Mirror of Justice

Respect Life Sunday

Tomorrow is "Respect Life" Sunday in Catholic churches.  I wrote a bulletin insert for my parish, on behalf of our Social Justice Commission.  Here it is:

We Catholic Christians are People of Life.  As the late Pope John Paul II proclaimed, we are called, as followers of Christ, to be “unconditionally pro-life,” and to “proclaim, celebrate and serve the Gospel of life in every situation.”

Of course, as Catholics, we have probably heard this before – many times.  We know that the first and fundamental right of every human person is the right to life.  We know that we are – old and young, guilty and innocent, weak and strong – loved by God and made in God’s image.  We know that, at the very heart of Catholic social teaching is the unshakeable conviction that human life is sacred and that each person has inherent dignity that must be respected.

We are “unconditionally pro-life.”  We have heard this before.  But, maybe we have become used to hearing it?  Maybe we are uncomfortable hearing it, or even tired of hearing it?  We’ve heard Christ’s call, but have we listened, and responded?  What does our call to “serve the Gospel of Life” mean?

Many of us are probably quick to translate Christ’s call to love and respect human life into a list of those things that we Christians should oppose, resist, and challenge:  unjustified aggression, euthanasia and “mercy killing,” medical experiments that destroy human life, and, of course, abortion.

This translation is not wrong.  We should oppose these practices.  After all, as we read in Evangelium vitae (“The Gospel of Life”), “[i]t is impossible to further the common good” – that is, there is no chance for social justice –“without acknowledging and defending the right to life, upon which all the other inalienable rights of individuals are founded and from which they develop. . . .  Only respect for life can be the foundation and guarantee of
the most precious and essential goods of society, such as democracy and peace.”

Our bishops – our pastors and teachers – have stated clearly that abortion, in particular, is not merely one “issue” among many, but is the “fundamental human rights issue for all men and women of good will[,]” because it “negates two of our most fundamental moral imperatives: respect for innocent life, and preferential concern for the weak and defenseless.”

To be People of Life, however – to live, serve, and proclaim the Gospel of Life – is not only to adopt a platform or take up a campaign.  Our call is also to
propose to our friends, communities, and fellow citizens the truth about who we are.  At the great Second Vatican Council, the Church reminded all Christians that God has not only revealed to us the truth about God, but – through and in Jesus – the truth about us.

The Christian writer C.S. Lewis preached a sermon in 1942 called “The Weight of Glory.”  He said:  “There are no ordinary people.  You have never talked to a mere mortal.  Nations, cultures, arts, civilizations – these are mortal, and their life is to ours as the life of a gnat.  But it is immortals whom we joke with, worth with, marry, snub, and exploit—immortal horrors or everlasting splendours.”

This is the amazing truth about us, and this is the truth that the Gospel of Life proclaims.  Every human person is known and loved by God, and so every human life carries the “weight of glory.”  This is why, as Christians, we must not only hear, on Respect Life Sunday, that we are People of Life.  We are called also to embrace and proclaim the truth that human persons -- the embryo, the unborn child, the elderly and infirm, the guilty and the violent – are
“everlasting splendours,” and so may not be sacrificed for convenience, cost, revenge, or research.

An Uncomfortable Thought ...

Can we disagree with one another, sometimes fundamentally about important issues (the morality of same-sex unions, e.g., or the prudence of using the criminal law in this society at this time, to deal with the moral tragedy of abortion), without our "judging" one another--judging the position, yes, but not one another?  Should we even aspire to do so?  A thought prompted by the following, which I found my way to through dotCommonweal:

A Monk’s Alphabet

September 18th, 2006

Jeremy Driscoll, OSB, is a most unusual monk. He’s a poet, patristics scholar, and professor who teaches both in Rome and at Mount Angel Abbey in Oregon, his monastery. He’s also the author of A Monk’s Alphabet, one of the most unusual books of this publishing season. The book consists of 196 short essays, reflections, and ruminations, arranged alphabetically from Airplane to Zerr. (Bonaventure Zerr was the seventh abbott of Mount Angel. Father Driscoll’s moving account of his death concludes the book.) He is a writer of exceptional talent and insight.

Great writers such as Pascal and Marcus Aurelius employed the genre of short, provisional essays, loosely organized, and Father Driscoll makes good use of the freedom the form offers. Here, for example, is his opinon of “Smugness:”

“God so hates religious smugness and self-satisfaction and the certainty that the other is a sinner and will go to hell that he would empty hell completely of the sinners who deservedly belong there and place the smug one there all alone to pass an eternity of painful astonishment, learning that God has mercy on whom he will. Should some faint sense of desiring to adore the One who is so merciful crack even slightly the bitterness of this terribly misused virtuous one, maybe then even hell would be emptied of him.

“In short, it is not for me to judge, not for me to presume to pronounce on others. ‘The last shall be first, and the first last.’”

[For the source of this post, click here.]

More on the Nirenberg Essay

I would like to thank Michael, the day after his onomastico, for making available the entire text of Professor David Nirenberg’s “Paleologus and Us.”

