Monday, September 22, 2014
Thousands of faithful and faithfilled Catholics along with members of other Christian faiths attended a Holy Hour and Eucharistic Procession at St. Francis Church in OKC yesterday afternoon to pray for Oklahoma City as a group of satanists prepared to hold a public black mass (sans consecrated host) at the OKC Civic Center. As reported by Anamaria Scaperlanda Biddick, "Archbishop Coakley said during the Eucharistic Holy Hour and outdoor Eucharistic procession that he and several bishops, dozens of priests and some 3,000 lay persons 'gather not to protest.' He urged attendees to 'put aside the outrage,' and instead 'adore, and listen to the holy Lord, and open our hearts to the promptings of the spirit.' It was a beautiful and reverant event reminding Catholics of the Lord's presence in the Eucharist, a fact that even the satanists seem to understand.
In recent column, Archbishop Coakley continued to urge people to stay away from the Civic Center before and during the staging of the black mass: "I am aware that other groups are planning to show their opposition to the blasphemous event that evening at the Civic Center. I urgently ask everyone to avoid confrontations with those who might oppose them. Our witness ought to be reverent, respectful and peaceful."
In another show of disobedience to the local ordinary, the schismatic SSPX was one of the "other groups" who ventured downtown to the Civic Center. Their presence, along with other groups, completely changed the narrative as it played out on local television.
The Archbishop's focus was on reverant prayer, Christian unity in Christ's body, and continued conversion of those attending the Holy Hour in addition to conversion of those staging the blasphemous event. The protests by SSPX and others at the Civic Center allowed the media to frame the narrative as one of clashing First Amendment rights - the free speech rights of the protestors against the religious freedom rights of the satanists.
Lost in this narrative was the authentic Catholic response: 1) a belief that Christ really is present in the Eucharist, 2) the devil, evil, and demonic forces are real and are dangerous to people and communities who open themselves up to these forces, 3) through Christ's passion, death, and resurrection, final victory, but skirmishes remain as long as this life endures, and 4) our response is prayer, the Eucharistic, and continued conversion and not clash of modern rights.
FYI, 88 people bought tickets to the black mass and 42 of those attended. Please pray for their souls. Many have told me that the Catholic Church should have just ignored this event because by opposing it and responding to it, it received much more media attention than it otherwise would have received. My response: If this had been a blasphemous b-movie, I would have agreed. But, as the Archbishop said, there is a very real danger to a community because "satanic ritual invokes powers of evil and invites them into our community."
Update: Here is Archbishop Coakley's homily given during the Holy Hour.
With the appointment of Bishop Blase Cupich of Spokane to be Archbishop of Chicago, products of Omaha, Nebraska are now leaders of two of the most important institutions of American Catholicism: the Archdiocese of Chicago and the University of Notre Dame (Father John Jenkins, CSC). Also, former Bishops of Rapid City, South Dakota will now be Archbishops of two of the six largest dioceses in the United States (in addition to Archbishop-elect Cupich in Chicago, my own Archbishop, Charles Chaput, OFM Cap. of Philadelphia, was formerly Bishop of Rapid City).
The prominence of Omaha and Rapid City may be a geographic coincidence, but there might also be a larger point here about the rise of Midwestern Catholicism in the American Church.
Consider that almost all of the ordinaries of the redoubts of the East Coast Catholic Church are Midwesterners: Boston (Cardinal O’Malley is from Lakewood, Ohio and Pittsburgh), New York (Cardinal Dolan is from St. Louis), Philadelphia (Archbishop Chaput is from Concordia, Kansas), and Washington (Cardinal Wuerl is from Pittsburgh). (Pittsburgh is a close call, but I say the Midwest begins when you pass the Alleghany Mountain Tunnel on the Pennsylvania Turnpike—and surely Pittsburgh historically has been more like Cleveland or Detroit than it’s been like New York or Philadelphia.) Only Archbishop Lori of Baltimore—a priest of the Archdiocese of Washington originally from Kentucky—is from an East Coast diocese. None of the American cardinals serving now as archbishop of a diocese is native to the East Coast: besides O’Malley, Dolan, and Wuerl, Cardinal DiNardo of Galveston-Houston is from Pittsburgh (via Bishop of Sioux City, Iowa). And Catholic university presidents at Notre Dame (Nebraska, as mentioned), Boston College (Father William Leahy, SJ is from Iowa), and Villanova (Father Peter Donohue, OSA is from Michigan) are from the Midwest.
The larger story, if there is one, may be that those formed by Midwestern Catholicism—less clerical, less dependent on the large institutions that have marked East Coast Catholicism—are suited to address the challenges of the 21st century American Church. Regardless, congratulations to Bishop Cupich and best wishes in retirement to Cardinal Francis George, OMI (originally from...Chicago).
