January 26, 2011

BY EMAIL AND FEDERAL EXPRESS

Senator Brian E. Frosh
Chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee
Miller Senate Building, 2 East Wing
11 Bladen Street
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Re: Religious Liberty Implications of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage

Dear Senator Frosh:

We write to urge the Maryland General Assembly to ensure that any bill legalizing same-sex marriage does not infringe the religious liberty of organizations and individuals who have a traditional view of marriage. Maryland’s very founding was premised on religious tolerance as evidenced by its Toleration Act of 1648. Providing religious protections in any same-sex marriage bill honors this long and rich tradition.

If the General Assembly legalizes same-sex marriage, it is possible to do so without infringing on religious liberty. The contentious debate in Maine, California and elsewhere surrounding same-sex marriage proves the wisdom of constructive, good-faith attempts both to grant legal recognition to same-sex marriage and to protect religious liberty for conscientious objectors.

This letter analyzes the potential effects of same-sex marriage on religious conscience in Maryland and proposes a solution to address the conflicts: a specific religious liberty protection that should be added to any proposed legislation, clarifying that people and organizations may refuse to provide services for a wedding if doing so would violate deeply held beliefs, while ensuring that the refusal creates no undue hardship for the couple seeking the service. We write not to support or oppose same-sex marriage in Maryland. Rather, our aim is to define a “middle way” to address the needs of same-sex couples while honoring and respecting religious liberty.1

As this letter details, the conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious conscience will be considerable if adequate protections are not provided. Without adequate safeguards, many religious individuals will be forced to engage in conduct that violates their deepest religious beliefs, and religious organizations will be constrained in crucial aspects of their religious exercise. We urge the Maryland General Assembly to take the time and care to ensure that the legalization of same-sex marriage does not restrict the inalienable right of religious liberty. Doing so is entirely consistent with the text of the Maryland State Constitution that each

1 While we have a range of views on the underlying issue of same-sex marriage, we wholeheartedly share the belief that when same-sex marriage is recognized it should be accompanied by corresponding protections for religious liberty.
member of the Legislature has sworn to uphold and protect. From its first constitution in 1776 to the present text, the Maryland Constitution has always protected religious freedom.²

Part A of this letter proposes a specific religious conscience protection that will defuse the vast majority of potential conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty. Part B provides examples of precedent for the protection we propose. Part C details the sorts of legal conflicts that will arise if same-sex marriage is legalized without strong protections for religious liberty.

A. Proposed Religious Conscience Protection

The many potential conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty are avoidable.³ But they are avoidable only if the Maryland General Assembly takes the time and effort to craft the “robust religious-conscience exceptions” to same-sex marriage that leading voices on both sides of the public debate over same-sex marriage are calling for.⁴ The juncture for balancing religious liberty and legal recognition of same-sex unions is now.⁵

Any proposed marriage bill can provide strong, specific protections for religious conscience by including a simple “marriage conscience protection” modeled, in part, on existing conscience protections in Maryland’s anti-discrimination laws.⁶ The “marriage conscience protection” would provide as follows:

**Section ___**

(a) Religious organizations protected.

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² See, e.g., M.D. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 36.


⁵ Though conscience protections should also extend to existing civil unions, we do not address civil unions here. We anticipate far fewer conflicts regarding civil unions, since for many conscientious objectors civil unions bear less religious significance than marriage.

⁶ See, e.g., Md. Code. Ann. art. 49B, § 18(2) (2010) (exempting any “religious corporation, association, educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution or society of its activities” from the prohibition on discrimination in employment.)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no religious or denominational organization, no organization operated for charitable or educational purposes which is supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, and no individual employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in the scope of that employment, shall be required to

(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or

(2) solemnize any marriage; or

(3) treat as valid any marriage

if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.

(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or small business shall be required

(A) to provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or celebration of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that directly facilitate the perpetuation of any marriage; or

(B) to provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or

(C) to provide housing to any married couple

if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause such individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such small businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.

(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if

(A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good or services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial hardship; or

(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if another government employee or official is not promptly available and
willing to provide the requested government service without inconvenience or delay; provided that no judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall be required to solemnize any marriage if to do so would violate the judicial officer’s sincerely held religious beliefs.

(3) A “small business” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a legal entity other than a natural person

(A) that provides services which are primarily performed by an owner of the business; or

(B) that has five or fewer employees; or

(C) in the case of a legal entity that offers housing for rent, that owns five or fewer units of housing.

