some Christians (b) with which Wills disagrees is a "faith based" position.

The piece is basically a bill of particulars.  One charge, in the section called "faith-based justice," struck me as particularly unfounded:

Ashcroft's use of the Civil Rights Division for religious purposes was broader than his putting partial-birth abortion under its jurisdiction. Tom Hamburger and Peter Wallsten, two critics of Republican policies, write in One Party Country:

In 2002, the department established within its Civil Rights Division a separate "religious rights" unit that added a significant new constituency to a division that had long focused on racial injustice. When the Salvation Army— which had been receiving millions of dollars in federal funds—was accused in a private lawsuit of violating federal antidiscrimination laws by requiring employees to embrace Jesus Christ to keep their jobs, the Civil Rights Division for the first time took the side of the alleged discriminators.

Surely, in a government constrained by our First Amendment, and dedicated to honoring our longstanding commitment to religious freedom, it is entirely appropriate for the "Department of Justice" to include in the "constituency" of the Civil Rights Division those who care not only about racial injustice but also discrimination against religion?

DOJ gives up on prison program

Over at Balkinization, Marty Lederman writes:

DOJ Comes to Its Senses on Faith-Based Prison Program

Marty Lederman

Several months ago, I argued here that the Department of Justice's proposed "residential multi-faith restorative justice program" entitled Life Connections was "manifestly unconstitutional in several respects." I wondered how the Office of Legal Counsel could possibly have signed off on this program.

Well, it appears that someone -- probably in OLC -- has thankfully had some sober second thoughts. On Thursday, DOJ cancelled the program "in its entirety."

[NOTE: This blatantly unconstitutional federal program did have the virtue of raising one very interesting and important constitutional question: Whether the state may ever attempt to promote religious faith or transformation, even (or especially) as a means of advancing secular ends (e.g., rehabilitation, cessation of alcohol dependence, etc.) that the state suspects to be correlated with faith.

I discussed that question with Rick Garnett and Doug Laycock here -- with links to additional thoughts from Steve Shiffrin and Rob Vischer.]

Church Autonomy takes a bit hit

In the U.K., anyway.  Professor Friedman reports:

Clergy Get Employment Protection In Britain

Britain's Employment Appeal Tribunal yesterday handed down a landmark case holding that clergy will be treated as employees of the church for purposes of bringing unfair dismissal cases. Reporting on the case, Personnel Today said that previously ministers were regarded British courts as appointed to a holy office, and not as employees. The decision in New Testament Church of God v. Stewart, (EAT, Oct. 27, 2006), relies on last year's House of Lords decision in Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission, [2006] IRLR 195, in reaching its conclusion. (See prior posting.)

Brooks on Santorum

It seems quite likely that Robert Casey -- a Catholic Democrat -- will defeat Rick Santorum -- a Catholic Republican -- in next week's Pennsylvania Senate election.  I realize that many of my friends and colleagues regard this as a good thing, particularly for the Democrats-for-Life cause.  But, as David Brooks's recent New York Times column suggests (no link available, due to the Times' silly "Times Select" feature), we should hope that, if he is defeated, Sen. Santorum and his service are remembered accurately, and not in the cartoonish way they is often portrayed:

Every poll suggests that Rick Santorum will lose his race to return to the U.S. Senate.  That's probably good news in Pennsylvania's bobo suburbs, where folks regard Santorum as an ideological misfit and a social blight. But it's certainly bad for poor people around the world.

For there has been at least one constant in Washington over the past 12 years: almost every time a serious piece of antipoverty legislation surfaces in Congress, Rick Santorum is there playing a leadership role.

In the mid-1990s, he was a floor manager for welfare reform, the most successful piece of domestic legislation of the past 10 years. He then helped found the Renewal Alliance to help charitable groups with funding and parents with flextime legislation.

More recently, he has pushed through a stream of legislation to help the underprivileged, often with Democratic partners. With Dick Durbin and Joe Biden, Santorum has sponsored a series of laws to fight global AIDS and offer third world debt relief. With Chuck Schumer and Harold Ford, he's pushed to offer savings accounts to children from low-income families. With John Kerry, he's
proposed homeownership tax credits. With Chris Dodd, he backed legislation authorizing $860 million for autism research. With Joe Lieberman he pushed legislation to reward savings by low-income families.