The Catholic/Evangelical/Baptist/LDS/Lutheran amicus curiae brief in support of cert in the Utah same-sex marriage case
A couple weeks back, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, the National Association of Evangelicals, the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod filed an amicus curiae brief in support of certiorari in the Utah same-sex marriage case.
The basic thrust of the brief seems right. The Supreme Court should "resolve without delay whether the Constitution requires the redefinition of marriage to include same-sex couples." At the same time, attention to the careful wording in the brief reveals the difficulty of simultaneously recognizing the Supreme Court's ultimacy in one sense, while also indicating the limited scope of that ultimacy and the possibility (and perhaps the likelihood) that constitutionalizing this matter will not shift the controversy over marriage from the Court to the People.
The brief opens:
The time has come to end the divisive national debate as to whether the Constitution mandates same-sex marriage. We are convinced that a charter “made for people of fundamentally differing views,” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), does not prescribe a single national definition of marriage so contrary to the beliefs, practices, and traditions of the American people. We are convinced that the best way to resolve this wrenching controversy is by trusting the People and their democratic institutions. But a chorus of federal courts disagrees.
It may be tactically wise to suggest in an amicus brief in support of certiorari that a Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriage has the potential to "end the divisive national debate as to whether the Constitution mandates same-sex marriage." And it might make sense to invoke Holmes's Lochner dissent. But I would be surprised if there is anything that the Supreme Court would write in an opinion that would end the debate over whether states are constitutionally required to define marriage to include same-sex couples. And we've already seen what one Holmesian approach to this issue results in.
The religious organizations argue, persuasively, that the legal uncertainty created by Windsor has impeded legislatures from acting on religious liberty protections in connection with same-sex marriage:
In our experience, legislators and other officials are frequently excusing their unwillingness to negotiate protections for religious liberty in the context of same-sex marriage on the specious grounds that such protections are invidious because same-sex marriage is a constitutional right or, conversely, unnecessary because this Court has yet to decide it is a constitutional right. Impeding the channels of democratic debate and engagement has been especially detrimental for religious organizations, given that States adopting same-sex marriage through legislative or popular lawmaking have often included at least some protections for religious organizations, while States compelled to make that change by courts have tended not to include such protections at all.
Even after a likely 5-4 decision creating a new constitutional right to same-sex marriage, however, much uncertainty will remain. The fight will turn to the scope and contours of this right, as well as the implications (both political and logical) of the Court's reasoning. Unlike desegregation, there will be no need for complex remedial decrees in particular cases. But the transition will not be as simple as issuing new forms that eliminate the terms "husband" and "wife." The scope of protections for cultural dissenters from the new federally imposed understanding of marriage, and everything that comes along with it, will be up for grabs. And it will be essential for religious organizations and others who adhere to a different orthodoxy from the new federal orthodoxy to work quickly with all reasonable people of goodwill, not so much to negotiate terms of surrender as to change the terms of engagement.
Depending for one's protection on the very judicial institution that so profoundly aligned itself in opposition to one's view of the legal institution of marriage does not seem a sound long-term strategy. In the short term, though, it is necessary to obtain a definitive declaration from the Supreme Court about where that institution stands amidst the legal uncertainty that it has created.
Saturday, September 20, 2014
ACTIVISTS on warring sides of the abortion debate rarely take the same position when it comes to Supreme Court cases involving women’s rights. But pro-choicers and pro-lifers have found common cause in Young v United Parcel Service, a pregnancy discrimination case the justices will take up on December 3rd. . . .
For the liberal women’s rights organisations, the question is one of gender equality. Workers like Ms Young, they say, have a legal right to the same kinds of accommodations that companies offer to employees unaffected by a pregnancy. For pro-life groups, there is an added dimension: women facing inflexible bosses tend to consider abortion. The amicus brief from 23 pro-life organisations quotes Senator Harrison Williams, an architect of the PDA who died in 2001. “One of our basic purposes in introducing this bill,” he had said, “is to prevent the tragedy of needless, and unwanted abortions forced upon a woman because she cannot afford to leave her job without pay to carry out the full term of her pregnancy.”
[cross-posted from Creo en Dios!
Yesterday I participated in the biennial conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools (RALS, for short), conveniently located this year at University of St. Thomas law school. The theme of the conference was Religious Identity in a Time of Challenge for Law Schools.
We covered many topics over the course of the day, including employment and student well-being, scholarship, and the relationship between justice and mercy.
Part of the joy of this conference is the fellowship among those of us who see our faith as an integral part of our lives of law professors, both in and and outside of the formal sessions of the conference. That leads to our deep concern with helping our students discern with God who they will be in the world after they graduate law school and our commitment to model for our students how our faith impacts our professional identity.