(c) No civil cause of action or other penalties.

No refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges protected by this section shall

(1) result in a civil claim or cause of action challenging such refusal; or

(2) result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions to penalize or withhold benefits from any protected entity or individual, under any laws of this State or its subdivisions, including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status.

This language has several important benefits. First, this language parallels existing protections in Maryland’s anti-discrimination law for “a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the activities of the religious entity.”\(^7\) This language also significantly mirrors, in part, the specific protections provided in the Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and District of Columbia same-sex marriage laws for religious organizations. Many of these laws protect, among other things, the conscientious

refusal “to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges . . .
related to the solemnization of a marriage.”

Second, this language lists the primary areas of Maryland law where the refusal to treat a
marriage as valid is likely to result in liability, penalty, or denial of government benefits (“laws
regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational institutions,
licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status”).

Third, this language provides protection only when providing services related to a
marriage, solemnizing a marriage, or being forced to treat a marriage as valid would “violate . . .
sincerely held religious beliefs.” This phrase is drawn from numerous court cases discussing the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and ensures that the religious conscience protections
will apply only to a “violation” of “sincere” beliefs that are “religious”—not to situations that
merely make religious people uncomfortable, not to insincere beliefs asserted as a pretext for
discrimination, and not to non-religious moral beliefs.

Fourth, this language provides vital protections in subsection (b) for individuals of
religiously informed conscience who own sole proprietorships and small businesses. We explain
the need for such protection in Sections C and F below.

Finally, this language recognizes that religious accommodations might not be without
cost for same-sex couples, such as the need to find a different wedding photographer or caterer if
their original choice must decline for reasons of conscience. In order to address this issue,
subsection (b)(2) ensures that a same-sex couple can obtain the service, even from conscientious
objectors, when the inability to find a similar service elsewhere would impose an undue hardship
on the couple. But because this hardship exception could force organizations or individuals to
violate their religious beliefs, it should be available only in cases of substantial hardship, not
mere inconvenience or symbolic harm. The language in subsection (b)(2)(B) also ensures that
no government employee or official (such as a county clerk) may act as a choke point on the path
to marriage. So, for example, no government employee can refuse on grounds of conscience to

8 See N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:37 (exempting religious organizations from “provid[ing] services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges . . . related to” the “solemnization,”
“celebration,” or “promotion” of a marriage); CONN. PUBLIC ACT NO. 09-13 (2009) §§ 17-19, available at
organizations from “provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges . . .
related to” the “solemnization” or “celebration” of a marriage, and providing separate exemptions for
religious adoption agencies and fraternal benefit societies); 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 4502(l) (2009)
exempting religious organizations from “provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges . . . related to” the “solemnization” or “celebration” of a marriage). See also
lims/legislation.aspx?LegNo=B18-0482 (exempting religious societies and religiously affiliated non-
profits from providing “accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose related to the solemnization or
celebration of a same-sex marriage, or the promotion of same-sex marriage through religious programs,
counseling, courses, or retreats…”).
issue a marriage license unless another government employee is promptly available and willing to do so. These sorts of override protections are common in other laws protecting the right of conscientious objection, especially in the health care context.  

B. Precedent for Religious Conscience Protections

There is ample precedent for the type of conscience protection we have proposed. As noted above, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia have already enacted religious exemptions as part of their same-sex marriage implementation legislation. Similarly, Maryland’s existing anti-discrimination laws on employment provide exemptions for religious organizations in certain circumstances. And federal anti-discrimination statutes provide protection for religious and conscientious objectors in many different contexts. In short, protecting religious conscience is very much a part of America’s, and Maryland’s, tradition. We urge the Maryland General Assembly to continue that “middle way” accommodation of interests.

The religious conscience protection that we have proposed would alleviate the vast majority of the conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty, while still allowing for full equality of treatment and respect for same-sex marriages. It has ample precedent in both Maryland and U.S. law. And it represents the best in the American and Maryland tradition of protecting the inalienable right of conscience.