In addition, he's issued a torrent of proposals, many of which have become law: efforts to fight tuberculosis; to provide assistance to orphans and vulnerable children in developing countries; to provide housing for people with AIDS; to increase funding for Social Services Block Grants and organizations like Healthy Start and the Children's Aid Society; to finance community health
centers; to combat genocide in Sudan.

. . .  Like many people who admire his output, I disagree with Santorum on key matters like immigration, abortion, gay marriage. I'm often put off by his unnecessarily slashing style and his culture war rhetoric.

But government is ultimately not about the theater or the light shows of public controversy, it's about legislation and results. And the substance of Santorum's work is impressive. Bono, who has worked closely with him over the years, got it right: ''I would suggest that Rick Santorum has a kind of Tourette's disease; he will always say the most unpopular thing. But on our issues, he has been a defender of the most vulnerable.''

"The Truth About Conservative Christians"

E.J. Dionne has this interesting review of a new book by Fr. Andrew Greeley and Michael Hout, "The Truth About Conservative Christians:  What They Think and What They Believe."  Here's the heart of the piece:

Of conservative Christians, they write: “Insiders and outsiders alike misrepresent, misperceive, and stereotype this large and diverse segment of American culture.” They conclude on the same note. In their final paragraphs, they write: “In our experience most of those who stereotype the conservative Christians do not know any of them.”

One of the reasons this book does not match most analyses of conservative Christians is that Greeley and Hout recognize what many other students of the subject don’t: a large number of theologically conservative Christians are African Americans, the nation’s most loyally Democratic group. Arguing that conservative Christianity is allied with conservative politics makes sense, they write, “only if you want to exclude Afro-American Christians from the ranks of the religiously conservative.” They continue: “But that is a groundless exclusion. Their ‘Evangelical’ credentials are as good as anyone else’s, in some cases marginally better.” Indeed.

And, here is Dionne's conclusion:

All this suggests that a significant share of the white Christian community, including Evangelicals, is willing to hear alternative arguments to those offered by the Right. Greeley and Hout believe the best arguments for Democrats are about economics. “Get economic justice right,” they argue, “and the conservative Christians held back by economic injustice will back you.”

For those who find themselves somewhere on the left side of politics, this is a hopeful view. And it’s certainly true that Democrats cannot win if they are not persuasive on the issues of social justice, economic insecurity, and the shift of risk away from corporations and government onto individuals.

But the very complexity of the human beings Greeley and Hout describe suggests that this economic appeal will not be successful unless it is part of a larger moral message. Conservative Christians-and Americans generally-worry about their paychecks but also about whether they can spend enough time with their families. They care about the economic opportunities their children will have and also about the values their children will inherit. They care about their own economic interests but also seek nurturing communities that are about more than money.

Creating a practical moral politics is not the explicit goal of the authors. Rather, by reminding us that conservative Christians are more interesting and more complicated than many think, Greeley and Hout have once again turned conventional wisdom on its head. In doing so, this book gives liberals a scolding and offers them some hope.

I suspect that Dionne is right when he says that an "economic appeal [to conservative Christians] will not be successful unless it is part of a larger moral message."  It seems to me, though, that this "larger moral message" might have to be a bit more "conservative" on the hot-button issues than Dionne's paragraph suggests.

More on Ectopic Pregnancy

Regarding our conversation on ectopic pregnancy, Boston College law prof Greg Kalscheur, S.J. recommends a 1993 article from Theological Studies by James Keenan, "The Function of the Principle of Double Effect."  (I don't have the link.)  Here's the abstract:

The casuistric principle of double effect should be applied taxonomically rather than geometrically as is currently being done. The geometric application assumes that the principle can be used as moral justification for any action which fits the four conditions of the principle. Instead, the principle should be recognized as an abstraction representing common aspects of paradigm cases which contain their own internal certitude. The taxonomic analysis shows that the principle does not apply to the case of ectopic pregnancy, although it fits the principle geometrically.

In the article, Keenan quotes John Noonan's conclusion that "whenever the embryo is a danger to the life of the mother, an abortion is permissible. At the level of reason nothing more can be asked of the mother."