One of the statements made early in the day that troubled me is that evidence shows that people enter law school more other-oriented than they leave law school. IF that is the case, law school is doing something drastically wrong and we should be deeply troubled. (In fact, I said during my talk yesterday afternoon that if that is the case for religiously-affiliated law schools, then we should close our doors and stop what we are doing.)
I hope it is not the case that our law students leave more self-centered and with less concern for others than they arrive at law school. But evidence like that cited yesterday should cause all of us who train professionals to reflect on whether we are doing enough to help people grow in their other-orientation and how we might more effectively do so.
Wednesday, September 17, 2014
Catholic "new urbanist" and classical architect Philip Bess is a dear friend and colleague, and I know I've mentioned his work here at Mirror of Justice many times (and, from time to time, vented my friendly frustration with some of the more preening and irritating aspects of some new-urbanist writing). (Buy his "Til We Have Built Jerusalem" here, after reading my First Things review!) Here, Rod Dreher interviews Bess and discusses his work.
Dreher's praise of Bess's work is well-deserved. That said, in my view, Dreher is a bit too hard on those conservatives who have appropriate reservations about "new urbanist" plans, proposals, and ideology. So long as "new urbanism" is reasonably seen as travelling moer comfortably with hipster aesthetics and environmental-apocalypse fantasies than with Bess's Aristo-Thomist invocations of the conditions for authentic human flourishing . . . and so long as "new urbanists" appear not-too-keen on large families and relatively uninterested in where the churches and parochial schools fit in to their ideal built environmetns . . . a little skepticism -- even of the friendly kind -- is in order.
September 17, 2014 | Permalink
I just came across an interesting Call for Papers for the 15th Conference of International Consumer Law, to be held in Amsterdam next summer. The theme of the conferences is "Virtues and Consumer Law."
Proposals on the following possible topic areas are identified as being especially encouraged, presumably because they represent the "virtues" contemplated by the conference organizers. Setting aside some qualms I have about the very first one, this struck me as a very interesting list of 'virtues' in this particular field of law.
- Self-realization (in tourism, air travel or entertainment sector);
- Faith (in public and/or private enforcement of consumer law, in collective redress);
- Curiosity (in e-commerce, telecommunication sector or on innovation and consumer law);
- Compassion (towards vulnerable consumers, in medicine or in clinical trials);
- Frugality (in the banking sector or in financial contracts);
- Fairness (against unfair commercial practices and/or misleading advertising, against unfair contract terms, in protection of SMEs, through good faith and fair dealing);
- Trust (through data protection, on privacy and security issues, through product safety and/or product liability, from behavioural economics perspective);
- Forgiveness (through mediation or ADR);
- Self-development (through education, through services, through consumer sale contracts);
- Hope (against overindebtness, through clean-slate doctrine, by way of insurance).
Those of us from an Irish Catholic background are inevitably reserved, to say the least, about British Unionism. But as Rick pointed out last week, the prospect of Scotland voting tomorrow to secede from the United Kingdom seems extraordinarily foolish and may, as argued here by Walter Russell Mead, usher in an era of wider political instability that we will all soon regret (and some of the damage may already be done). Two offhand thoughts on this eve of the referendum:
First, rather than a modern domesticated version of Robert the Bruce, the Scottish nationalist movement today seems more a Caledonian variant of Peronism—socially progressive, yes, but also a brew of authoritarianism, economic populism, and class resentment (see Tom Gallagher's piece earlier this summer). Many voting for Scottish independence tomorrow have hopes of creating a Scandinavian welfare state utopia shorn of retrograde English capitalism, but they are more likely to get economic stagnation, debt crises, currency instability, and political turmoil. And as John Haldane wrote here, none of this will be good for the Catholic Church or for religious liberty.
Second and as a matter of political and legal theory, there is something odd about the bare majoritarianism at work in tomorrow’s vote. 50% plus one of Scottish citizens age 16 and older (well, those who live in Scotland—Scots living in other parts of the UK can’t vote in the referendum) can decide to form an independent country and abrogate the 1707 Act of Union with England—and that result binds 50% minus one of Scots. Jeremy Waldron elegantly argues in The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge UP, 1999) against the arbitrariness of majoritarianism and the legitimacy of Locke's "physics of consent" by majority rule. Fair enough as to normal politics—popular voting for candidates or legislative majorities. Ultimate questions of sovereignty, though, seem to me to require an account of authority and a background political culture that majoritarianism alone can’t provide--a problem rarely (and fortunately so) posed in the modern state. As Tyler Cowen wrote this morning, crudely posing certain questions and asking the people to resolve them (here by bare majority rule) threatens any political order, and independence "might just be a question which should not be asked in such a blatant form." And as he wrote presciently some months ago, "If a significant segment of the British partnership wishes to leave, and for no really good practical reason, it is a sign that something is deeply wrong with contemporary politics and with our standards for loyalties.”