I cannot disagree with Nirenberg’s statement that Pope Benedict made a declaration of ongoing and universal Catholic teaching, and that this is “exactly what we should expect from the vicar of St. Peter.” Actually, the Pope is the Vicar of Christ, and he is the successor of Peter even though the term “vicar of St. Peter” had been used earlier in the Church’s history. But, to borrow from Thomas More, the title used does not detract from the Pope’s authority. But I digress from my principal remarks.

Nirenberg’s assertion that the Pope’s “lecture was a polemic posing as a dialogue” misses a major point of what I earlier identified as three major themes in the Regensburg address. [See my posting of September 13.] The first concerned freedom, and since he was addressing an academic audience, I chose in my earlier posting to concentrate on academic freedom. But, the Pope’s quotation from the Koran “there is no compulsion in religion” also speaks of religious freedom. This is something that Professor Nirenberg does not address. I think this is an important theme that we will hear about time and again during Benedict’s pontificate.

In this regard, Cardinal Bertone, the new Secretary of State, emphasized the importance of religious freedom and conscience in his address delivered yesterday to the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See. The Pope himself previously addressed these matters of liberty of religion and conscience and how they relate to the search for truth—God’s truth—in his January 9, 2006 address to the same diplomatic corps. Unfortunately, Professor Nirenberg did not comment on this vital aspect of the Regensburg address. Instead, he leaves us with the inaccurate and tired depiction of Benedict as the “the Rottweiler” pursuing a “dogged defense of doctrine” that he advanced as a cardinal but now doing so baring “his teeth as pope.” The professor’s canine references do little to explain what Benedict is about and what he said on September 12, and that is a doggone shame.    RJA sj

Helping to Redeem 9/11

Gene Steuerle and I attended two terrific Catholic schools in Louisville, Kentucky, way back in the Dark Ages:  Saint James Grade School, 1952-60, and Saint Xavier High School, 1960-64.  Gene lost his wife--Norma Lang Steuerle--when the American Airlines plane on which she was a passenger hit the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.   Gene and his two daughters--Kristin and Lynne--took the money they received in consequence of Norma's death and founded an organization called Our Voices Together:  Building a Safer, More Compassionate World.  (Some of you may have seen Gene interviewed about the organization on This Week With George Stephanopoulos on September 11, 2006.)  I recommend that you take some time to browse the organization's website.  Maybe you'll want to add your name to the e-mail list and receive the periodic newsletter.  Click here.
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John Allen reports ...

[This from the 9/29/06 edition of John Allen's All Things Catholic, here]

One critical reaction [to Benedict XVI's controversial talk on Islam] comes from Richard Gaillardetz, the Murray/Bacik Professor of Catholic Studies at the University of Toledo. Gaillardetz writes:

Most commentators have overlooked a provocative claim in his address that articulates a fundamental - and to my view quite troubling - element of Pope Benedict's theological vision. … The pope makes the assertion that because Greek influence can already be seen in the Old Testament, and because the New Testament was written in Greek, Christianity is inextricably tied to the "Greek spirit." He rejects out of hand the process of "de-hellenization," the history of which he maps out in three stages. His historical schematization of that process is, I believe, sweeping and simplistic, but that is an argument for another day.

Particularly disconcerting is his account of the third stage of the process, in which many scholars have differentiated between the inherent revelatory and salvific significance of Jesus of Nazareth, and the ways in which the Christ event was quickly inculturated in a Hellenistic milieu. He describes this approach as "coarse and lacking in precision." He then suggests that the early adoption of a Greco-Roman world view is an essential and providential development in the history of Christianity. This assertion constitutes a huge theological leap that is in no way substantiated through careful theological argumentation. Nowhere does he justify why this moment of Hellenistic inculturation transcends the realm of historical contingency to enter into divine providence. In the pope's encomium to the "Greek spirit" one almost forgets that the Word became flesh as a Galilean Jew and not a citizen of Athens!

The pope's views on this topic are of great consequence for the larger church. I recently read through three volumes of groundbreaking documentation regarding the work of the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences produced over the past three decades. That reading, accompanied by my recent visit to East Asia, has reinforced in me a wonderful appreciation for "the new way of being church" that so many Asian leaders have celebrated. I had a similar experience regarding the birth of an authentically African Christianity emerging on that continent. Much of what is developing theologically in those two regions is undercut by the pope's insistence on the normativity of a Greek philosophical articulation of the faith. The pope clearly believes that the intellectual and cultural synthesis that was achieved in Europe over the course of two millennia is normative for the rest of the church. Such a view leaves little room for substantive processes of local inculturation.

In the wake of Vatican II, Karl Rahner famously claimed that the most important contribution of the council was the fact that it had gently set aside that missiological mentality which saw the church essentially as a "Western European export firm" and began to move toward becoming a genuine world church (Weltkirche). The pope's recent address articulated a central feature of his ecclesiological vision, a vision far closer to the European export firm than the world church that Rahner believed was a-borning.