And John McGuinness writes because he is:

becoming uncomfortable with the prominent role the "burining building" hypothetical is playing in the moral analysis on MOJ, as it has several probalem that make it ill-suited as a moral guide.  First, as Prof. Penalver noted when he introduced the hypothetical, there is a significant moral difference between choosing to save one person over another, and deliberately killing one person for the benefit of another.  Second,  there's often a gap between what we "would" do and what we "should" do.  If I came home today and found a man with a knife standing over the bloody corpses of my wife and children, it's likely I would do some things that are not morally correct.  Third, this type of analysis would work to justify all sorts of discrimination.  A white racist would probably save a white baby over a black baby -- does this make segregation OK?  The ingrained discrimination is precisely what we are trying to confront.  The "burning building" is almost a tautology -- I would discriminate against embryos; therefore discimination is OK.  Fourth, your particular use of it is flawed -- you say that the choice between an embryo or your wife would not be difficult becuase several chidren depend on her for love and care.  But I suspect the choice between your wife and your newborn child would at least be difficult (although perhaps the same), even though nobody is dependent on the newborn child. The hypothetical may be a useful tool for uncovering what our initial moral intuition is, but it should not be one of the first tools we reach for in evaluaing the morality of policies.

Just to be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the fact of my favoring my wife's life over our early-stage embryo's life establishes its moral correctness.  But it raises some questions for me, especially because I am confident that if I was presented with the dilemma 100 times, I'd make the same decision 100 times, and if I reflected deeply on my decision for many months, I'd remain resolute in its correctness.  It's not just a function of my personal bias because if a stranger in the same situation asked for my advice, I'd tell him the same thing.  And it's not the same as reacting in passion to the sight of the person who has just murdered my family.  It is a decision that seems grounded, in a meaningful way, in the core convictions of my conscience. (Hence the relevance of the burning building hypo: in that case, I would not only find it morally acceptable to rescue the infant instead of the blastocyst, I would find it morally unacceptable to rescue the blastocyst instead of the infant.) 

So again, if I choose to save my wife by ending the life of our embryo -- and if I choose what may be the safest route by removing the embryo itself, rather than the tube -- is my conscience improperly formed?  And if so, what moral insight am I lacking? 

To take the inquiry to another level, if the natural law is written on our consciences, whose conscience would tell them to let the mother risk death instead of removing the embryo?  And if the vast majority of persons of faith who do value life, including pre-born life, would choose my course of action on this issue, then where else is the natural law written?

Rob

Radical Subsidiarity

In the September/October 2006 Houston Catholic Worker, Geoffrey Gneuhs, who served as chaplain to the New York Catholic Worker near the end of Dorothy Day's life, has an article entitled "Dorothy Day's Unsentimental Spirituality."  Here is an excerpt:  "For Dorothy the works of mercy were the way to incarnate Christ in daily life: she honored the sacramentality of life.  It gave her joy that the little acts in creation bespeak God's eternal love.  And we must not wait.  She maintained that in modernity governments and bureaucracies had usurped - and very inadequately - our responsibility for our brothers and sisters. ... The "servile state," or welfare state, she said, citing Hilaire Belloc, was the breakdown of community, depersonalization, and loneliness.  Our I-poded, blackberryed, self-absorbed culture has no time for the other in need, for the other who might just inconvenience us."

Same-Sex Marriage

Linda McClain's work is always worth taking seriously, whether or not, in the end, one agrees. See her new book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility (Harvard, 2006).  If you are interested in the controversy over same-sex marriage, read on ...

"The Evolution - or End - of Marriage?: Reflections on the
Impasse over Same-Sex Marriage"
Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-28
Family Court Review, Vol. 44, p. 200, 2006

Contact: LINDA C. MCCLAIN
Hofstra University - School of Law
Email: lawlcm@hofstra.edu
Auth-Page: http://ssrn.com/author=233178

Abstract: http://ssrn.com/abstract=930989

ABSTRACT: The debate over legalization of same-sex marriage
implicates the question of whether doing so would signal the end
- or destruction - of the institution of marriage, or instead
would be an appropriate evolution of marriage laws that is in
keeping with the ends of marriage and with relevant public
values. This essay comments on an earlier published debate on
that question: Special Issue: The Evolution of Marriage, 44
Family Court Review 33-105 (2006). The essay contends that the
appeal to preserving a millennia-old tradition of marriage
against destruction fails to reckon with the evolution of the
institution of civil marriage that has already occurred.
Invocations of gender complementarity between parents as
essential to child well-being also conflict with the growing
recognition in family law that children's best interests can be
served by gay and lesbian parents. Canada's path toward same-sex
marriage suggests that impasse need not be inevitable. In the
United States, the impasse stems in part from the problem that
same-sex marriage serves as an emblem of everything that
threatens marriage.