Today the Universal Church celebrates the optional feast of Saint Robert Bellarmine—a Catholic intellectual, a faithful priest, and prudent but courageous member of the Society of Jesus. He understood well Father Ignatius’s declaration that the purpose of the Least Society is to strive to defend and propagate the faith and to assist souls in Christian life and doctrine. But, really, is this not the calling of everyone who claims to follow Christ knowing that he or she is a citizen of two cities—the City of God and the City of Man? I hold and profess the view that all Christians, including those who advance Catholic legal theory, are, in one fashion or another, called to similar purpose as was Robert Bellarmine, who was trained in both theology and juridical science (like your humble correspondent). One other important element of Christian life needs to be recounted here as we consider today’s feast observing the life and death of Bellarmine: the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross which we celebrated this past Sunday. As I was celebrating the Eucharist, I prayed very slowly the words of the Collect: “O God, who willed that your Only Begotten Son should undergo the Cross to save the human race, grant, we pray, that we, who have known his mystery on earth, may merit the grace of redemption in heaven…” This prayer is intensified by the Gospel reading for the feast from Saint John that includes the oft-prayed passage of John 3:16. I am certain these principles of the Catholic faith were an ever-present guiding star of Robert Bellarmine in all that he accomplished and all that he tried to achieve in Christ’s name.
While Bellarmine was a learned man, a bishop, and a cardinal, he was first and last a humble servant of his and our Church who followed Christ in simplicity. Like our current Holy Father, Francis, he was attracted to the plainness of life lived by Saint Francis of Assisi. For us Jesuits, we are reminded how Father Ignatius states in his autobiography how he would like to be as Dominic or as Francis (of Assisi). But Father Ignatius’s exhortation is not limited to Jesuits; I am convinced it applies to all who follow Christ or claim to do so.
Returning to the nexus between the life, discipleship, and the work of Robert Bellarmine, I am certain that he continues to show those of us who dedicate our lives to Catholic legal theory how to seek in our apostolic service the pressing need to meet the grave challenges of our present age with prudence, courage, and fidelity. We cannot take for granted that all we meet and with whom we may labor are practitioners of the same virtues. One essential tool of which I have spoken often in the past, given the vineyards in which we work, is the need for the Catholic Christian to be mindful of the gifts of objective intelligence given to us by the Creator to comprehend the intelligible reality of the world and of the universe. Using these gifts wisely and without reservation should enable those of us who teach human law, as it is intersected by God’s law (we can never get away from our dual citizenship, now, can we?), to do so in a fashion the replicates the way of proceeding utilized by Robert Bellarmine throughout his life. He, too, lived in an age of skeptics fueled by a world of corruption, vainglory, and power-over-right, but he was not deterred from seeking out and collaborating with his fellow disciples and people of good will in his striving for the defense and propagation of the faith and assisting souls in Christian life and doctrine.
May we profit from his example not only on this day but for all the days of our lives.
Saint Robert Bellarmine, pray for us! Amen.
Tuesday, September 16, 2014
An important, even if not uplifting, essay by Prof. Steven Smith:
In culture war battles over same-sex marriage, one group of scholars (“the moderators”) offers what is held out as a “live and let live” truce: same-sex marriage would be legalized, qualified by exemptions to protect groups and individuals who oppose same-sex marriage on religious grounds against liability or legal sanctions. The appeal of this proposal lies in part in its implicit claim to symmetry. The compromise– namely, same-sex marriage with religious exemptions-- is said to respect the legitimate interests of each side. Consequently, the moderators view both religious conservatives and secular egalitarians who decline to embrace the compromise as intransigent, and as unreasonably attempting to “impose their values” on others.
This essay criticizes the moderators’ implicit claim of symmetry. In fact, neither rejection of same-sex marriage nor legalization qualified by exemptions is equally respectful of each side’s interests. Both sides understand this fact, and they understand that it is better to be in a position of granting accommodation than to be in need of accommodation. In addition, the parties face different risks if they find themselves in a politically subordinate position and hence in need of accommodation. The final section of the essay considers the likelihood that either party, if politically dominant, will be inclined to accommodate the other party. While emphasizing that the question is inherently speculative, the essay argues (contrary to much academic opinion) that Christian conservatives have both the intellectual resources and the historical experience to support an attitude of tolerance. Whether secular egalitarianism has these toleration-supportive ingredients is more uncertain
The Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics and Public Policy will take place in Bowling Green, Ohio, April 17th-18th, 2015. The keynote speakers are Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame) and Andrew Koppelman (Northwestern University).