I am grateful for much that this new papacy has brought us: a more measured wielding of papal authority, a more modest public papal profile, a greater theological depth in papal reflections. But now, at a time when our church is bursting with new vitality and fresh insight in places like Africa, we have a pope who seems incapable of breaking out of his European intellectual milieu.

Whatever one makes of Gaillardetz's analysis - and he would be the first to recognize the need for further discussion - it illustrates the sort of reflection on the heart of the Regensburg address one hopes will now emerge.

"Voting God's Politics"

Sojourner magazine’s “Voting God’s Politics” [sic/k] voter guide is not pro-life re abortion. It never says abortion is killing or injustice or betrayal or violence, or destructive of human equality and dignity, etc.. At best, it hides the truth about abortion.

Abortion seems like a lesser evil that people are virtually forced to choose because we don’t help them out enough, maybe like parents not giving their kids nutritious breakfasts before school. We must provide “meaningful alternatives” and “necessary supports,” to use the words of the voters’ guide. All of which are great, but insufficient to express the mortal danger presented to us by the culture of death.

Moreover, the first thing “God” wants is to “reduce the abortion rate by preventing unwanted pregnancies.” As I’ve said before, that’s like urging “Let’s reduce the amount of racist violence against Mexicans by sealing the borders and thus reducing the number of Mexicans who can be violated.”

The contraception/border-fence strategy may not itself count as violence, but it certainly expresses hostility to children and Mexicans. So I don’t see how it can help us build up a culture of life. (I’m not saying that all forms of contraception must be opposed, but it’s ludicrous to trumpet it as something pro-life, just like it’d be ludicrous to trumpet the border fence as something pro-Mexican.)

As for euthanasia of the severly disabled, I could not find a word spoken against it. So it’s the kind of guide Michael Schiavo and his buddies might like to distribute in their political campaigning.

What Would Robby George Say?

[I picked this up from the New York Times online:]

[Andrew] Sullivan dissents from [Jack] Balkin [Yale Law School] and others who have suggested that the timidity of the Democratic opposition to the detainee bill will lead liberal voters to stay home this fall. He says opponents of the Bush administration’s handling of the war on terror must vote Democrat, even if they don’t like the Democrats:

In congressional races, your decision should always take into account the quality of the individual candidates. But this November, the stakes are higher. If this Republican party maintains control of all branches of government, the danger to individual liberty is extremely grave. Put aside all your concerns about the Democratic leadership. What matters now is that this juggernaut against individual liberty and constitutional rights be stopped. The court has failed to stop it; the legislature has failed to stop it; only the voters can stop it now. If they don’t, they will at least have been warned.

Has everyone forgotten?????

I shouldn't have to be the one to do it, but, hey, I'm not complaining.

Question:  This day--September 29--is the feast day of whom?

Answer:

Abortion, Murder, Slavery...

In response to Rob's questions, George correctly identifies one key point in this discussion: 

My own view, having tried to think through the question as carefully and soberly as possible, is that the injustices supported by the Democratic Party (though, of course, not by all Democrats) are so grave, and their magnitude is so great, that it is not reasonable to act for the sake of bringing the party into power--even assuming for the sake of argument that the Democrats have the superior (including more just; less unjust) positions on issues such as immigration, welfare, taxes, social security, and foreign policy.  Obviously, the validity of my judgment here depends on the soundness of my assessments of the gravity and scope of the injustices on both sides of the equation.

George's emphasis on the gravity of the injustice of abortion is incomplete because it seems to assume a 1:1 relationship between abortion's legality and its practice, as Amy observes.  But setting that issue aside, the debate over how to weigh abortion's gravity is the same discussion we had about abortion a few weeks back (i.e., whether abortion is the same as murder, some lesser form of adult homicide, or whether it constitutes a form of homicide that is so morally different from the killing of an adult that it is not even useful to use the same nomenclature for the two acts).  On that score, George has, in his recent writings (and in his responses to MOJ posts) given us some indication of his view of the magnitude of injustice in permitting legal abortion:  in his NRO essay from the last election, he compares it to slavery; in his responses to MOJ posts, he suggests that perhaps it is like the intentional killing of hundreds of thousands or millions of civilians with nuclear weapons.  I've already given my thoughts on the comparison to slavery, which I find uncompelling.  In an e-mail to me, MOJ reader Antonio Manetti objected to my reasons for distinguishing between the cases of abortion and slavery, noting:

While I agree with your point, I think it's also necessary to recognize that those who have made this comparison justify it on the basis that slavery and abortion are both offenses to human dignity. They seem to ignore the fact that slavery is wrong, not simply because it violates some abstract principle, but because of the cruelty and injustice inflicted on the person enslaved. It’s the recognition of that personhood which animated the abolitionists’ zeal.  For me, and I suspect the public at large, no amount of rhetoric can bridge the ontological chasm between a person enslaved and a fetus, especially in its earliest stages of development. Those seeking a solid non-sectarian basis for placing restrictions on abortion need to look elsewhere.