C. Conflicts Between Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty

9 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005) (“An individual who may lawfully perform, assist, or participate in medical procedures which will result in an abortion shall not be required against that individual’s religious beliefs or moral convictions to perform, assist, or participate in such procedures. . . . Abortion does not include medical care which has as its primary purpose the treatment of a serious physical condition requiring emergency medical treatment necessary to save the life of a mother.”); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-40, -50 (2002) (“No private or non-governmental hospital or clinic shall be required . . . to permit their facilities to be utilized for the performance of abortions; provided, that no hospital or clinic shall refuse an emergency admittance.”); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.004 (Vernon 2004) (“A private hospital or private health care facility is not required to make its facilities available for the performance of abortion unless a physician determines that the life of the mother is immediately endangered.”).

10 See note 8 above and pages 14-15 below.

11 See, MD Code, State Government, § 20-604 (stating that it will not be a discriminatory employment practice for “a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the activities of the religious entity”).

12 See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 1630.11 (accommodating conscientious objectors to military service); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (accommodating health care professionals who conscientiously object to participating in medical procedures such as abortion or sterilization); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (Religious Freedom Restoration Act lifts federal-created burdens on religious exercise).
In the only book-length comprehensive scholarly work on same-sex marriage and religious liberty, legal scholars on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate agreed that codifying same-sex marriage without providing robust religious accommodations will create widespread and unnecessary legal conflicts—conflicts that will work a “sea change in American law” and will “reverberate across the legal and religious landscape.” The conflicts between religious conscience and same-sex marriage generally take one of two forms. First, if same-sex marriage is legalized without appropriate statutory accommodations, religious organizations and individuals that object to same-sex marriage will face new lawsuits under the state anti-discrimination act and other similar laws. So will many small businesses, which are owned by individual conscientious objectors. Likely lawsuits include claims where:

- Individuals of conscience, who run a small business, such as wedding photographers, florists, banquet halls, or making wedding cakes in one’s home, can be sued under public accommodations laws for refusing to offer their services in connection with a same-sex marriage ceremony.

- Religious summer camps, day care centers, retreat centers, counseling centers, meeting halls, or adoption agencies can be sued under public accommodations laws for refusing to offer their facilities or services to members of a same-sex marriage.

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14 Id. Marc Stern, Assistant Executive Director, American Jewish Congress, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches at 1 [hereinafter “Stern”]. See also id., Douglas Laycock, University of Virginia Law School, Afterword at 191-97 [hereinafter “Laycock”] (detailing the scope of “avoidable” and “unavoidable” conflicts).


16 Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Dep’t of Law and Public Safety, Notice of Probable Cause issued Dec. 29, 2008) (finding that a Methodist organization likely violated public accommodations law by denying same-sex couples use of its wedding pavilion); Butler v. Adoption Media, 486 F. Supp.2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (administrators of Arizona adoption facilitation website found subject to California’s public accommodations statute because they refused to post profiles of same-sex couples as potential adoptive parents); see also Stern at 37-39; Robin Fretwell Wilson, A
A church or other religious nonprofit that dismisses an employee, such as an organist or secretary, for entering into a same-sex marriage can be sued under employment discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status.\(^{17}\)

The second form of conflict involving religious organizations and individuals (or the small businesses that they own) that conscientiously object to same-sex marriage is that they will be labeled unlawful “discriminators” under state or municipal laws and thus face a range of penalties at the hand of state agencies and local governments, such as the withdrawal of government contracts or exclusion from government facilities. For example:

- A religious college, hospital, or social service organization that refuses to provide its employees with same-sex spousal benefits can be denied access to government contracts or grants on the ground that it is engaging in discrimination that contravenes public policy.\(^{18}\)

- A religious charity or fraternal organization that opposes same-sex marriage can be denied access to government facilities, such as a lease on government property or participation in a government-sponsored employee charitable campaign.\(^{19}\)

- Doctors, psychologists, social workers, counselors, and other professionals who conscientiously object to same-sex marriage can have their licenses revoked.\(^{20}\)

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\(\text{Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475 (2008) (describing clashes over adoptions by same-sex couples).}\)

\(^{17}\) Stern at 48-52; Issues Brief at 3-5. Maryland’s religious exemption from employment discrimination laws does not cover every possible situation. See Md. Code. Ann. art. 49B, § 18(2) (2010) (exempting any “religious corporation, association, educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution or society of its activities” from the prohibition on discrimination in employment.)

\(^{18}\) See, e.g., Code Md. Regs. 21.05.08.07 (2010) (prohibiting public works contractors from discriminating on the basis of, among other things, “marital status, [or] sexual orientation”); see also Catholic Charities of Maine v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp.2d 77 (D. Me. 2004) (upholding ordinance forcing religious charity either to extend employee spousal benefit programs to registered same-sex couples, or to lose access to all city housing and community development funds); Don Lattin, Charities Balk at Domestic Partner, Open Meeting Laws, S.F. CHRON., July 10, 1998, at A-1 (describing how the Salvation Army lost $3.5 million in social service contracts with the City of San Francisco because it refused, on religious grounds, to provide benefits to the same-sex partners of its employees).