Those interested in presenting a paper are invited to submit a 2-3 page abstract (double-spaced) by November 15th, 2014. We welcome submissions in all areas in applied ethics and philosophical issues relevant to this year’s conference theme: the scope of religious exemptions. We are especially focused on papers that address normative questions about religious exemptions, including the moral-philosophical justifications for religious exemptions and how often and to whom religious exemptions should be granted. We will consider multiple approaches to the topic, not merely in political philosophy and political theory, but normative ethics, metaethics and applied ethics.
More information is here.
Over at Law & Liberty, there's a podcast with Daniel Mahoney about Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, his work, his reception, his legacy, etc. Here's part of the intro:
Comes now the great Daniel J. Mahoney, author of penetrating intellectual biographies of Bertrand de Jouvenel, Raymond Aron, and Charles de Gaulle, among other books, to discuss his latest work, The Other Solzhenitsyn. Mahoney, co-editor of The Solzhenitsyn Reader, provides us in this discussion a tremendous introduction to the Russian dissident writer’s corpus of writings and a rebuttal to his many critics.
We might say that most western writers who, from their position of faux outrage, frequently critique their governments, societies, and cultures have Solzhenitsyn envy, earnestly desiring that their work could perform something even close to the role of the Russian anti-communist writer par excellence. Not that they admire Solzhenitsyn’s political and moral philosophy, and his belief that freedom is ultimately born of spiritual commitment, but that no one will ever say of their work that it put a “sliver in the throat of power.” Such was the praise given Solzhenitsyn after the publication of One Day in the Live of Ivan Denisovich in 1962. . . .
Whenever those polls and quizzes asking for "lists of 10 books that changed your life" or "that stayed with you" circulate on Facebook, Ivan Denisovich is always one of my ten. (I wrote on of my college-application essays on his Cancer Ward and remember clearly buying "Warning to the West" at a bookstore in Cambridge, MA during a Spring Break visit to a friend there. Yes, I am a geek.)
Solzhenitsyn was, of course, a hero to the anti-communists in the United States during the Cold War, but his popularity waned as he turned his critical idea to western materialism, consumerism, etc. Also, many critics today see him as "anti-democratic, theocratic, and pro-Putin, to name a few[.]" In the podcast, Mahoney discusses and responds to these critics' claims.
James Mumford has a thoughtful piece in The Telegraph ("It's time to rethink our attitude to abortion") that engages the widespread but (he thinks, and I agree) misplaced emphasis placed on the "viability" of unborn children in abortion law and in the abortion debate. Here's a bit:
But why should being capable of being born alive – being able to survive the onset of breathing and oral feeding – be the make-or-break threshold? Viability may have solidified as a legal concept, but the science shows that in reality it’s a moving target. . . .
More fundamentally, what feminist thinkers have shown is the fact that viability constitutes a profound category mistake. Human beings arrive in the world in a state of radical dependency. To insist they reach a stage of independence before we confer rights upon them is to assume, in the words of feminist political philosopher Seyla Benhabib, a "strange world" in which "individuals are grown up before they are born". . . .
Mumford's piece resonates strongly, I think, with what many of us here at MOJ (and many others, too) have said about the content of the Church's "moral anthropology," i.e., that it provides an account of the human person, of human dignity, and of human destiny that is not built on autonomy and self-sufficiency so much as on dependence and relationships. (For an essay of mine that touches on this account, go here.)
Monday, September 15, 2014
Over at Law & Liberty, I have a reply posted to the three very thoughtful responses authored by Donald Drakeman, Paul Horwitz, and John Inazu. Here's the reply (and you can access the original piece and the responses there). A bit:
. . . Drakeman’s [response] serves to underscore the importance of insisting that there is more to religious freedom than an accommodations-and-exemptions regime. After all, such a regime always and inevitably (and understandably) involves the balancing, by the state, of the costs and benefits, to and for the state, of accommodations and exemptions. A political community that loses sight of the many ways that religious institutions’ and actors’ religious and religiously motivated activities serve the common good is going to be less likely to accommodate and exempt. It is important, then, to emphasize that a moral and legal commitment to religious freedom also involves an appreciation and (enforced) respect for the limited but still real “autonomy” of religious institutions and actors as well as for the limits on the state’s regulatory authority. . . .
Paul Horwitz – whose important book, First Amendment Institutions, has both shaped and challenged my thinking about the subject under discussion – is right to remind readers that “religious institutionalism” is “not necessarily a libertarian position”; it does not require or even invite “disdain for the state”; it is does not reflect or imply “complete skepticism about or outright hostility to government.” It does, I think, necessarily involve (as Horwitz says) the ungrudging acceptance – indeed, the welcoming – of non-state authorities and of occasional “incongruence” (to borrow Nancy Rosenblum’s term) between, on the one hand, the rules that govern and the goals that move the liberal state and, on the other, the practices and values of non-state groups, communities, associations, and institutions. As my colleague, Robert Rodes, has put it, there is a “nexus” between religious and political authorities that involves both cooperation and contestation, mutual support and resistance. . . .