This seems to come back again to our discussion of several weeks ago of the differences, notwithstanding the (in some sense) human status of the embryo, between our moral responses to the death of fully formed human beings and the death of human beings in the earliest stages of development.  As Steve asked in an earlier post, for example, why isn't the failure of a large number of embryos to implant in the uterus considered a public health crisis?  (My brother, a recent medical school graduate, tells me that medical students are taught that something on the order of 75% of embryos fail to implant.  I have no idea whether that figure is accurate or where it comes from, but even if the true number is closer to 25%, the number of embryos lost is staggering.)  I understand that embryo's failure to implant is not the result of intentional human intervention -- i.e., not killing -- but the question goes to the differences in our response to the death itself, a difference that seems relevant to the appropriate assessment of the moral status of embryos, and therefore of their intentional killing.

George wants to put the burden on Catholic Democrats to explain why they think the injustices perpetrated by this Republican government permit them to set aside their misgivings about the Democrats' position on abortion.  In my view, what stands in need of greater justification is his catgorical rejection of the view that a Catholic voter might reasonably conclude that (given both the imperfect fit between abortion's legality and its practice and the substantial uncertainty over how to weigh the injustice of abortion) differences over abortion policy are less important than, say, Republican candidates' and strategists' not-infrequent appeals to racial hatred (a tendency that traces its roots back to Nixon's shameful "southern strategy"), this government's advocacy (and, as of yesterday, legalization) of torture, and its prosecution of an unjust war that has now claimed well over 100,000 lives. (I know that many on this site will disagree with my characterization of Republican positions or this government's policies, but I think that there is ample evidence that the characterizations are at least within the realm of reasonableness.) 

Finally, a quick point of fact.  George wheels out the tired meme that the Democratic party is intolerant of pro-life views:

Pro-life Democrats such as the late Robert P. Casey (for whom I had the privilege of working as an advisor on pro-life issues) have sometimes been subjected to ridicule and abuse by those in their Party for whom support for abortion is a non-negotiable principle.  Even small victories for pro-life Democrats are few and far between.

In fact, in the current election cycle, Casey's pro-life son is the Democratic nominee for the Senate in Pennsylvania, and has been receiving unqualified support from the Democratic establishment.  In addition, the pro-life Harry Reid is the leader of the Democrats in the Senate.  I could go on, but the point seems clear.

Abortion as a Moral Tragedy: A Response to Robert George’s Reply

First, thank you, Robby, for this deeply engaging and thought-provoking conversation.

 

I agree that understanding and defining abortion as a moral tragedy is not a distinctive of a “pro-life” position.  I also agree with your richer articulation of the first point of agreement between pro-life republicans and pro-life democrats.  I’m continuing to digest your description, and so will come back to this in a later post.

 

In this post I’d like to continue with the abortion as a moral tragedy point.  I wonder if I might classify that as a preface to the discussion of more complex points of agreement.  The reason that I keep coming back to this is because I think this preface might have important consequences for the tenor and the analysis of our search for points of agreement.

 

Regarding the tenor of the discussion: I wonder what would happen if everyone were to keep in mind that many people—both pro-choice and pro-life—agree that abortion is a moral tragedy, that it is not a good thing (and even a morally bad one), and that they wish that women contemplating abortion would choose a different option.  I think it might have important consequences for how we talk with each other, and especially how we characterize each others’ arguments.

 

Thinking about the broader political debate (not this particular conversation, which I find very respectful and cordial), I think recognizing this point of agreement might help us to move away from a certain reductionism (e.g., democrats don’t care about unborn babies, and republicans don’t care about poor people).  In and of itself, this could be a very helpful contribution that could help us to focus on the substantive points of disagreement.

OK, so say we agree on the point that abortion is a moral tragedy.  This brings to mind a further substantive question: what happens, then, to the discussion about abortion as an intrinsic evil?

 

I’m not sure I can make this leap.  But it seems that if the real heart of disagreement is not on the morality of abortion, and not on the question of whether the problem is extremely weighty, but on what we do about it, how we think about the social and legal tools for dealing with this evil—all essentially prudential political questions--then the “intrinsic evil” categorization becomes something of a non-sequetur in the conversation.  The fact that abortion is an intrinsic evil does not resolve the fact that we still need to deal with prudential questions surrounding what to do about it, and on those there will be legitimate political debate.

   

Robby, I want to emphasize that I am genuinely struggling with these questions.  I find the level of political polarization in the Church on this issue, and on other topics, deeply troubling and extremely painful, as I have written about here.  As I blogged during the 2004 election here and here, I found the question of the connection between intrinsic evil and voting deeply problematic.

 

As many of you know, I am not shy about identifying myself as pro-life.  But I am also deeply concerned about finding creative ways to heal international conflicts and solutions for international and domestic poverty—and based on deep reflection on Catholic Social Thought principles, I find myself drawn to approaches that might be closer to a democratic party line.  So for me the viability of a pro-life democratic position is personally important.  This is why I am very grateful for this kind of exchange.  Amy

For Robert Araujo and Others

Thanks so much to Robert for his post.  Robert pointed out that he and other non-subscribers to TNR are unable to access the article, so let me post it here in full.  (I hope I'm not breaking any copyright laws!)