\(^{19}\) See Evans v. City of Berkeley, 38 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2006) (affirming revocation of a boat berth subsidy at public marina due to Boy Scouts’ exclusion of atheist and openly gay members); Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the Boy Scouts may be excluded from the state’s employee charitable contributions campaign for denying membership to openly gay individuals).
o Religious fraternal organizations or other nonprofits that object to same-sex marriage can be denied food service licenses, adoption agency licenses, child care licenses, or liquor licenses on the ground that they are engaged in unlawful discrimination.\textsuperscript{21}

o Religious colleges or professional schools can have their accreditation revoked for refusing to recognize the validity of same-sex marriages.\textsuperscript{22}

o Church-affiliated organizations can have their tax exempt status stripped because of their conscientious objection to same-sex marriage.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20}See, e.g., MD Code, Health Occupations, § 19-311.16 (giving the Maryland Board of Social Work Examiners the power to "deny a license to any applicant, fine a licensee, reprimand any licensee, place any licensee on probation, or suspend or revoke a license if the applicant or licensee" discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation); Stern at 22-24 (noting that a refusal to provide counseling services to same-sex couples could be "considered a breach of professional standards and therefore grounds for the loss of a professional license"); see also Patricia Wen, "They Cared for the Children": Amid Shifting Social Winds, Catholic Charities Prepares to End Its 103 Years of Finding Homes for Foster Children and Evolving Families, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2006, at A1 (explaining how Massachusetts threatened to revoke the adoption license of Catholic Charities for refusing on religious grounds to place foster children with same-sex couples); Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475 (2008) (describing dismissals and resignations of social services workers where conscience protections were not available).

\textsuperscript{21}See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-40 (forbidding adoption agencies from discriminating in the selection of adoptive parents on the basis of sex or marital status); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:122B-1.5 (forbidding foster care, or "resource care," agencies from discriminating against a resource parent applicant on the basis of gender or sexual orientation); see also Stern at 19-22 (noting that many state regulators condition licenses on compliance with anti-discrimination requirements).

\textsuperscript{22}Stern at 23 (describing how religiously affiliated law schools have unsuccessfully challenged diversity standards imposed by the American Bar Association as a condition of accreditation); D. Smith, Accreditation Committee Decides to Keep Religious Exemption, 33 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Jan. 2002) (describing a proposal of the American Psychology Association to revoke the accreditation of religious colleges and universities that have codes of conduct forbidding homosexual behavior), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan02/exemption.html.

\textsuperscript{23}Jill P. Capuzzo, Group Loses Tax Break Over Gay Union Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007 (describing the case of Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, in which New Jersey revoked the property tax exemption of a beach-side pavilion controlled by an historic Methodist organization, because it refused on religious grounds to host a same-sex civil union ceremony); Douglas W. Kmiec, Pepperdine Law School, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 107-21 (describing attacks on tax exemptions for religious organizations with objections to same-sex marriage); Jonathan Turley, George Washington University Law School, An Unholy Union in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 59-76 (arguing for same-sex marriage but against withdrawal of tax exemptions for religious organizations with conscientious objections).
All of these conflicts either did not exist before, or will significantly intensify after, the legalization of same-sex marriage. Thus, legalizing same-sex marriage without adequate protections for religious liberty will have at least two unintended consequences: It will harm religious organizations and individuals of conscience, and it will spawn costly, unnecessary conflicts, many of which will lead to litigation.\footnote{Filed lawsuits are often just the tip of the iceberg with respect to conflicts over a given law and a claimed right. Most conflicts get resolved before a suit is filed and comes to the attention of the public. Some employers will back down when suit is threatened. Others will pay a settlement and walk away. Some employers will be quietly “chilled” even though they would prefer another course of action. What matters is the number of conflicts rather than the number of lawsuits. This data is not available, however, and so cannot be empirically studied. Nonetheless, there need only be a few conflicts for there to be a crisis of conscience. Each conflict is a profound violation of religious liberty. Moreover, even assuming that there are a small number of actual conflicts (as some critics claim), then there will be a correspondingly few number of same-sex couples affected by the religious exemptions we recommend. Finally, discrimination lawsuits often increase dramatically over time, so an important question is how many lawsuits against conscientious objectors will be filed 20 years from now. \textit{See, e.g.}, Vivian Berger \textit{et al.}, \textit{Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits}, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. \& EMP. L.J. 45, 45 (2005) (“The number of employment discrimination lawsuits rose continuously throughout the last three decades of the twentieth century. In the federal courts, such filings grew 2000\% . . . .”).}