Abortion in El Salvador

My colleague Elizabeth Brown points out that Nicaragua may simply be following the lead of its neighbor El Salvador, which adopted a total abortion ban in the 1990s.  Elizabeth explains:

El Salvador’s ban admits no exceptions, not even to save the life of the mother.  The Archbishop in El Salvador was a strong supporter of El Salvador’s ban. Proponents of the ban claimed that medical science has advanced to the point where abortion is NEVER needed to save the life of the mother.

Article 1 of El Salvador's constitution declares that the prime directive of government is to protect life from the "very moment of conception." The penal code detailing the Crimes Against the Life of Human Beings in the First Stages of Development provides stiff penalties: the abortion provider, whether a medical doctor or a back-alley practitioner, faces 6 to 12 years in prison. The woman herself can get 2 to 8 years. Anyone who helps her can get 2 to 5 years. Additionally, judges have ruled that if the fetus was viable, a charge of aggravated homicide can be brought, and the penalty for the woman can be 30 to 50 years in prison.  El Salvador is very aggressive about enforcing its ban on abortions. Doctors are not allowed to treat ectopic pregnancies until either the fetus is dead or the fallopian tube ruptures, which places the life of the mother in danger.

Back in April, The New York Times reported from El Salvador:

According to Sara Valdés, the director of the Hospital de Maternidad, women coming to her hospital with ectopic pregnancies cannot be operated on until fetal death or a rupture of the fallopian tube. "That is our policy," Valdés told me. She was plainly in torment about the subject. "That is the law," she said. "The D.A.'s office told us that this was the law." Valdés estimated that her hospital treated more than a hundred ectopic pregnancies each year. She described the hospital's practice. "Once we determine that they have an ectopic pregnancy, we make sure they stay in the hospital," she said. The women are sent to the dispensary, where they receive a daily ultrasound to check the fetus. "If it's dead, we can operate," she said. "Before that, we can't." If there is a persistent fetal heartbeat, then they have to wait for the fallopian tube to rupture. If they are able to persuade the patient to stay, though, doctors can operate the minute any signs of early rupturing are detected. Even a few drops of blood seeping from a fallopian tube will "irritate the abdominal wall and cause pain," Valdés explained. By operating at the earliest signs of a potential rupture, she said, her doctors are able to minimize the risk to the woman.

Is this really what a culture of life demands?

Rob

The Life of the Mother

Regarding my question about Nicaragua's total abortion ban, Georgetown philosophy prof Karen Stohr explains:

Without knowing the details of the law, I'm guessing that they are defining abortion as the intentional killing of a fetus, with the understanding that not all procedures that result in the fetus's death are properly considered to be abortions. For instance, everyone (I think!) agrees that it's permissible to treat an ectopic pregnancy by way of salpingectomy, or the excision of the fallopian tube. This of course results in the baby's death, but it's not considered intentional killing on the double effect grounds that the death is not serving as a means to treating the woman's life-threatening condition. (There is much more disagreement about whether other treatments for ectopic pregnancy constitute abortions, but that's neither here nor there.) Likewise, inducing labor prior to viability to treat a woman's life-threatening eclampsia or HELLP syndrome would not be considered abortive, even when it's known in advance that the baby cannot survive. I don't know enough about obstetrics to know whether there is always a non-abortive procedure that would save a woman's life, nor do I know whether the non-abortive procedures would ever carry significantly higher maternal health risks compared to the abortive procedures. I take it that the Nicaraguan government is assuming that the answer to the first question is "yes" and that the answer to the second question is either "no" or "doesn't matter."

Notre Dame law prof Julian Velasco explains further:

The Church would allow you to take many measures to save the mother's life even if those measures are certain to result in the unborn child's death, but you may not directly kill the child.  It's part of the principle of double effect: you cannot intend the evil as either the end or the means, but can accept it as a result.  The perfect example is the ectopic pregnancy: you cannot have an abortion, because that would be directly killing the baby, but you can remove the portion of the fallopian tube that is causing problems, even though it will result in the death of the baby.  In that case, you neither want the baby to die nor are you killing him/her.  You are merely saving the mother's life.