(This seems an opportune moment to emphasize again that the fact I post something does *not* mean that I agree with it.  I post things I think will be of interest to MOJ-readers.)

A Preliminary Response to Professor Nirenberg's Remark

I would like to thank Michael Perry for his important and interesting post of Mr. Grant Gallicho’s discussion of Professor David Nirenberg’s New Republic essay on Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensburg address. Unfortunately, both the MOJ and Commonweal links to the Nirenberg essay require a subscription to the New Republic. Because of this block, I cannot comment properly on all that Professor Nirenberg has argued. However, his statement that was contained in the Gallicho and Perry postings, “What we cannot accept without contradiction or hypocrisy is the pope’s presentation of the speech as an invitation to dialogue,” has provoked me to investigate what, if anything, did the Holy Father say about dialogue with Islam prior to Regensburg? If Benedict XVI did say something, would it provide an essential context in which we can better understand the import of his remarks made on September 12, 2006?

As it turns out, the Pope on at least three prior occasions presented his appeal to the Muslim world for dialogue with the Church and the West. Moreover, his previous invitations also expressed grave concerns about the dangers faced by believers when their religious freedom is challenged or threatened. Such an atmosphere is inconsistent with true religious belief and the desire for sincere dialogue between Christians and Muslims.

For example, in his December 1, 2005 address to the Ambassador of Algeria to the Holy See the Pope Benedict stated in part:

“As I have already had the opportunity to say, the Catholic Church intends to pursue an open and sincere dialogue with believers of other religions in search of the true good of many and of society. I therefore rejoice at knowing the quality of the relations maintained in your Country between the Catholic Community and the Muslim Community. An encounter in truth between the believers of the different religions is a demanding challenge for the future peace in the world and requires great perseverance. To overcome ignorance and reciprocal prejudices, it is important to create bonds of trust between peoples, especially through the sharing of daily life and work done together, so that the free expression of differences in belief are not a cause of mutual exclusion but rather an opportunity to learn to live together with mutual respect for the identity of the other.”

On August 20, 2005 when attending the World Youth Day in Cologne, he addressed a Muslim group with these words:

“Dear friends, I am profoundly convinced that we must not yield to the negative pressures in our midst, but must affirm the values of mutual respect, solidarity and peace. The life of every human being is sacred, both for Christians and for Muslims. There is plenty of scope for us to act together in the service of fundamental moral values. The dignity of the person and the defence of the rights which that dignity confers must represent the goal of every social endeavor and of every effort to bring it to fruition. This message is conveyed to us unmistakably by the quiet but clear voice of conscience. It is a message which must be heeded and communicated to others: should it ever cease to find an echo in people’s hearts, the world would be exposed to the darkness of a new barbarism. Only through recognition of the centrality of the person can a common basis for understanding be found, one which enables us to move beyond cultural conflicts and which neutralizes the disruptive power of ideologies… Past experience teaches us that, unfortunately, relations between Christians and Muslims have not always been marked by mutual respect and understanding. How many pages of history record battles and wars that have been waged, with both sides invoking the Name of God, as if fighting and killing the enemy could be pleasing to Him. The recollection of these sad events should fill us with shame, for we know only too well what atrocities have been committed in the name of religion. The lessons of the past must help us to avoid repeating the same mistakes. We must seek paths of reconciliation and learn to live with respect for each other’s identity. The defence of religious freedom, in this sense, is a permanent imperative, and respect for minorities is a clear sign of true civilization… Teaching is the vehicle through which ideas and convictions are transmitted. Words are highly influential in the education of the mind. You, therefore, have a great responsibility for the formation of the younger generation. I learn with gratitude of the spirit in which you assume your responsibility. Christians and Muslims, we must face together the many challenges of our time. There is no room for apathy and disengagement, and even less for partiality and sectarianism. We must not yield to fear or pessimism. Rather, we must cultivate optimism and hope. Interreligious and intercultural dialogue between Christians and Muslims cannot be reduced to an optional extra. It is in fact a vital necessity, on which in large measure our future depends.”

Finally, on February 20, 2006, in his address to the Ambassador of Morocco to the Holy See, the Pope offered these words:

“[Y]ou stressed your Country’s contribution to the dialogue between civilizations, cultures and religions. For her part, in the present international context with which we are familiar, the Catholic Church remains convinced that to encourage peace and understanding between peoples, it is urgently necessary that religions and their symbols be respected and that believers not be the object of provocations that wound their outlook and religious sentiments. However, intolerance and violence as a response to offences can never be justified, for this type of response is incompatible with the sacred principles of religion; consequently, we cannot but deplore the actions of those who deliberately exploit the offence caused to religious sentiments to stir up acts of violence, especially since such action is contrary to religion. For believers, as for all people of good will, the only path that leads to peace and brotherhood is that of respect for the religious convictions and practices of others, so that the practice of the religion a person has freely chosen may be guaranteed to each one.”