\section{D. The Need for Robust Religious Liberty Protection}

In January 2011, SB 116 and HB 55—The Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Protection Act—were introduced into the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee and House Judiciary Committee, respectively. This most recent attempt to legalize same-sex marriage offers \textit{no protection} to those with conscientious religious objections to same-sex marriage. Section 2 of the bills contain the following provision:

That an official of a religious institution or body authorized to solemnize marriages may not be required to solemnize any marriage in violation of the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Maryland Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights.\footnote{Senate Bill 116 § 2, \textit{available at} http://mlis.state.md.us/2011rs/bills/sb/sb0116f.pdf; House Bill 55 §2, \textit{available at} http://mlis.state.md.us/2011rs/bills/hb/hb0055f.pdf.}

As explained below, \textit{this provision provides less protection for religious liberty than every other state that has considered the issue}. By its own terms, section 2 confers on religious organizations only those protections already guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Maryland Constitution. Individual clergy or religious organizations who refuse to perform same-sex marriage receive ersatz protection, for they are already protected by the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, with or without this language, “[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them.”\footnote{Stern at 1.} Focusing on the issue of “forced
officiating” is entirely unnecessary and a distraction from real situations where religious conscience is at risk.

What section 2 leaves out is considerable:

- It provides no protection from the loss of government benefits for refusing to recognize a same-sex marriage.
- It provides no protection for individual objectors.
- It provides no protection to religious organizations from private lawsuits brought under Maryland’s anti-discrimination laws.

This legislation is grossly lacking as the following sections explain in more detail.

**E. No Protection from Government Penalty**

A good deal of misunderstanding surrounds religious liberty exemptions. Exemptions serve the important function of protecting conscientious objectors from private lawsuits. But exemptions also serve the purpose of insulating conscientious objectors from penalties at the hands of the government.27 How might this occur?

An objector may be penalized by losing access to government grant programs or other state or local benefits. Thus, in Catholic Charities of Maine v. City of Portland, the district court upheld a Portland ordinance that forced a religious charity either to extend employee spousal benefits to registered same-sex couples, or to lose eligibility to all city housing and community development funds.28 Similarly, the Salvation Army lost $3.5 million in social service contracts with the City of San Francisco because it refused, on religious grounds, to provide benefits to the same-sex partners of its employees.29 The Boy Scouts of America have litigated, and lost, numerous suits over a state’s authority to deny them access to benefits that others receive, when the law was otherwise silent.30

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28 304 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Me. 2004); see also footnote 17 above.


30 See Evans v. City of Berkeley, 38 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2006) (affirming revocation of a boat berth subsidy at public marina due to Boy Scouts’ exclusion of atheist and openly gay members); *Cradle of Liberty Council v. City of Philadelphia*, 2008 WL 4399025 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2008) (city terminated a lease with the Boy Scouts based on the Boy Scouts’ policies regarding homosexual conduct); *Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman*, 335 F.3d 80 (2nd Cir. 2003) (holding that the Boy Scouts may be excluded from the state’s workplace charitable contributions campaign for denying membership to openly gay individuals).
Church-affiliated organizations have lost their exemption from taxes as well. In New Jersey, the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, a group owned and operated by an historic Methodist organization, refused on religious grounds to host the same-sex civil union ceremonies of two lesbian couples in its beach-side pavilion.\(^\text{31}\) Local authorities stripped the group of their exemption from local property taxes, and billed them for $20,000.\(^\text{32}\)

The Camp Meeting Association did not just lose its tax exemption. It was also investigated by the New Jersey Department of Civil Rights for an alleged violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. In fact, the Department of Civil Rights has determined that probable cause exists to find a violation. Thus, the case is not only about losing tax exempt status, but also about being penalized for allegedly violating state anti-discrimination laws.\(^\text{33}\)

These results are possible because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in *Employment Division v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (concluding that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment no matter how much they burden an individual’s or organization’s exercise of religion). These outcomes demonstrate our point: legislative relief is needed to protect religious conscience.