. . . Inazu . . . expresses some doubt – friendly doubt, I think, but doubt nonetheless – about the “constitutional” and especially the “theological” limits on what I called the “translation, not transplantation” of the “freedom of the church” into present day law and practice. He writes, “The freedom of the church is first and foremost a theological argument. Some theological arguments are at least partially translatable; indeed, we have seen examples of this kind of translation unfold within American law through concepts like conscience and forgiveness. But other theological concepts are less susceptible to translation from the theological perspectives out of which they emerge.” I take the point, but would respectfully maintain that Inazu is underestimating the political, legal, and social dimensions of the idea and therefore overestimating the theological limits to translation. To be sure, Christians and Christianity have an account of what “the Church” really is that is not political and that is about the “reality of Jesus Christ”, not “the special nature of ‘religion.’” They – we – are called to bear witness to that reality and not to – in Inazu’s words – “domesticat[e]” it or make it more suitable to moderns or comfortable to liberals. Nevertheless, I continue to think that there is plenty of content in the “freedom of the church” idea, argument, proposal, and struggle that is not only translatable to, but urgently needed for, the this-side-of-Heaven project of ordering our lives together.
A few days ago, I put up a short post on the Herx case -- having to do with a discrimination lawsuit against a Catholic school by a teacher -- and characterized the trial court's ruling -- rejecting the school's ministerial-exception argument -- as misguided. (I didn't post the link to the opinion, but it is here. Reading it again, I continue to think it is off-the-mark.)
A reader wrote in with some questions and -- with permission -- I'm posting some of them, and saying a bit in response, here . . .
I’d be interested in reading in the future your response to the judge’s distinction between the Herx and Perich, the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor. I think his approach is quite sound.
I think the trial judge read Hosanna-Tabor far too narrowly and incorrectly focused simply on the question whether the teacher in question is "ordained" or is instead a "lay teacher." Under the terms of her contract, it is quite clear (to me) that she is expected to be, and is held out as being, charged with the formation in the faith -- through example, teaching, and witness -- of the school's students. That she is not an ordained minister or a theology teacher should not end the inquiry. The trial judge's approach is, it seems to me, closer to the one employed by the Sixth Circuit in Hosanna-Tabor than by the one employed by the (unanimous) Supreme Court.
I’d also be interested in reading more about your proposed presumption that K-8 teachers in parochial schools are ministers. I’ve had kids on the younger end of that spectrum in religious school (probably not parochial since the school was affiliated with a Catholic university run by a religious order) and it frankly never occurred to me that the teachers were all “ministers” unless that term is defined very broadly such that the cafeteria staff, janitors, etc. are also included.
I think it is easy to draw a line between "teachers" and "cafeteria staff, janitors, etc." In my view, given the mission of Catholic parochial schools as it is described in the writings on Catholic education by recent popes and by the relevant USCCB bodies, a teacher (lay or ordained) at a Catholic school is a "minister" of the Church within the meaning of Hosanna-Tabor. Whether or not courts will agree with me is, of course, an open question. I suspect, in the current climate, many will not.
My reader's question does underscore for me the importance of making as clear as possible -- and of making more clear than some Catholic schools have done in the past -- how the school conceives of its mission and of its teachers' role.
Getting more specific, would you apply this presumption to Herx (who did not teach religion classes and had a contract different from teachers who did)? How about a teacher who did not share the parochial school’s religious affiliation (Herx and Perich did but I think you’ll agree that this fact pattern does arise)? What if the parochial school didn’t have any religion classes or chapel services at all or had special teachers, perhaps more recognizable as “ministers,” lead them? In other words, how would the presumption be overcome, if indeed it could be overcome and is not simply a “church always wins” rule?
I would apply the "presumption" to any teacher in a K-8 school, regardless of whether that teacher is a Roman Catholic or not. (Again, I'm assuming that every teacher's contract does, or should, speak clearly about the school's mission and the teachers' role.) A Catholic school should not lose the right to make mission-related decisions in the hiring context simply because, in some cases, the school decides that a non-Catholic can advance that mission. (I think it is obvious that, in many cases, non-Catholics support and advance the distinctly Catholic mission of Catholic schools.)
If a "parochial school didn’t have any religion classes or chapel services at all," then I'd think it wasn't much of a parochial school. I'd be surprised if many, or any, K-8 Catholic schools fit this description.
I'm thinking that the "presumption" could be overcome if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it was clear that the teacher was not expected by the school to play any role in the formation of the students and this fact was made clear to the teacher as well as to the relevant parents. But, yes, in cases involving a "parochial school" -- that is, a traditional K-8 meaningfully Catholic school -- the school should usually win.