It seems from his earlier statements that the Pope is devoted to authentic dialogue based on mutual respect. Moreover, he does not hesitate to state that there are forces in the world that, in the name of religion, use compulsion rather than debate to make their point and achieve their objectives. And these tactics, in his estimation, are counterproductive to genuine dialogue. This point was reiterated in his Regensburg address when he recited the passage from the Qu’ran: “There is no compulsion in religion.”

I wonder if Professor Nirenberg had read and reflected on these earlier statements of Pope Benedict? If he did, should he have made the assertion that questions the Pope’s sincerity?    RJA sj

Robert George's Response to Post on Abortion as a Moral Tragedy

Here is Robert George's thoughtful and thought-provoking reply to my post on abortion as a moral tragedy:

Thanks for your lastest posting explaining why you are presenting as a point of agreement between pro-life Democrats and Republicans the proposition that abortion is a moral tragedy.

One problem, as I see it, is that the shared belief that abortion is a tragedy, and even a moral tragedy, is a point of agreement between pro-lifers (irrespective of party) and most people (though, to be sure, not all) who regard themselves as pro-choice. I know almost no one that believes that abortion is a good thing. Most pro-choice politicians and many activists even go so far as to say that they are "personally" opposed to abortion. (I don't know a single Catholic pro-choice politician who fails to say this or something very much like it.) Such people oppose abortion, even while supporting its legality and in most cases even claiming that abortion is a woman's right, because (one must assume) they regard it as not a good thing. They wish, no doubt sincerely, that women contemplating abortion would choose a different option.

To say that abortion is a "moral tragedy," and to mean by saying it that abortion is not to be taken lightly and, indeed, that it is not a good thing (and even a morally bad one), is not necessarily to embrace the pro-life position. What makes pro-life Democrats (like Ben Nelson) pro-life, and distinguishes them from their self-identified pro-choice colleagues (like Teddy Kennedy), is that they say more than that. A central feature of what they perceive as bad about abortion--a feature with direct implications for the question of whether abortion may legitimately be permitted by a political society--is that abortion is a grave injustice against a vulnerable member of the human community. So, they believe, not only is it the case that there is no right to abortion; the child in the womb has a right to be protected by public authority against deliberate acts of violence.

In my own experience with pro-life Democrats (for many years I was one of the breed myself), they don't disagree with pro-life Republicans about the injustice of abortion or the right of the unborn child to legal protection against direct killing or other forms of unjust homicide. So the fundamental point of agreement is much richer than what is captured by the idea that abortion is a moral tragedy.

Perhaps it will illuminate things to consider how (1) pro-choicers (of either party), (2) pro-life Republicans, and (3) pro-life Democrats would respond to the following question: Is the embryonic or fetal offspring of human parents a human being possessing inherent dignity and a corresponding human right to the equal protection of the laws? Pro-choicers would say "no." (Some would say--absurdly--that the human embryo or fetus is not yet alive; others would say--almost equally absurdly--that the embryo or fetus, though a living being, is not yet human; still others would say--incorrectly, in my view, though not absurdly--that the embryo or fetus, though a living human being--i.e. an individual member of the species Homo sapiens--is not yet a "person" bearing a right to life. A few would say, with the philosopher Judith Thomson, that the fetus is, or may well be, a person with a right to life, but may legitimately be evicted by a pregnant woman from her body as a sort of uninvited guest, even if fetal death is a certain consequence.) Pro-life Republicans would give the opposite answer: they would say "yes." How would pro-life Democrats come down? Would they answer "no" or "yes"? (Note that the question--the central question dividing those of us who are pro-life from those who are pro-choice--logically does not admit of a third possible answer; if the answer is anything other than "yes," it must be "no.") My guess is that most pro-life Democrats would say "yes." I would be surprised if there are many self-identified pro-life Democrats who would answer the question by denying that the child in the womb is anything less than a human being with equal fundamental human rights.

I think that many, if not most, pro-life Democrats would agree with pro-life Democrat (and Notre Dame dean) Mark Roche, who argued (in an article written, ironically, to encourage Catholics to support pro-choice Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry) that "history will judge our society's support of abortion in much the same way we view earlier generations' support of torture and slavery - it will be universally condemned." We condemn earlier generations' support for slavery not (merely) as a moral tragedy, but as a grave injustice of extraordinary magnitude. In the days of slavery, however, there were people who were personally opposed to slaveholding, and who would not themselves own slaves, who nevertheless supported "the peculiar institution" as a "necessary evil" or a "tragic necessity." (Indeed, there were even some slaveholders--such as Jefferson--who viewed slavery as a moral tragedy.) Of course, those who held this position could not be counted as abolitionists or supporters of racial equality. (Some, I'm sure, hoped for the day when social conditions and economic developments would cause slavery's extinction. Among these, perhaps, were people who favored economic reforms and other public policies aimed at eliminating the cause of slavery without using the corecive force of the law to ban it.) At the same time, among those of whatever party who fully believed in racial equality and who viewed slavery as a profound injustice that no decent polity could permit, it would not capture their fundamental point of agreement to say that they shared the view that slavery was a "moral tragedy." As in the case of pro-life Democrats and pro-life Republicans today, their fundamental agreement was, I believe, richer than what is captured in that phrase.