Some exemption opponents argue that *Ocean Grove* is irrelevant to the same-sex marriage debate because the tax exemption at issue was conditioned upon the Camp Meeting Association’s willingness to open the property for the entire public. This argument, however, overlooks two points. First, while the tax exemption in *Ocean Grove* was based on an open-space requirement, nothing stops governments from conditioning tax exemptions on other things, such as compliance with state and local anti-discrimination laws or, more generally, being organized for the “public interest.” *Bob Jones Univ. v. United States*, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983). Thus, just as governments can strip a tax exemption because an organization cannot in good conscience open its property to the entire public, so also governments can strip a tax exemption because it concludes that an organization’s conscientious objection to same-sex marriage violates anti-discrimination laws or “public policy” more generally. Second, when the Camp Meeting Association agreed to open its property to the entire public, it likely never contemplated the legalization of civil unions or same-sex marriage, much less that it would be asked to facilitate such a marriage in violation of its religious beliefs. *Ocean Grove* thus illustrates the fact that legalizing same-sex marriage will create significant conflicts of conscience that were never contemplated before.

\(^\text{33}\) As the Third Circuit explained, “The federal complaint arose out of the DCR’s investigation into whether the Association’s refusal to permit couples to use the Boardwalk Pavilion for civil unions violates the LAD. Clearly, therefore, New Jersey’s interest in eliminating unlawful discrimination is at the center of this dispute.” *Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo*, 339 Fed.Appx. 232, 238 (3rd Cir. 2009).
These impacts on church-affiliated organizations, predicted by scholars,\textsuperscript{34} did not result from statutory revocations of tax-exempt status in civil union legislation. Instead, these actions occurred because state law offered no explicit exemption providing otherwise. These experiences drive home the need for explicit protection from penalties by the government.\textsuperscript{35}

F.  Needed Protection for Individual Objectors

Legal recognition of same-sex marriage can also place a real burden on individuals whose objection arises not from anti-gay animus, but from a sincere religious belief in traditional marriage.

SB 116 and HB 55 do not protect individuals who, for religious reasons, prefer to step aside from same-sex marriage ceremonies. Thus, a religious individual who runs a small business making wedding cakes in her home, a wedding photographer, a caterer, a florist, a reception hall owner, a seamstress, or a tailor, receives no protection at all.\textsuperscript{36} The failure to protect such individuals puts the individual to a cruel choice: your conscience or your livelihood.\textsuperscript{37}

Some assume that any religious objection to same-sex marriage must be an objection to providing goods or services to gays as such: in other words, that a refusal represents animus

\textsuperscript{34} Douglas W. Kmiec, Pepperdine Law School, \textit{Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion} in \textit{SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS} 107-21 (describing attacks on tax exemptions for religious organizations with objections to same-sex marriage); Jonathan Turley, George Washington University Law School, \textit{An Unholy Union} in \textit{SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS} 59-76 (arguing for same-sex marriage but against withdrawal of tax exemptions for religious organizations with conscientious objections).

\textsuperscript{35} To make matters worse, Maryland is one of only a handful of states, including Nebraska, New Jersey, and Oregon, that have both interpreted their state constitutional religious freedom protections narrowly and have declined to pass a state Religious Freedom Restoration Act. \textit{See Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen}, 925 A.2d 659, 661 (Md. 2007); \textit{Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh}, 363 Md. 565 (2001). \textit{See also In re Interest of Anaya}, 276 Neb. 825, 834-35 (2008); \textit{South Jersey Catholic School Teachers Organization v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School}, 150 N.J. 575 (1997); \textit{Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor and Industries}, 322 Or. 132 (1995).

Thus, religious objectors receive no generally available protection from state law and must instead rely on the narrow protections of the federal constitution under \textit{Employment Division v. Smith}, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). \textit{See} footnote 29 above.


\textsuperscript{37} Robin Fretwell Wilson, \textit{A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex Adoption}, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475 (2008) (describing dismissals and resignations of social service workers where conscience protections were not provided).
towards gay couples. Yet many people of good will view marriage as a religious institution and the wedding ceremony as a religious sacrament. For them, assisting with a marriage ceremony has religious significance that commercial services, like serving burgers and driving taxis, simply do not. They have no objection generally to providing services, but they object to directly facilitating a marriage.