Here is another explanation of the distinction between "abortion" and efforts to save the mother's life that result in the fetus's death:

Catholic Theologians typically discuss the morality of three common treatments for ectopic pregnancies according to the principle of double effect.[4] One approach utilizes the drug Methotrexate (MTX), which attacks the tissue cells that connect the embryo to its mother, causing miscarriage. A surgical procedure (salpingostomy) directly removes the embryo through an incision in the fallopian tube wall. Another surgical procedure, called a salpingectomy, removes all of the tube (full salpingectomy) or only the part to which the embryo is attached (partial salpingectomy), thereby ending the pregnancy.

The majority of Catholic moralists reject MTX and salpingostomy on the basis that these two amount to no less than a direct abortion. In both cases, the embryo is directly attacked, so the death of the embryo is not the unintended evil effect, but rather the very means used to bring about the intended good effect. Yet, for an act to be morally licit, not only must the intended effect be good, but also the act itself must be good. For this reason, most moralists agree that MTX and salpingostomy do not withstand the application of the principle of double effect.

I'll admit to absolutely no expertise in this area, but I'll also admit that this seems like hair-splitting to me.  Maybe it's important hair-splitting, but to tell a mother whose life is in peril that she cannot simply remove the embryo, but must instead remove a portion of the tube in which the embryo is located, seems to verge on putting principle above prudence, particularly if this increases the risk to the mother or lessens her chances of becoming pregnant in the future (I don't know if it does either of these).

In thinking of "life of the mother" exceptions more broadly, I'm reminded of Eduardo's "burning house" hypothetical.  I realize that there is moral significance to the act/omission distinction in not rescuing vs. removing from the tube.  At the same time, if my choice is between saving my adult wife, on whom several children depend for love and care, and saving an embryo in its earliest stages, that's not a particularly difficult question for me.  (It's a heart-breaking question, but not a difficult one.) And I will presume that it's not a difficult question for the vast majority of Americans.  Is this simply a case where Church teaching is so far removed from the current state of public opinion that it's not worth talking about in our legal and political discourse?  Or do we need to talk about it more because we have a nation of improperly formed consciences (including my own, perhaps)?

Rob

Bainbridge on the Latin mass

It might not be "legal theory," but it is Bainbridge, and that's close enough.  Here is Steve B.'s TCS column on the Latin-mass rumors. . . .

"Is There a Culture War?"

That's the title of a new book edited by E.J. Dionne and Michael Cromartie and written by James Davison Hunter and Alan Wolfe.  Here's a description of the book:

In the wake of a bitter 2004 presidential campaign and in the face of numerous divisive policy questions, many Americans wonder if their country has split in two. People are passionately choosing sides on contentious issues such as the invasion of Iraq, gay marriage, stem-cell research, and the right to die, and the battle over abortion continues unabated. Social and political splits fascinate the media: we hear of Red States against Blue States and the "Religious Right" against "Secular America"; Fox News and Air America; NASCAR dads and soccer moms. Is America, in fact, divided so clearly? Does a moderate middle still exist? Is the national fabric fraying? To the extent that these divisions exist, are they simply the healthy and unavoidable products of a diverse, democratic nation? In Is There a Culture War? two of America's leading authorities on political culture lead a provocative and thoughtful investigation of this question and its ramifications.

James Davison Hunter and Alan Wolfe debate these questions with verve, insight, and a deep knowledge rooted in years of study and reflection. Long before most scholars and pundits addressed the issue, Hunter and Wolfe were identifying the fault lines in the debate. Hunter's 1992 book Culture Wars put the term in popular circulation, arguing that America was in the midst of a "culture war" over "our most fundamental and cherished assumptions about how to order our lives." Six years later, in One Nation After All, Wolfe challenged the idea of a culture war and argued that a majority of Americans were seeking a middle way, a blend of the traditional and the modern. For the first time, these two distinguished scholars join in dialogue to clarify their differences, update their arguments, and search for the truth about America's cultural condition.

James Davison Hunter is the William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Sociology and Religious Studies at the University of Virginia, where he is also executive director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture. Among his several books is The Death of Character: On Moral Education of America's Children (Basic Books, 2000).

Alan Wolfe is a professor of political science at Boston College, where he directs the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life. He is the author of numerous books, most recently Return to Greatness: How America Lost Its Sense of Purpose and What It Needs to Do to Recover It (Princeton, 2005).

My own take on the "America divided" thing is set out here.

(Thanks to Melissa Rogers for the post.)