To be clear . . . none of this means that the school is behaving well, or fairly, or justly, or that a particular decision cannot be criticized on moral or fairness grounds. As I wrote here, and in more detail here. . .
Here's a bit that jumped out at me, from Cardinal George's recent column, "A Tale of Two Churches":
. . . Swimming against the tide means limiting one’s access to positions of prestige and power in society. It means that those who choose to live by the Catholic faith will not be welcomed as political candidates to national office, will not sit on editorial boards of major newspapers, will not be at home on most university faculties, will not have successful careers as actors and entertainers. Nor will their children, who will also be suspect. Since all public institutions, no matter who owns or operates them, will be agents of the government and conform their activities to the demands of the official religion, the practice of medicine and law will become more difficult for faithful Catholics . . .
Generally speaking, I've thought (and tried to speak and write) more in terms of engagement and participation than retreat and retrieval. Generally speaking, I've thought it important to insist -- even as I find much to admire in the MacIntyre-ish localism / roots / place / "build community" themes that run through, say, the stuff at Front Porch Republic -- that it continues to be important to do all one can, in politics, law, and litigation, to protect the rights and place of religious believers and institutions in the public square and in the public conversation. Not too long ago, I might have thought that Cardinal George was being a bit too pessimistic. Now . . . I'm not sure he is.
On Friday, I'm giving a lecture (thanks to the University of Arizona and the Notre Dame Alumni Association) in Tucson on "Law, Religion, and Politics: Understanding the Separation of Church and State." More info here. In a nutshell: "Healthy secularity" is way to understand "the separation of church and state" and this understanding is good for religious freedom.
Saturday, September 13, 2014
The other day I found myself re-reading Pope Francis’ recent exhortation, Evangelii Gaudiem. In light of last week’s news, the following excerpt jumped out at me where he discusses how we are all invited:
…to receive God’s love and to love him in return with the very love which is his gift, bring[ing] forth in our lives and actions a primary and fundamental response: to desire, seek and protect the good of others.
The message is one which we often take for granted, and can repeat almost mechanically, without necessarily ensuring that it has a real effect on our lives and in our communities. (Evangelii Gaudiem, para. 178)
Later in the document, when more specifically discussing this call to protect the most vulnerable in society, Pope Francis singles out victims of domestic violence. He writes “[d]oubly poor are those women who endure situations of exclusion, mistreatment and violence, since they are frequently less able to defend their rights.” (Evangelii Gaudiem, para. 212)
As I previously blogged, much of this last week has demonstrated how society has taken for granted, indeed, accepted a certain level of violence against women, thereby negatively “affecting our lives and communities.” However, Thursday also demonstrated how some women senators have engaged in the very actions Pope Francis exhorts us all to do.
A bipartisan group of 16 women senators wrote Commissioner Roger Goodell expressing dismay with the NFL’s “policy” regarding domestic violence. Central to this letter is this most basic but poignant observation:
We are deeply concerned that the NFL’s new policy, announced last month, would allow a player to commit a violent act against a woman and return after a short suspension. If you violently assault a woman, you shouldn’t get a second chance to play football in the NFL.
The NFL is a major American business whose teams split $6 billion in revenue in 2013. I would hope that in most businesses if an employee (let alone a public figure) knocked a co-worker unconscious and was indicted, he would be severely disciplined. This certainly would be true if he beat unconscious a person because of his or her class, religion, or creed. But somehow it is not true if he beat unconscious a person because of her gender. That apparently is more acceptable.
I am pleased that these senators are seeking to help protect women. It is sad, however, that this business needs to be told this basic truth: “If you violently assault a woman, you shouldn’t get a second chance to play football in the NFL.”
A full text of the letter can be found here.
Friday, September 12, 2014
Amicus Brief of Pro-Life Organizations Supporting Strong Protection for Pregnant Workers from Discrimination
(from Tom Berg:) I'm very pleased to tell others about an amicus curiae brief, filed in the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday by 23 pro-life organizations in Young v. United Parcel Service, an important case involving the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (the PDA). The brief, which supports the pregnant employee who filed suit against UPS, is by pro-life organizations from across the political spectrum, from Concerned Women for America and the Southern Baptists to Feminists for Nonviolent Choices and Democrats for Life. Here are a couple of news releases, from St. Thomas Law and from the Democrats for Life (on whose board I sit), each summarizing the case (and also linking to the brief).
The filing of the brief makes important statements that, I think, are noteworthy in our society polarized over the “life” issue and how to address it. In this, a variety of pro-life groups with different missions, who disagree on other things, have come together to emphasize that supporting pregnant women is a fundamentally pro-life position. I suspect that, in our polarized atmosphere, some people may be surprised that a bunch of pro-life groups have filed to support working women—so spread the news!