In short, non-discrimination statutes enacted years ago now take on a whole new level of significance, with a much greater need for religious exemptions. A Marriage Bill that provides no protection to individual objectors (other than authorized celebrants, who are already protected by the Constitution) would effectively leave any individual who refuses to assist with same-sex wedding ceremonies open to suit, whether framed as sexual-orientation discrimination, sex discrimination, or, where applicable, marital-status discrimination.38

Of course, accommodating individual objectors might not be without cost for same-sex couples. Thus, we argue only for “hardship exemptions”—exemptions that are available only when there is no undue hardship on same-sex couples.39

G. No Robust and Uniform Protection for Religious Organizations

Maryland law prohibits discrimination based on, among other things, marital status, sex, and sexual orientation. Such discrimination is prohibited in a variety of areas—including

38 Refusals to provide benefits to same-sex partners have been invalidated in other jurisdictions as a form of gender or sex discrimination. For instance, in In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009) (Order of Reinhardt, J.), the court found an employer’s denial of coverage for an employee’s same-sex partner under the company’s employment benefits plan to be sex discrimination. As Judge Reinhardt explained:

There is no doubt that the denial of Levenson’s request that Sears be made a beneficiary of his federal benefits violated the EDR Plan’s prohibition on discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation. Levenson was unable to make his spouse a beneficiary of his federal benefits due solely to his spouse’s sex. If Sears were female, or if Levenson himself were female, Levenson would be able to add Sears as a beneficiary. Thus, the denial of benefits at issue here was sex-based and can be understood as a violation of the EDR Plan’s prohibition of sex discrimination.

See also In re Golinski, 2009 WL 2222884 at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2009) (Order of Kozinski, C.J.) same-sex spouses raised difficult constitutional questions regarding sex discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality op.) (discrimination by state agai construing Ninth Circuit benefits policy to include same-sex spouses because denial of benefits to nst same-sex marriage was form of sex-based discrimination); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 436-40 (Cal. 2008) (same-sex marriage proponents pursued gender discrimination claims ultimately rejected by court); cf. Wis. STAT. § 111.36(1)(d) (defining sexual-orientation discrimination as a form of gender discrimination).

39 See Part A above.
employment, housing, and public accommodations—with only very narrow, if any, exemptions for religious organizations.

As explained in Part C above, these nondiscrimination laws can prompt lawsuits against religious organizations that, for religious reasons, cannot recognize or facilitate a same-sex marriage. For example, a nonprofit social service organization, like a Catholic hospital, could be sued for refusing to provide its employees with same-sex spousal benefits in violation of its religious beliefs; religious day care centers, retreat centers, counseling centers, or adoption agencies could be punished under public accommodations laws for refusing to offer their facilities or services to members of a same-sex marriage; or a religious organization that dismisses an employee, such as a youth counselor, for entering into a same-sex marriage can be sued under employment discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status.

Current legislative attempts in Maryland to legalize same-sex marriage would provide much less protection than every other jurisdiction where the legislature has considered the issue. Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the District of Columbia have all enacted same-sex marriage laws, and all provide much more protection for religious liberty than does Maryland. Each of those states protects religious organizations from being forced to offer “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges” related to a marriage when doing so would violate their religious beliefs. Thus, while the protections in Connecticut, New

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43 See footnote 7 above.
44 See, e.g., footnotes 16-18, above.
45 CONN. PUBLIC ACT NO. 09-13 (2009) §§ 17-19, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm (exempting religious organizations from “provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges … related to” the “solemnization” or “celebration” of a marriage, and providing separate exemptions for religious adoption agencies and fraternal benefit societies); N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:37 (exempting religious organizations from “provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges … related to” the “solemnization,” “celebration,” or “promotion” of a marriage); 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 4502(l) (2009) (exempting religious organizations from “provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges … related to” the “solemnization” or “celebration” of a marriage).
46 Id.
Hampshire, Vermont, and the District of Columbia also fall short in key areas, they still provide far more protection than.

**Conclusion**

Without adequate safeguards for religious liberty of the sort proposed in this letter, the recognition of same-sex marriage will lead to socially divisive and entirely unnecessary conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty. That is a needless and destructive path where both sides lose. There is a balanced “middle way.” The Maryland General Assembly should avoid either extreme and be the peacemaker. On that note, we would welcome any opportunity to provide further information, analysis, or testimony to the General Assembly.

Respectfully yours,

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48 Academic and organizational affiliation is indicated for identification purposes only. The universities and organizations that employ the signers take no position on this or any other bill.