A blog of interest

You know what they say about television re-runs:  "If you haven't seen it, it's new to you."  On that note, here is a new blog that will be of interest to many MOJ readers, run by Melissa Rogers, who is visiting professor of religion and public policy at Wake Forest University Divinity School.  I've met Melissa several times at conferences, and we testified on the same panel a few years ago before a Senate subcommittee.  She is engaging, thoughtful, smart, and pleasant.  The blog looks to be a good law-and-religion-and-public-life resource.

Tenure? Easy. Sainthood? Quite Possibly.

That's the title of a short piece in today's Chronicle of Higher Education about the sainthood cause of Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen.  It begins:

The academic career of the man on track to be named the first American-born male saint got off to a less than divine start.

After earning a prestigious Agrege degree in 1923 — a sort of European superdoctorate in philosophy that guarantees a job at a European university — Fulton J. Sheen had offers to teach at both Columbia and Oxford. Excited but unsure, the young priest telegraphed his hometown bishop in Illinois to ask where he should go.

The answer? Back to Peoria, son. A local parish needed a priest. Bound by his vows, Father Sheen obeyed.

The article discusses allegations that he fabricated a Ph.D. from the Pontifical College Angilicum, but suggests that even if it's true, it wouldn't necessarily hinder the sainthood cause:

In the end it probably won't make a difference. Saints are human and have flaws, says Father Apostoli. He cites the postulator working on Mother Teresa's canonization, who advised the Sheen supporters: "Don't try to prove he was a saint all his life. Just prove he was a saint the last 15 years."

The article concludes with this list of "The Saints of Academe."  I understand why the patron saint of oversleepers is included in this category, but why the patron saints for lost causes and impossible situtations? 

THE SAINTS OF ACADEME

Patron saints have long watched over academe, its people, and its problems.

Colleges and universities:
Four patron saints share this turf, including St. Contardo Ferrini and St. Thomas Aquinas

Computer users:
St. Isidore of Seville

Learning:
Five, including St. Acca and St. Margaret of Scotland

Lecturers and speakers:
St. John Chrysostom, St. Justin Martyr

Liberal arts:
St. Catherine of Bologna

Lost causes/impossible situations:
Four, including St. Jude Thaddeus and St. Philomena

Mathematicians:
St. Barbara and St. Hubert of Liège

Natural sciences:
St. Albertus Magnus

Oversleepers:
St. Vitus

Students:
17, including St. Gabriel of the Sorrowful Mother and St. Ursula

Test takers:
St. Joseph of Cupertino

Lisa

Banning Abortion Without Exception

Today Nicaragua's legislature voted to ban all abortions, even when the mother's life is in danger.  Is this justified -- much less mandated -- under the Church's teaching?  My understanding is that an intentional abortion is never morally permissible, but a procedure intended to save the mother's life is permissible even if it is certain to result in the unborn child's death.  Unless I'm missing something, I assume that such procedures would be prohibited under a total ban (unlike South Dakota's law, which contains an exception for saving the mother's life).  What's the argument in favor of a total ban and why is the Church in Nicaragua reportedly calling for one?

Rob

drinan chairs: a comment

I guess I'll offer a comment about the Georgetown and BC chairs honoring Father Drinan. My first reaction is that these decsions are not a huge surprise but that the decisions are open to serious question. I am sure that Father Drinan has done a lot of good things in his long career. (One of my younger sisters was his research assistant a couple of decades ago and she had good things to say about his personal qualities.) But his public profile involves a long record of support for abortion rights. That record includes his scandalous New York Times op-ed in support of President Clinton's veto of a ban on partial-birth abortions. I understand that he recanted that op-ed but I don't think that recantation received much attention. Father Drinan also serves on the Boards of the ACLU and PFAW, groups that are not known for their strong support of Catholic social teaching. Given this record (and perhaps he has reformed on the issue of abortion), I don't think that a Catholic law school ought to have a chair in his honor. Maybe the theory is that his other work cancels out these lapses, but the message that is being sent is that the areas where he departs from the teachings of the Church must not be terribly important.

When we discussed the Rice honorary degree, I noted that a school defines itself in part by the people the school chooses to honor and to hold up as role models. These actions do not signal a whole-hearted embrace of Ex Corde.   

Richard M.   

"The Simpsons" on Heaven

Marge Simpson and Ned Flanders help us understand "Protestant Heaven" and "Catholic Heaven," here.