I worked along with several other counsel, including my colleague Teresa Collett, to organize and draft the brief. And yet another St. Thomas Law colleague, MOJ's own Lisa Schiltz, made important contributions to the brief as well. (Go Tommies!)
The case involves Peggy Young, a driver for UPS who became pregnant and, based on the doctor’s note concerning lifting restrictions, sought to be switched to “light duty” work for the remaining few months of her pregnancy. UPS had provided such an accommodation for several significant categories of employees, including those injured on the job, those with disabilities, and those who had lost their commercial driving license for various medical reasons—but it refused to accommodate Young. She was forced to take an unpaid leave and lost her employer-provided health insurance for several months. Young sued under the PDA, which requires that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees “similar in their ability or inability to work.” Although UPS had made the accommodations mentioned above, the lower courts ruled against Young because there were other categories of employees UPS had not accommodated (e.g. off-the-job injuries); essentially, the court said that pregnancy was not discriminated against if it was treated no worse than those and was not ”singled out” for denial. Young is seeking reversal in the Supreme Court.
The case raises an important issue concerning the effectiveness of the PDA’s protection for pregnant employees, since many employers make accommodations for some but not all employees with physical limitations. The pro-life organizations’ brief argues that pregnancy should be treated as well as conditions the employer deems important enough to accommodate, not as poorly as conditions the employer refuses to accommodate. The brief points to the background of the PDA, which had support in 1978 from pro-life groups and pro-life members of Congress. Their rationale was that protecting pregnant women from discrimination reduced pressure on economically vulnerable women to abort their children, and strengthens the fundamental right to bear children and raise a family. The brief makes those arguments as well.
Counsel of record are Carrie Severino and Jonathan Keim of the Judicial Education Project (also an amicus).
Cross-posted (with minor changes) at Whole Life Democrat
Check it out. Here's a bit about the project:
Beliefs about justice typically lurk just beneath headlines from around the world, whether they deal with separatist movements in Ukraine, Kurdistan, or Sri Lanka; Islamic rebellions in Syrian and Iraq; U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan; war between Israel and Palestine; global development policy; women’s rights; economic justice; the drug wars in Latin America; the one-child policy in China; and religious freedom. Usually, these beliefs go unexamined. The same is often true even in the academy. In American political science, for instance, justice is sharply separated from the scientific study of politics. Arc of the Universe is devoted to resurfacing justice – examining the day’s headlines from the deep commitments of ethical traditions. Arc of the Universe is also distinctive in bringing religion into the picture. Some posts will appeal to religion while others will be rendered in secular terms. Arc of the Universe is a place where secular and religious meet in conversation about global justice.
So come follow Arc of the Universe!
A friend posted this on Facebook:
On this day in 1683, the forces of the Holy League, led by Polish King Jan Sobieski III and his Winged Hussar lancers, mounted one of the largest cavalry charges in history to defeat the combined Ottoman forces of Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, relieve the siege of Vienna, and save Europe from an existential threat. Upon achieving victory Sobieski is said to have declared "Veni, vici, Deus vicit."
September 12, 2014 | Permalink
On September 18, the Center for Civil and Human Rights at the Notre Dame Law School (which is directed by my friend and colleague, Dan Phipott), is hosting an important and interesting-looking conference, "Under Caesar's Sword: A Christian Response to Persecution." More info here. This is the beginning of an exciting, ongoing interdisciplinary research project. Stay tuned.
"Under Caesar's Sword" . . . aims to document and understand the ways in which Christian communities deal with the violent suppression of their rights. Recently awarded a $1.1 million grant from the Templeton Religion Trust, CCHR and RFP will host a panel of experts on religious freedom at Notre Dame Law School. These experts, along with many others, will set out across the globe in the next year to investigate the varied methods by which Christian communities respond to repression, from complex diplomacy to simple flight.
Here's a nice piece, called "Discrimination, or Intellectual-Lite?", at God, People, Place. The author, Charlie Peacock, says (among other things):
. . . I am committed to discriminate thinking, that is the intellectual ability to differentiate and separate – to tell the difference between one thing and another. What education I do have encouraged the promotion of discriminate thinking and the cultivation of the ability to evaluate, make comparisons, and categorize.
Yet, there is a disturbing trend among our American institutions of higher learning. In the interest of anti-discrimination, the keepers of our intellectual future have forgotten how to think discriminately – to tell the difference between one thing and another. . . .
The Boston University Law Review has posted a number of excellent contributions to a symposium on Ronald Dworkin's Religion Without God. Talk about an abundance of riches! There are pieces by James Fleming, Jeremy Waldron, Stephen Carter, Paul Horwitz, Andy Koppelman, Cecile Laborde, Linda McClain, Micah Schwartzman, and Steven Smith. Wow!