Academic Blogging

(O.K., maybe the relevance of this to CLT is a bit of a stretch.  But it is:  1.  about blogging;  2.  about academics who blog;  3.  about the effect of controversial blogging on tenure & appointments;  4.  about conservative v. liberal bloggers; and  5. about controversy generated by positions on contemporary Middle Eastern politics, so arguably relevant to Pope Benedict's Regensburg remarks.)

There's an interesting editorial in the Sep/Oct issue of the Yale Alumni Magazine about Yale's decision not to hire Juan Cole, a professor of Modern Middle Eastern history.  It raises the issue of the effect of blogging on academic tenure and appointments decisions. 

Do those who live by the blog die by the blog?

In April, Juan Cole, a professor of modern Middle Eastern and South Asian history at the University of Michigan--Ann Arbor, whas turned down for an appointment at Yale in contemporary Middle Eastern politics.  This kind of event doesn't ordinarily stir up excitement in the wider world.  But it became a hot topic in the blogosphere, because Cole himself is an eminent blogger.  "Everyone who is anyone reads his blog,"  writes NYU professor Siva Vaidhyanathan in the Chronicle of Higher Education.  Apparently, everyone who reads Cole's blog thought Yale rejected him because of it.

Cole has an impressive c.v.  He has written, edited, or translated 14 scholarly books, many of them for prestigious academic presses.  But on his blog, Informed Comment, he is an unrelenting critic of the war in Iraq and the Bush administration, and several conservative bloggers were outraged that Yale would consider him for tenure.  The blog Little Green Footballs called Yale's interest "almost unbelievable."  John Fund of WallStreetJournal.com called Cole "hothead" and "intolerant."

The faculty of two departments voted to hire Cole.  But at Yale, senior tenure decisions must pass three levels of committees.  Cole failed the second level:  the Tenure Appointments Committee in the Humanities, composed of two deans and nine tenured faculty, voted him down.  Now it was the liberal bloggers' turn for outrage.  "Neoconservative zealots . . . screwed professor Juan Cole out of a job"  (Majikthise).  "This reaction reeks of fear"  (Whiskey Bar).

There's no way of knowing if those who reviewed Cole were influenced by their political views.  Politics are strictly dissallowed as critera for hiring at Yale.  But academics are human.  It would be surprising if nobody on those committees was influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by feelings about Cole's outspoken stands.  It would be surprising if nobody at all wondered about the consequences of hiring a controversial public figure.

. . .

The Cole affair may help push academia to define how it feels about blogs.  Cole's blog is opinionated but erudite;  he translates Arabic and Persian sources and comments on theology.  But academics haven't reached consensus yet on how to weight blog posts in evaluating scholarship. (It's not clear how, or whether, Yales' committees assessed Cole's blog.)  As more and more academics engage in blogging, universities will have to decide whether blogging matters.

UPDATE:  My colleague, Elizabeth Brown, adds:  "You may be interested in a posting by J.B. Ruhl, the Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property at the Florida State University College of Law, on his thoughts regarding the “Hierarchy of Legal Scholarship” here:  http://jurisdynamics.blogspot.com/2006/09/hierarchy-of-legal-scholarship.html   Basically Ruhl, like Brian Leiter (who Rick Garnett commented upon in his MoJ post here: http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/2006/09/leiter_on_blogs.html ), thinks that blogs (while lots of fun) have zero value as scholarship. 

Ruhl thinks the most valuable contributions to legal scholarship are empirical studies of law’s impact on society.  Ruhl’s rankings have generated a lot of comments among other law bloggers."

Lisa

Response on Point One: Abortion as a Moral Tragedy

I’d like to continue (one point at a time) the conversation with Robert George on possible points of agreement between pro-life democrats and pro-life republicans. On my first point, he writes: "Regarding point one, I do not think it captures the key point of agreement to describe abortion as a ‘moral tragedy for all the people directly involved and for society as a whole.’"

I’d like to explain why I emphasize as a separate point of agreement that both see abortion as a moral tragedy for this reason: it is exactly on this point that there’s a tendency to talk past each other. At times the democrats’ struggle over the question of whether abortion should or should not be legal is characterized as an indication that they take the problem lightly, or that they see abortion itself as a good thing for society. I will not hesitate to admit that in some cases that may be true. But I would like to see if we can reach agreement on this point: when pro-life democrats focus intensely on the prudential dimensions of practical political solutions, including the limits of legal regulation, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they don’t believe that abortion is a moral tragedy. Can we agree that pro-life democrats and pro-life republicans are on the same page in seeing abortion as a moral tragedy even if they may disagree about the prudential and political dimensions of the role and limits of legal regulation?

More on Benedict on Islam

[This item of interest from dotCommonweal:]

Dialogue or monologue?