Drinan Chairs

As a brief follow-up to the postings of Michael P. and Richard regarding Georgetown, Boston College Law School has also established a Drinan Chair. Their recent announcement is HERE .    RJA sj

The Laboratory as Slippery Slope

Dale Carpenter has concerns about the New Jersey Supreme Court's same-sex marriage decision:

It’s significant that no other gay-marriage case (with the possible and instructive exception of Vermont, where the court adopted similar reasoning) has been brought in a state with as favorable a public policy toward gays as this one was: a broad set of antidiscrimination laws, domestic partnerships, second-parent adoptions, a hate crimes law, and so on. In this environment – where the state was committed to protecting gay people, sustaining gay couples, and facilitating gay parenting – it was both logically and practically difficult to hold on to the procreation and child-rearing rationales. The state had nothing left in defense of the rights gap except an unadorned “tradition” that the state itself had steadily undermined in its public policy. . . .

[T]he New Jersey court’s quotation from Justice Brandeis’ famous dissenting opinion praising the states as “laboratories” to “try novel social and economic experiments” is a bit ironic. The New Jersey court now holds that once the state substantially experiments with gay equality it must go all the way, ending the experiment.

While the result in this case is surely a good one for gay families, it may chill experiments in other states where legislators might fear that they cannot move incrementally toward equality for gay couples without surrendering the judicial basis for any remaining distinctions. I doubt that’s really a great danger in most states, where courts tend to be less aggressive than New Jersey’s and where the standard rational-basis test should allow legislatures to proceed incrementally, but this opinion will surely be cited as a reason not to grant any rights to gay couples.

Rob

Catholics and Civil Unions for Gays and Lesbians

Why should we think that Catholics can't support civil unions for gays and lesbians, as distinct from civil marriages?  Consider the following piece by John Allen:

The Drinan Chair in Human Rights

To read the announcement about the new Drinan Chair in Human Rights, click here.

Drinan Chair?

Because the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling is 90 pages long, I thought I'd ask about a less controversial issue. What do folks think about Georgetown Law School's recent announcement of a Drinan Chair in Human Rights? Do you think that we will witness a protest like the one we saw at Boston College this spring over the controversial award of an honorary degree?

Richard M.

      

Same-sex marriage ruling

The New Jersey Supreme Court has held:

Denying committed same-sex couples the financial and social benefits and privileges given to their married heterosexual counterparts bears no substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. The Court holds that under the equal protection guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, committed same-sex couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and benefits enjoyed by opposite-sex couples under the civil marriage statutes. The name to be given to the statutory scheme that provides full rights and benefits to same-sex couples, whether marriage or some other term, is a matter left to the democratic process.

Rob

The Silence of Contemplation

Lisa asks if "the silence of contemplation" is possible in the life of a working parent?  For me the answer has been yes, with a lot of cooperation from my husband and daughter. 

Perhaps at least in part becuase I returned to Catholicism some years ago after spending a number of years as a Buddhist (almost two years of which were spent living essentially in a monastic environment), time for contemplation is as necessary for me as the air I breathe.  And so for at least the last five or six years or so (i.e., beginning when Elena, now 13, was 7 or 8 or so), I take the first 30-45 minutes of each day in quiet prayer.  It took a while for my daughter to respect that time - in the beginning there were all sorts of important things that just couldn't wait from her perspective....then she shifted to standing in my doorway saying something like, "I'm not interrupting your prayer, I'm just waiting to see if you are finished."  But for some time now, if I'm sitting and the door is closed there is no interruption.

My husband's faciliation has been even more instrumental.  Every year I go off for at least one 8-day retreat and sometimes a second shorter one.  Although I'm sure the period of single parenting is not convenient, he happily does so.  (And the retreat periods are in addition to putting up with lots of trips for academic travel as well as weekends spent at the Jesuit retreat house of which I am a member of the adjunct staff.)

Ultimately, I think our goal as Christians is to live our lives out of a contemplative stance - to be contemplatives in action.  However, I think contemplative prayer is necessary in order to develop that ability.

As Michael suggests. learning to shift from telling God to "listen[ing] with [our] hearts to God who speaks" takes time.....perhaps more time for those of us who are used to being the speakers (and writers) during the rest of our day.

Reconciling Evangelization and Dialogue

I have posted under my name at the side a draft of my Scarpa Conference essay, “Reconciling Evangelization and Dialogue through Love o