September 28, 2006, 12:17 pm

University of Chicago historian David Nirenberg dissects the pope's Regensburg lecture at the New Republic. A sample:

Benedict's plea for Hellenization draws on a German philosophical tradition--stretching from Hegel's The Spirit of Christianity through Weber's sociology of religions to the post-World War II writings of Heidegger--whose confrontations of Hebraism with Hellenism contributed to, rather than prevented, violence against non-Christians on a scale unheard of in the Muslim world. We may grant that such an intellectual dependence is hard to avoid, given the deep and abiding influence of this theological and philosophical tradition on the modern humanities and social sciences. From a Eurocentric point of view, we might even concede the pope's well-worn claim that, as Heine put it in 1841, the "harmonious fusion of the two elements," the Hebraic and the Hellenic, was "the task of all European civilization." 

What we cannot accept without contradiction or hypocrisy is the pope's presentation of the speech as an invitation to dialogue.

For the rest of his analysis, click here.

by Grant Gallicho

Skeel on Christian Legal Scholarship

Penn law prof David Skeel has posted a new paper, The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal Scholarship.  Here is the abstract:

When the ascendency of a new movement leaves a visible a mark on American law, its footprints ordinarily can be traced through the pages of America's law reviews. But the influence of evangelicals and other theologically conservative Christians has been quite different. Surveying the law review literature in 1976, the year Newsweek proclaimed as the "year of the evangelical," one would not find a single scholarly legal article outlining a Christian perspective on law or any particular legal issue. Even in the 1980s and 1990s, the literature remained remarkably thin. By the 1990s, distinctively Christian scholarship had finally begun to emerge in a few areas. But even today, the scope of Christian legal scholarship is shockingly narrow for such a nationally influential movement.

This Essay argues that the strange trajectory of Christian legal scholarship can only be understood against the backdrop of the fraught relationship between religion and American higher education starting in the late nineteenth century. As the nation's modern research universities emerged in the 1860s and 1870s, leading reformers began to promote nonsectarian, scientific approaches to education. Within a few decades, these trends hardened into a hostility to religion that has not disappeared even today. But the disdain did not run in one directions only. For much of the twentieth century, American evangelicals absented themselves from American public life. The few theologically conservative Christians who remained in legal academia operated under cover, a stance reflected in the absence of Christian legal scholarship except on church-state issues and in a handful of other areas.

The first half of the Essay is devoted to this historical exegesis and to a survey of current Christian legal scholarship. The essay then shifts from a critical to a more constructive mode, from telling to showing, as I attempt to illustrate what a normative, and then a descriptive, Christian legal scholarship might look like. Normatively, I outline a Christian theory of criminal and civil liability that implies a far more limited role for the secular law than the standard "law as morality" perspective suggests. My descriptive theory begins with a puzzle; call it the Bono puzzle. In both England and the U.S., the recent debt relief campaign and related movements have deep Christian roots, but the Christian influence has manifested itself very differently on the two sides of the Atlantic. I argue that the relative lack of theologically conservative Christian enthusiasm for debt relief in the U.S. stems from evangelicals' historical distrust of activism on social issues, which dates back to the evangelical confrontation with modernity in the late nineteenth century. Only through the work of high profile norm entrepreneurs like Bono has it been possible to overcome the presumption against intervention. Although the apparent shift in the norm against intervention on social issues has focused on debt and poverty in Africa, the shift could have dramatic feedback effects on U.S. politics.

Rob

Robert George's Response to Points of Agreement

Robert George offers the following response to my earlier post:

I'm writing in reply to your Mirror of Justice posting on points of agreement between pro-life Democrats and what you characterize as "the republican party line." I agree that identifying points of agreement between pro-lifers in the two parties would be helpful and constructive. Thanks for initiating the discussion.

May I raise a question or two and make some proposals for revising the three possible points of agreement you suggested?

Regarding point one, I do not think it captures the key point of agreement to describe abortion as a "moral tragedy for all the people directly involved and for society as a whole." The problem is that this leaves out of the description the grave injustice of directly killing an unborn child, as well as the sin against fundamental equality involved in denying to embryonic and fetal members of the human family elementary legal protections afforded to everyone else. Many self-identified "pro-choice" people regard abortion as a tragedy-even a "moral" tragedy. Their difference with "pro-life" people is that they do not regard the deliberate taking of fetal life, or the failure to protect the developing child against the abortionist's lethal assault, as an injustice-a violation of the child's right to life. Therefore, I think a proper formulation of this point of agreement between pro-life democrats and republicans would focus on the thing that defines them as pro-life (and distinguishes them from those who are not), namely, the belief that deliberate feticide and its legal permission are profoundly unjust.

On point two, much depends on what you mean by "principal" in the claim that most pro-life people agree that the criminal law is "too blunt" to be the "principal" instrument for the regulation of abortion. Is the suggestion that most pro-lifers oppose criminal prohibitions of abortion? If so, I'm sure this is incorrect. My Princeton colleague Russell Nieli has carefully studied polling on abortion going back to Roe v. Wade. Of course, the results of individual polls come out differently depending on how the survey questions are framed, but he reported in a lecture here that a stable consensus exists in the United States that most ab